Xeigul

Hmm, I’m not sure how you perceive my relationship with Mr. Itagaki, but I can tell you it’s likely different from what you imagine. Let me provide a general overview and some key topics regarding my history with Mr. Itagaki. However, consider this a warning. What follows is content that would normally be covered in media interview articles, and I’d strongly advise any impatient fighting game fans out there to stop reading now. No, scratch that—this is a serious warning. If you have a typical level of patience and common sense, you’re better off not reading further. If you do, there’s a high chance you’ll either give up midway, fall asleep, or subject yourself to the pain of endless scrolling—even on a 100-inch tall vertical smartphone screen. Even then, I’ve omitted most of the events and focused only on the major incidents. Let me make this clear: I’ve warned you ahead of time. If anyone dares to respond with “too long” after this, they’ll be sent straight to their ancestors’ graves and permanently muted. Why? Because I specifically said, “Don’t read this.” Now, what I’m about to discuss happened during the old Namco era and has almost nothing to do with the post-merger Bandai Namco era. So, younger generations and employees who joined after the Bandai Namco merger, consider yourselves exempt from this context. Also, please forgive any translation errors or nuances that I might have misinterpreted—I’m still stuck at the English level of my university days. Yes, I’ve warned you about everything. You should not read further. You’ll regret it if you do. [[ 1. First Contact ]]-- It was during the 1990s when the first Dead or Alive (DOA) was announced. On the way back from a game show, I happened to run into SEGA’s Virtua Fighter (VF) team (who would later become the heads of SEGA-AM2) at a station. Coincidentally, Mr. Itagaki also appeared. The key people behind VF, Tekken, and DOA were all there by chance, so we decided to take advantage of the opportunity and went out for drinks at an izakaya in Shinjuku. At the izakaya, I and two members of SEGA-AM2 got into an animated discussion about shared technical topics. At the time, Namco shared some animation control techniques with SEGA through engineers we had headhunted from SEGA. Of course, just a few years later, the Tekkenproject independently developed its own animation control technology from scratch. (The knowledge and foundational technologies developed by the Tekkenproject at that time would become the very origins of Bandai Namco’s human action development technologies today. Surprisingly, many Bandai Namco employees are unaware of this fact: Tekken is the ancestor of Bandai Namco’s polygon-era animation and action control technologies. Without this foundation, it’s self-evident we wouldn’t have been able to co-develop Super Smash Bros.with Mr. Sakurai). Mr. Itagaki listened with great interest as I and the SEGA executives discussed these topics. Later, we all bonded over casual, non-work-related chatter about games. One moment stands out even after nearly 30 years: Mr. Itagaki said to me, “Mr. Harada, you’re a really approachable and funny person.” At that time, Mr. Itagaki still addressed me using polite language (and of course, I did the same for him). In other words, we didn’t know much about each other yet, and our relationship was very professional and gentlemanly at the time. [[ 2. What Itagaki Discovered ]]-- A few months after the VF, Tekken, and DOA drinking session, I happened to run into Mr. Itagaki again at another gaming event. He approached me and said, “Harada, you’re from Waseda University, aren’t you? I also went to Waseda, and our time there overlapped. That makes you my junior.” I responded, “I might be your junior, but I don’t think we were there at the same time.” However, he said, “No, I was so busy with mahjong every day that it took me seven years to graduate. I’m sure we were there at the same time. In fact, I remember seeing you during our university days. You were the captain of the yacht racing team, weren’t you?” Yes, Mr. Itagaki had thoroughly researched my background and discovered that I was his junior. From then on, he started referring to me as his junior and speaking to me in the casual tone of a senior addressing a junior, dropping the polite language entirely. [[ 3. The Beginning of Itagaki’s Media Strategy ]]- Mr. Itagaki wasn’t just a game designer or director; more than anything, he was starting to show his prowess as a producer. This became clear to me after he left Tecmo when he explicitly told me as much. Back then, he began seriously thinking about how to elevate DOA to surpass Tekken in terms of marketing and branding. Let’s rewind a bit to the past. During that time, the arcade gaming market was still thriving. SEGA and Namco were the two giants dominating the Japanese arcade market. Not only did they develop games, but they also operated their own arcade chains domestically and internationally, managing a significant share of game distribution and publishing as well. Mr. Itagaki recognized that Tecmo couldn’t compete against this level of marketing and publishing power. As a result, he explored media strategies using not only print magazines but also the emerging internet media of the time. Despite his outwardly emotional demeanor, Mr. Itagaki had a very cool and calculated eye for analyzing resources and strategy. Among his various strategies, one was to deliberately “bite” at Tekken to draw media attention. In doing so, he even called me out by name and criticized Tekken’s game design and other aspects. Let me emphasize: this was just one of the many strategies he employed, not his only approach. [[ 4. An Uneven Relationship ]]-- Due to the media strategy I just described, the Tekken project team was initially baffled. In one magazine, for instance, Mr. Itagaki used a two-page spread to openly criticize Tekken and my name, delivering a highly aggressive interview. In overseas magazines and internet media, especially in Western gaming outlets, the attacks escalated further, with harsher criticism of both Tekken and myself. Meanwhile, I was ordered by my superiors at Namco to remain completely silent. In other words, I was strictly forbidden to respond in any way to Mr. Itagaki’s attacks. This dynamic of “Harada remains silent while Itagaki attacks” lasted for about ten years, roughly from the late 1990s until around 2007, after the release of DOA4at the end of 2005. Looking back, it’s clear that under these circumstances, there was absolutely no chance for Mr. Itagaki and me to develop a friendly relationship. In fact, during those ten years, I spent much of my time wondering, “Why is Mr. Itagaki so fixated on targeting and attacking me?” [[ 5. The Sudden Summons Incident ]]-- Let’s rewind to 1998. Out of the blue, Mr. Itagaki called Namco directly and asked for me by name. As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Itagaki had already started his media strategy of targeting Tekken and had learned that I was his junior from university. Given the strained relationship I had with him at the time, his call left me deeply confused. Cautiously, I picked up the phone. He said, “Could you come to Tecmo’s headquarters? Just you, alone.” It reminded me of getting summoned by a delinquent upperclassman behind the school building back in middle school. For a moment, I considered declining, but in the end, my curiosity got the better of me. I agreed to his request and headed to Tecmo’s headquarters the following day, alone. When I arrived, Mr. Itagaki himself greeted me and led me into a small room. There, I saw something covered with a cloth that looked like an arcade cabinet. Like a magician performing a stage act, he dramatically removed the cover with a flourish. Underneath was an arcade cabinet and CRT monitor, revealing something for the first time: the development build of DOA2,which had not yet been announced (it would debut in arcades a year later in the fall of 1999). “You’re the first outsider to see this screen,” he said. More than the game itself, I was bewildered by his magician-like presentation. That aside, he had two main purposes for summoning me. First, he wanted to sell more DOA2boards to the arcade market. At the time, SEGA and Namco were the two largest buyers of arcade boards due to their extensive arcade chains. Normally, he would have approached Namco’s sales team, but he felt that wasn’t enough. Instead, he sought validation from a developer like me, hoping my endorsement would lead to Namco purchasing more DOA2 boards. Second, he wanted to gauge DOA2’sperformance and see how the Tekken project would react. If I so much as scoffed at DOA2, he would take it as evidence that Tekkenhad superior technology and confidence. On the other hand, if I showed any signs of being impressed or unsettled, he would use that as a benchmark to compare Team Ninja’s position to the Tekkenproject. After presenting the concept briefly, he said, “Alright, give it a try!” When I pressed the start button, he sat down right next to me, as if we were about to face off. I chose Kasumi under his unspoken pressure and began playing. Just seconds into the match, after pressing the punch button three times, he asked, “Well? What do you think?” I was completely thrown off. What could I possibly judge after only a few seconds? I instinctively replied, “It feels good to play.” I expected him to retort with, “How could you know after just a few seconds?” Instead, he responded with: “See? I told you, Harada.” At that moment, I was genuinely confused. Was he serious? Was this some kind of hidden-camera prank? To be fair, DOA2 was already demonstrating impressive technical achievements for its time, even in its unfinished state. However, his insistence on immediate feedback and constant explanations while I played left me overwhelmed with information. Later, I learned from a former Team Ninja member that after my visit, Itagaki returned to the development floor and declared, “Today, we beat Tekken.” While I was merely startled by his approach, he took it as proof that I was overwhelmed by DOA2’sperformance. [[ 6. Itagaki’s Analysis and Strategy ]]-- Later, Mr. Itagaki explained to me that he had felt a significant sense of accomplishment from his media strategy at the time. His aggressive stance against rival titles clearly led to a significant increase in readership, especially in Western gaming media. He told me that this approach, while unpopular in Japan—where comparative advertising was frowned upon—was highly effective overseas. Additionally, Itagaki was known by some for his vast knowledge of global history and military affairs, particularly World War II. He likened the relationship between DOA and Tekken to warfare. He believed that winning a war required thorough reconnaissance of the enemy’s resources, so he conducted a detailed analysis of the Tekken project’s capabilities. In his personal office, he even displayed a chart analyzing Namco’s Tekken project team’s strength. He began with the game staff credits, meticulously investigating the educational background, career history, skills, and achievements of the individuals listed. (This was how he discovered, as mentioned earlier, that I was his junior at Waseda University.) He also analyzed the order in which names appeared in the credits, finding patterns like this: those listed at the top of each unit were not necessarily core technical contributors. Instead, they were likely managers skilled in people management or senior staff moving away from hands-on work. According to Itagaki, my presence as a young team leader at the time didn’t align with these patterns, which made me stand out as an unusual figure to keep tabs on. He was correct in his assessment. At the time, I was privileged to work with brilliant individuals, some 10 years my senior, including directors and programmers regarded as geniuses. These senior colleagues provided me with exceptional support, allowing me to lead game design in an environment where I was, in a sense, “spoiled.” They often asked, “Harada, what do you want to do? What do you need? We’ll provide anything.” It was an extraordinary setup that made me something of an anomaly in the industry. When our rivalry ended, Mr. Itagaki showed me his analysis chart during a later conversation, and I was astonished by its accuracy. It identified key figures in the Tekken project who were instrumental at the time. Seeing it left me with an eerie feeling. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the gaming industry had yet to establish sophisticated marketing analyses, Itagaki had a detailed understanding of Tekken’s sales figures and customer demographics. Using this data, he developed strategies to elevate DOA’s brand recognition by directly opposing Tekken in the media. At the same time, his product development strategy avoided head-on collisions with Tekken.Instead, he identified “needs that Tekken didn’t fulfill” and areas where DOA could excel technically, crafting a distinct direction for his game. This is why DOA ultimately offered gameplay and targeted a market audience different from Tekken’s. [[ 7. After the War ]]-- After Mr. Itagaki left Tecmo in 2008, he called me again. At the time, our dynamic hadn’t changed much from the previous ten years—I still perceived our relationship as adversarial. Yet, there he was, calling me once again. He invited me to dinner, where he shared that he had left Tecmo. During the meal, he said something surprising: “Harada, you were my comrade-in-arms.” I realized then that this was how he saw our relationship. He explained his strategies and thoughts from that time in detail, stating explicitly: “I never had any grudge against you, Namco, or Tekken. On the contrary, I respected you all. When I compared the power dynamics in development, sales, and publishing, it was clear that a straightforward approach wouldn’t work. I had to employ every strategy I could. I’m sorry for everything.” Then, he turned the tables and asked about Tekken’sstrategies, particularly in terms of production, branding, and marketing. I explained many things but emphasized this: Since the 1990s, I’ve been visiting arcade venues worldwide to see how players were engaging with my games. I also met with numerous arcade operators and distributors. Around the late ’90s, I quickly noticed the rapid decline of the arcade market in the West (arcades were shutting down at an alarming rate). This signaled that the battleground for fighting games was shifting from arcades to home consoles. More importantly, the value of “one play for 100 yen” (or 25 cents in the US) was disappearing. The incentive for the winning player to keep playing on a single coin was fading, as was the risk of losing coins for the losing player. This fundamentally changed the value perception of fighting games as a form of entertainment. Realizing this, we shifted Tekken’sstrategy toward establishing fighting games as a viable product for home consoles (As you may know, TEKKEN was ahead of its time in the genre, having developed and released modes like Tekken Ball (which came before DOA Beach Volleyball), belt-action modes such as TEKKEN FORCE, and pre-rendered movies and story campaign modes that went beyond the typical scope of fighting games). In addition to this, I explained to him how I became aware of the emergence of "community events," especially in North America, as arcades began to decline. At that time, these events were at a grassroots level. They ranged from small gatherings at someone’s house to tournaments held in university halls or community centers. Over time, they grew into larger tournaments hosted in hotel ballrooms and gymnasiums. I recognized the potential of these events early on and began providing behind-the-scenes support to those communities. Specifically, we offered free rentals of arcade cabinets and game boards, took care of transport and setup, and occasionally provided small prizes like posters for tournament winners. In fact, many veteran players in their 40s and 50s today may not have known my name or who I was back then, but some might remember seeing me quietly setting up arcade machines at venues (without even wearing sunglasses back then). During this time, Street Fighter had gone into a decade-long hibernation following Street Fighter III, and the decline of arcades accelerated as gaming markets shifted. Even as other fighting game series disappeared, I focused on maintaining both an active home console market and a foothold in the Asian arcade market. In fact, the method of constantly releasing new games in the series without a break, and using the huge profits made from arcade boards and in-game purchases to fund the development of console versions, was surprisingly able to continue all the way up to Tekken 7. This included supporting the grassroots tournament community (the FGC, or Fighting Game Community) to keep our business and development ongoing. At the time, I can confidently say that very few developers were paying attention to the growing tournament scene in the West. How do I know this? Because during those years, I was often the only Japanese developer on-site, personally delivering cabinets and boards or observing events. While marketing representatives from various companies were present, I rarely saw other developers engaging directly with these communities. This approach allowed Tekken to continue its numbered releases steadily, even through the "winter" of the arcade market. While the Virtua Fighter series fell silent, we expanded into the Western market and secured a significant share. I believed that when I faced my own hardships, no one would come to my aid, but the support from an external entity—namely, the core fighting game community in the market—would be the only thing I could rely on. I told Mr. Itagaki that I had kept this strategy under wraps—neither sharing it with other teams in the company nor discussing it with developers from other companies. I simply worked on it quietly. Upon hearing this, he was surprised and said, “What? That’s not what a developer is supposed to do! Really? You’re more action-oriented than I expected.” It seemed that he had a stereotypical image of game developers born in the 1970s as people who stayed in their offices, glued to monitors, endlessly coding. To be fair, that was also part of my work, but by the late 1990s, I was using the development downtime between projects to travel around the world. [[[ Putting an End to the Conflict ]]-- Through this exchange of past strategies, I finally resolved my long-standing feud with Mr. Itagaki. This happened in late 2008. After that, every year-end, I’d receive a drunken phone call from him, which became something of a tradition. (That said, I haven’t received one in the last few years, come to think of it.)

Okay, since it's lunchtime, let's talk a little about the differences between Soul Calibur (Project Soul) and TEKKEN Project. Before we get to that subject, you mention "game mechanics" as a prime example of how to talk about the survival of a game, but things are not that simple. In the case of fighting games, if the arcade game market was in its heyday and the income of "one coin per play" was important, it was still the case, but in the home video game market, the only people who can reach an evaluation of game mechanics are those who have already purchased the game, and the paradigm shift in the business model of games has changed the marketing of games itself. The paradigm shift in the business model of games has changed marketing itself in games. In other words, the world of marketing has changed to a world where the question is how to create a situation where people want to buy a game before they play it, and they do buy it, and how to increase the pre-release evaluation and the number of initial sales. In talking about historical video game franchises, the shift in marketing and branding due to the paradigm shift in business models cannot be overlooked, and many people who have been in the industry for a long time will probably agree with my simple explanation. On top of that, of course, it is important to evaluate game mechanics. It is important to have game mechanics that can be played for a long time, because it is a factor that affects the sales beat after the initial launch, and it is a factor that will work like a body blow in the long run. However, it is too naïve and innocent a point of view to leave everything to game mechanics when talking about the survival of a game franchise. If they are so innocent, why did that game title that was so fun to play disappear? Where are those arcade titles that we were so crazy about? Where did that fighting game franchise with those great mechanics go? Why did that fighting game with those good mechanics disappear? There are so many titles that have disappeared, that didn't sell despite their highly regarded game mechanics, that are literally dying (people around 45~55 years old today should remember, how many fighting games were there in the 90's? And each of them had reasonably well-received mechanics, More to the point, there must have been some titles you rated as having much better mechanics than TEKKEN!). Yes, The fact that a series with no good game mechanics has disappeared may be on one hand, but it should not be the only reason. While it is true that games with better mechanics will be loved and survive longer, you are not so naïve as to believe that, and you understand that the world is not simple. Especially in this day and age when there are so many choices of games, marketing is becoming more and more important as it is the key to sales. And back to the point...you said... "If Soul Calibur II had a director as loyal (or better said long term?) as @Harada_TEKKEN" While this is a hypothetical, it is not an industry theory, as it is also a theory of consequence. However, after observing the industry for 30 years, I can say that in the case of fighting games, there have been many instances in which a series has stagnated or ceased to exist when a key player in the franchise leaves or disappears. and the reasons for the disappearance of these key persons are often not only their own problems. And in the case of Soul Calibur, I can assure you, having seen it up close and personal, that this is the case. This was not simply a matter of sales and marketing, but I can tell you that the organizational changes and decision makers at Namco Bandai had a great deal to do with it. I was one of the support personnel for the planning and debugging of SC's predecessor, Soul Edge (Soul Blade), and have since served as Co-Director for SC IV, but I have basically been in the position of maintaining a certain distance from the SC franchise. In the past, the SC series had a strong leader named Yotoriyama (who was also once the Animation Team Leader of TEKKEN), and above all, the team of engineers was more knowledgeable about Fighting Game than TEKKEN, and had excellent programming skills. The TEKKEN Project had been called "a group of outlaw", "Bellicist" since the days of the old Namco, and was a unique group in the development department, but Project Soul was an elite group, a sophisticated development team. At the dawn of the polygon era, Namco and SEGA were leading the video game industry, and rivalries were intensifying. In a similar vein, the rivalry between TEKKEN Project and Project Soul was intensifying. I was in the same game designer department as Yotorityama of Project Soul, but we had friction to the point where we fought daily (That was just the first 10 years, and we were very close after that. BTW, He quit Bandai Namco), and TEKKEN and SC were always rivals within the company as well. More so than people can imagine. The two projects had different visions, different development policies, and very different ways of thinking about the brand. It is not that we hated each other. However, they were such rivals that it was not surprising to think so. However, even though they were very different at the time, they had a clear vision for each other. Yotoriyama always said, "There is no point in putting the needs of TEKKEN into Soul Calibur," and I agreed with him. However, our policies clashed with each other in the debate over whether it was a good thing for [A fighting game of the same company] to have "lever guards" or "button guards," for example (Discussion of....Is it good that they are products of the [Same Company], yet different there?). Ah...I will tell you another time how Tomonobu Itagaki, who was Tecmo at the time, adopted a hybrid lever/button guard system for DOA, and how he called me into his office and proudly presented it to me (By the way, he and I attended the same University). Whatever the case, Project Soul certainly had a leader and staff with "soul" and "clear vision. The enthusiasm of the game designers on site could have surpassed that of the TEKKEN team, and it was enough to make us feel impatient. If Project Soul had been able to maintain that structure, I sometimes wonder if things might be a little different today. When the paradigm shift from the arcade market to the console market occurred, SC's console version was outperforming TEKKEN in the North American market and had a high technical reputation. On the other hand, TEKKEN had grown to be an immovable object that earned overwhelming top income in the arcade game market, and in home use, it was a title that sold less than SC in North America and was characterized by "wide sales in many countries in all regions. SC was always seen as having a promising future, even within Namco, and was considered to be capable of expanding beyond the realm of Fighting Game in a rather global perspective. Even I, at the time, had a certain appreciation for the hypothetical possibilities. However, as you all know, as the industry expanded, it became larger and larger, and companies merged with each other. Bandai Namco is no exception, and has changed for "better or for worse. As you know, Japanese game companies and the IT industry do not have the same organizational systems as those found on the West Coast of North America. There are not many presidents or directors with engineering or game designer backgrounds, and most of them have a "sales/sales" background, or are management professionals, or come from banks, in other words, people with excellent "organizational management" skills have become decision makers. This is not a snide remark, but a fact. One thing is for sure: "They are not familiar with game development, game branding, or the game community. For example, on the West Coast of the U.S., each position has its own board of directors, but this is not the practice in Japan. As a result, what happens in the case of major game companies is that the management and operation of game companies is focused on "organizational management" and "Human Capital, Capital Available, Resources. Within this framework, game developers will do their best. But what will be the career roadmap for game developers? The career path of a game developer who focuses on "organizational management" and "Human Capital, Capital Available, Resources" results in "becoming a manager of an organization. This is a phrase that many of the leaders of each part of the Ace Combat Project, both we at TEKKEN Project and Project Soul, have actually been asked, "How long are you going to be in the field? When are you going to become a manager?" And, "When will you be the manager of the organization? "How long will you be a creator? (Yeah, that was directed at the director of Ace Combat.)" No one in the organization at the time was asking, "When are you going to grow up to be a great game developer?" Literally, not one person talked about the career path of a game developer. It was all about management and administration, and it was true that this was not an organization that could properly evaluate the content of games and their value. And by "becoming a manager of an organization," he meant that one should not stick to one thing forever, but should broaden one's perspective to every department, division, and business. In fact, at the time, the only way to advance one's career was under such a system. Broadening one's horizons" sounded good, but in game development, it was the opposite of "pursuing a single path" or "mastering something. Also, at that time, the concept of job rotation was widespread, based on the idea of "broadening one's horizons, growing as a manager leading any department or any division or business, and contributing to the expansion of the company. It was originally intended for younger employees, but as a result, it was undoubtedly one of the factors that gave rise to the trend that "working only on a specific game or a specific genre of work forever is not a career development and is not valued. Then the phenomenon of people leaving various titles and series as if they were being peeled off began to occur. Each time a project's key players were peeled away, the big dreams and visions that the project once held became weaker. Project Soul was struggling to survive (or so it seemed to me), especially among its younger members. However, it seems that it was difficult for them to maintain their vision, will, and organizational structure now that they are no longer in the game development-centered world of the past, but rather "a game development team that is just one of all the businesses in the group companies. At the same time, of course, this was happening to me in the same situation. First, the company was split into a development company and a publishing company, and I became of the publishing company member, but also the head of a new department called Global Business Development, which had nothing to do with game development (none of my subordinates were in development, they were all marketing staff). This meant that from a company organizational point of view, I was out of the TEKKEN Project, both in terms of the company itself, its divisions and departments, and its budget management.This was not my idea, of course, but was decided by the management at the time according to the company policy I mentioned earlier. And while this might have put me on a career path...I had something else in mind entirely. I made the decision to lead the TEKKEN Project despite the fact that I was in a different company, department, and division, and had no budget authority. I practically manipulated the creative and budget planning. Why? I knew, that the soil and currents of such a large organization "just happen from Things that are happening due to delusions caused by the group mind And a head appointed solely for career advancement, with no love for that game title and no long term vision, cannot be good for the survival of the series or the fan community". And we, TEKKEN Project, always said that "the rights to the title belong to the company, but the fan community can only rely on the team that has the will to make the game". So, from the very beginning, I decided to completely break the "rule of tacit understanding in a company". So, I decided to continue to play the role of "TEKKEN Project leader," which was not directly related to my original duties, and proceeded with the development as an independent team "with independent decision making as a team beyond the boundaries of the company or organization" with the team members who became a separate company (this move was very much disliked by the publisher department heads must have been very uncomfortable with it. Yeah, he hated me so much). Yes, as mentioned above, we, TEKKEN Project, were called a"a group of outlaw", "Bellicist". So we survived as the only group with independent decision making in the great tide of group companies (Now recognized as an official organization). If there is only one major difference between Project Soul and the other companies, this is the only one. There are many titles that have disappeared in the course of these past transitions. There are no obvious villains in that history. They are all being chipped away in the course of a larger trend. However, I think... me and the TEKKEN Project, were Evil in the eyes of the group companies. In TEKKEN, Heihachi and Kazuya say "A fight is about who's left standing. Nothing else." ....and This line used to be my motto. I kept this in mind throughout our rivalry with Soul Calibur, and even when the market for 3D fighting games was becoming increasingly competitive, I continued to tell my team, "No matter how you do it, the last one standing wins," And this motto remained unchanged even in the midst of the major trends that occurred within the group companies (I understand that there were some board member who were not happy about it, and I received quite a few complaints). So we were never obedient, but always a wicked group with a strong will (I've realized through these experiences that, unfortunately, I probably have a bad personality). I think this was the only difference between TEKKEN Project and Project Soul. I think that the fact that the number of members who had the drive to keep the title alive, even if they had to jump through all kinds of pressure, decreased as the organization changed, and that is one of the aspects that weakened Project Soul little by little. I am not saying that is all But it was a big factor. Happened due to organizational policy, not individual problems. But from my point of view, I don't think the fire of Project Soul has been extinguished. There are still a few people in the company who have the will to do it. I would like to believe that they are just not united now.