I think Tony is 100% correct. But I also think the collective-bargaining discussion routinely understates how exceptionally difficult the architecture is in college sports. FWIW, I continue to think the only realistic path to systemic collective bargaining runs through Congress. And advocates in this space may have a once-in-a-generation opportunity right now to build a workable bargaining framework. So here is a small-scale model that MIGHT work — and, perhaps more importantly, illustrates the problems you immediately encounter even when you deliberately choose what should be the easiest possible test case. Start with basketball (because of the smaller roster size). Start with one conference. The Big East may be the perfect laboratory. Here's the model. The conference creates a separate private entity: Big East Basketball, LLC. The schools do not leave the Big East. Nothing changes about admissions, academics, NCAA membership, scheduling or Madison Square Garden. But Big East Basketball becomes the employer of the men's basketball players — and, importantly, the coaches and basketball staff. A player enrolls at Villanova, Georgetown, UConn, etc., but signs an employment contract with Big East Basketball and is assigned to that school's team. The LLC receives the relevant basketball revenue, makes payroll, hires the basketball workforce and actually operates basketball. Why go to all that trouble? Because the LLC needs to control the subjects it is promising to bargain over. If Villanova technically puts its players on the LLC payroll but still employs the coach who controls practices, playing time, discipline, roster decisions and the day-to-day basketball workplace, Villanova risks remaining a joint employer. That isn't necessarily fatal. But it defeats much of the point of creating one private employer — particularly once pesky UConn enters the picture — and makes it harder for the LLC to bargain comprehensively over working conditions it does not actually control. That's why I think the coaches have to move too. The basketball company needs to be the genuine operational employer, not merely a payroll processor for eleven university-run teams. The coaches don't end up in the players' bargaining unit. Head coaches would almost certainly be statutory supervisors; assistant-coach status would depend on their actual authority. Then comes organizing — another part people skip. The Big East cannot simply create a "players association" and start negotiating with it. The PLAYERS have to select their representative. So assume the players independently organize the Big East Basketball Players Association, demonstrate majority support, and Big East Basketball voluntarily recognizes it. Then bargain one CBA. Maybe it provides: — $75,000 minimum salary — $3 million team payroll cap — individually negotiated salaries within that cap — guaranteed educational benefits — health and injury protections — limits on mandatory basketball activity — one-year employment contracts — collectively bargained free-agency/transfer rules — tampering rules — grievance and neutral arbitration — genuine third-party NIL outside the cap. The numbers are illustrative. The architecture is the point. And now we potentially solve a very big problem. A $3 million payroll limit is no longer simply eleven competing basketball programs agreeing among themselves not to pay players more. It is a compensation term negotiated between an employer and the employees' exclusive bargaining representative. That gives you a dramatically stronger nonstatutory labor-exemption argument. But even THAT isn't magic. The labor exemption is strongest when we're talking about wages, hours and working conditions negotiated between the actual employer and the actual union. The farther the arrangement reaches into independent NIL markets, NCAA eligibility rules or restrictions affecting nonparties, the harder the analysis becomes. That's why genuine outside NIL stays outside the payroll cap. Next problem: UConn. This is a major reason for using the LLC in the first place. The NLRA excludes states and political subdivisions. UConn cannot simply be treated like Villanova for NLRA purposes. But if Big East Basketball genuinely employs the players and controls the basketball workplace, the UConn player and Villanova player have the same private employer. Even if UConn were later found to be a joint employer, that would not automatically eliminate NLRB jurisdiction over the private LLC. But it would complicate the model enormously. You now have a public university exercising authority over subjects the private employer is supposed to bargain about, plus Connecticut public-sector law and university-governance questions. So the objective isn't simply "avoid joint employment." It is to make sure the entity at the bargaining table actually possesses the authority necessary to make the bargain. Then there is another Big East-specific jurisdictional issue hiding in plain sight: religion. Many Big East institutions are religiously affiliated. Existing Board doctrine limits NLRB jurisdiction in parts of religious higher education. That doctrine does not answer the athlete question, but if the universities themselves become the players' employers or joint employers, you may invite an entirely separate First Amendment/NLRA fight. Again, an independent basketball company helps. But notice the pattern: every reason to make the LLC MORE independent creates another problem. Because now you encounter NCAA institutional control. Labor law pushes you toward: "The LLC really controls the basketball workplace." NCAA governance pushes you toward: "The university really controls its athletics program." That is a genuine structural tension. You would have to draw the line carefully: universities retain admissions, academics, student conduct, NCAA compliance and institutional oversight; the LLC controls employment and basketball operations. Maybe that works. Maybe the NCAA has to interpret or modify its institutional-control rules. But you cannot simply ignore it. Then comes House. Where does a salary paid by Big East Basketball go? If it is attributable back to Villanova, Georgetown, UConn, etc., you need a mechanism for charging it against the appropriate institutional House allocation. If it isn't attributable to the schools, you need an answer for why a conference-created entity paying athletes for basketball services isn't simply an end run around the settlement structure. Calling the LLC a "third party" doesn't solve that. Then transfers and admissions. A CBA can create free agency as an employment matter. It cannot force Georgetown to admit somebody. Nor can it unilaterally rewrite whatever NCAA eligibility rules remain applicable. So "free agency" really means a contractual right to leave one team and seek assignment to another — conditioned on admission, enrollment and eligibility. Then immigration. This one may be brutal. F-1 students have tightly constrained employment authorization. Now ask whether a student employed by Big East Basketball to practice, travel to Omaha, play at Madison Square Garden and perform basketball services around the country fits comfortably within those rules. International players are not a rounding error. You need a real immigration solution. And I haven't even gotten to tax, Title IX, workers' compensation, wage-and-hour law, unemployment, benefits administration and multistate employment law. None of this means the model can't work. But it illustrates why hot takes about "resisting collective bargaining" are simultaneously correct and radically incomplete. Collective bargaining potentially solves one of college sports' biggest problems: it creates a mechanism through which athletes can agree to compensation restraints and other employment terms that schools have enormous antitrust difficulty imposing unilaterally. But before you ever get to the CBA, you still have to answer: Who employs the players? Who actually controls the work? Who employs the coaches? Who is in the bargaining unit? How do public universities participate? What about religious universities? How much control can schools surrender? How does House treat the compensation? How do international athletes legally work? What happens under Title IX? How far does the labor exemption reach? IMO, that is why the Big East is such an interesting thought experiment. Small scale. One sport. One conference. One employer. One union. One CBA. And still a half-dozen legal regimes collide before anyone tips off.