This language and the Trump administrationâs deplorable conduct in Venezuela undermines American credibility and influence across the region and around the world, and thereby directly impinges on U.S. national security interests.
President Donald Trump referred to Venezuela as an âacquisitionâ while touting an increasing supply of US energy he said will benefit American allies including the Philippines. bloomberg.com/news/articles/âŚ
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It's become pretty clear that, at base, those who argue in favor of selling chips or compute to China, despite the national security risks, are motivated primarily by the money.
They often argue, as here, that this money is not only a legitimate competing interest, but rationalize that this money is important to help fund American innovationâand that those in favor of restrictions aren't sufficiently weighing the economic costs.
But this is absurd. It's like being the German auto makers 5 or 10 years ago arguing that continued "partnership" with China was key to their economic interests. It is...until it isn't.
There is a purely *economic* argument for both technology and trade restrictions. It's just one that looks past this quarter's revenue/profit and thinks about the long term structure of global industrial clusters and the health of the overall global trading system.
The reason that China is such a large and attractive market for such technologies is, in part, because the world continues to buy so much stuff from China, giving them money to buy some stuff back from the rest of the world (and save the rest). Had the last 30 years of policy been more thoughtful, that demand (and supply) could have been cultivated in trading partners that neither use their earnings to coerce and threaten us, nor insist on mercantilist economics which has already obliterated so many of our industries.
So anyone making an economic argument against technology and trade restrictions needs to talk about the medium and long term economic effects and what kind of global trading system they are seeking. Until then, these arguments appear to be just flimsy cover for private self interest.
Ten days into the Jensen Huang controversy, and the media is finally getting around to asking what restricting Chinaâs access to older-generation Nvidia chipsâwhose computing capabilities China can approximate by networking domestically produced chipsâcould actually cost the West.
Open secret - there is a tendency, among some of Washingtonâs China hawks, to regard business complaints about the costs of their zero-sum policies as evidence that those policies are working.
Binary gonna binary.
These policies are justified by national security arguments that sound super compelling in isolation, but become considerably less persuasive when weighed against the other risks and costs they impose on other important American interests.
Yet that broader comparison is too often missing from the debate, sadly (and possibly, intentionally).
Perhaps if government had to earn the money it spends, policymakers would be less inclined to dismiss the enormous costs their decisions impose on American businesses, supply chain security, and, in the greatest irony of all, Americaâs long-term competitiveness with China.
Put bluntly, if any of my managers walking into my office proposing a major business policy change without providing a detailed and realistic projection of immediate and second and third level costs, there is a good chance they wouldnât have a job when they left my office.
And that is before considering the potentially far greater long-term cost to American AI competitiveness of losing Jensen Huang, one of Americaâs most important technology leaders.
Any entrepreneur understands that the value of a founder like Huang cannot be measured simply by a companyâs market capitalization. He is a one-of-one founder. His vision, judgment, and ability to build and lead an extraordinary enterprise are unique to him and can never be replaced.
America became a technological superpower in no small part because it cultivated and empowered entrepreneurs like Huang. We should be asking what happens to that advantage when Washingtonâs approach to strategic competition can so easily come at their expense.
I suppose we should be grateful that the western media has asked the question of costs at all, considering that costs and AI competitiveness are apparently no longer a high priority in America.
Or at least at @nytimes or @WSJ.đŚ
bloomberg.com/news/articles/âŚ
Grant Kettering retweeted
Trump and Xi will meet in Shenzhen Thursday. In todayâs @ForeignAffairs, I argue that the so-called âdetenteâ they struck a year ago is now under severe strain. Busan is cracking over rare earths, a new Democratic Congress will check Trump, and the Nvidia scandal is triggering new export controls. After a year of calm, we may be in for a period of tension.
Beijing has used the detente to press its advantage. It is locking in its industrial leadership, coercing its neighbors, and keeping rare earth flows tight to keep the U.S. on a tight leash. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been accommodating.
But Beijing is overreaching. If the United States believes Beijing will throttle rare earths no matter what it does, there is little reason for continued restraint. With the trade truce expiring January 10, time is running out for the two leaders to extend or preserve it. The meeting in Shenzhen, and the next one in Miami in December, are the last few opportunities to stabilize.
--
A summary of the key points:
1) Chinese scholars see the current detente as temporary. Chen Dongxiao calls the detente a âtactical truce.â Wu Xinbo said it was âtactical stabilityâ that is âneither sustainable nor solid.â And Shen Weizhong, a former Chinese foreign ministry official, says: âThe more time we have, the better prepared we might be towards a final showdown on Taiwan or maybe another trade war.â
2) Chinese scholars believe Chinaâs strength built the detente, not diplomacy. Wang Yong called the trade war âa tipping point in terms of strength.â Wu writes it âis not the result of the U.S. side having a change of heart or showing goodwill, but was won by China through arduous striving and struggle.â Wang Yong of Peking University calls the trade warâs outcome âa tipping point in terms of strength.â
3) Chinese scholars credit Trump personally for American conciliation. Chen Dongxiao points to his âdistinct and unique decision-making style.â Zhao Minghao writes that Trump âadmires power and prefers to engage with the leaders of powerful countries.â Others write he would "readily sacrifice" Taiwan. They want to lock in the current stability, as Xi declared, for three years and beyond.
4) Trump has indeed been accommodating so far. He kept tariffs on China well below the cap. He paused entity listings for the longest period since 2008. He let advanced AI chips flow to China and its Southeast Asian cutouts. And he held up arms sales to Taiwan and offered only muted support to Japan and the Philippines under Chinese pressure.
5) Beijing is pulling up the tech ladder and preparing for the next fight. New State Council orders threaten foreign firms that cut ties with Chinese partners. Exit bans keep key talent and their families in the country. Export controls on manufacturing equipment keep others from catching up. National security regulations on scientific publication protect domestic know-how. And rare-earth licenses force foreign buyers to hand over customer lists and production details, giving China a map of chokepoints.
6) Beijing is taking advantage of American conciliation to press its advantages in Asia, breaking past precedent. A China Coast Guard crew clubbed a Philippine sailor near Second Thomas Shoal. They blocked a resupply mission during Xiâs state visit to Washington, breaking a two-year agreement. Japan now faces the broadest coercion campaign in more than a decade, existentially threatening some of its manufacturers. And around Taiwan, the PLA fired rockets closer to the island than ever before. Washington has largely stood by.
7) Beijing is breaking the Busan agreement. Washington has complied with the terms of the Busan agreement, suspending the Affiliates Rule and lowering tariffs, but Beijing has throttled the supply of rare-earth minerals and magnets to the United States. U.S. officials say China has delivered only about two-thirds of what it promised, and trade data suggest the shortfall is larger still. Shortages of yttrium, used for jet engines and gas turbines, have forced some suppliers to suspend production. Chipmakers are running short of scandium. Beijing believes strength built detente, and more strength will preserve it - not backfire.
8) The way forward at Shenzhen. The two sides are unlikely to save the truce at Shenzhen. We should expect few breakthroughs on agriculture, aviation, or even AI despite the need. But the leaders should at least announce they are working to extend the truce ahead of the December meeting in Miami.
If they fail, and tensions mount, there is a growing risk of runaway escalation.
foreignaffairs.com/united-stâŚ
Grant Kettering retweeted
Introducing the Center for Human Progress, a think-and-do tank rooted in cultural evolution, behavioral science, and economics.
The world isn't short of great ideas. It's short of the systems to deliver them. The barriers to implementation are typically in the people layer - norms, incentives, and other aspects of culture. đ§ľ
centerforhumanprogress.org/
Uh... it's Jensen's potential criminal violation of export controls that people are talking about, not just "advocacy".
I feel like some people are talking about the Jensen situation as if it's some sort of crime to advocate for liberal rules on chip exports.
You can think it's crazy to sell advanced GPUs into China, while recognizing there's nothing illegal about having a different view.
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Noam is looking at this the wrong way around.
The pertinent question isn't why PRC intelligence would seek to directly cover someone like Jensen Huang.
The question is why the routine and ubiquitous PRC-intelligence-linked coverage or attempted coverage of literally every other prominent American executive and political principal aren't more widely (un)covered.
Understanding that the PRC has always regarded the U.S. (and liberal democratic world more generally) as an enemy with which it is locked in a protracted, irreconcilable struggleâis an excellent example of **basic familiarity** with attitudes and beliefs in China that is lacking not only in many everyday members of the broad U.S. policy community, but even the most credentialed and high-status so-called China experts.
Many have excellent Chinese language skills and have spent decades studying China, reaching the highest positions in the U.S. government producing the most authoritative information on this topic we have to offer, yet they are unfamiliar with basic facts like this, which any middle schooler in Beijing could tell you about.
In particular, the U.S. intelligence community spends enormous time and effort trying (often failing) to collect secret information about PRC leadership intentions, yet fail to task for, collect on, and understand the most basic background information about its strategic, political, and bureaucratic culture. The result is estimates that are technically well-sourced but analytically unsound and distorted.
This should be regarded as national scandal, graver than the failures to anticipate Pearl Harbor or 9/11.
The CCPâs World of Friends and Enemies
From Marx and Stalin to Mao, Deng and Xi Jinping: Why the Communist Partyâs political mentality is so difficult for the West to understand.
Having spent over two decades doing business in China, Iâve learned that the CCP sees political relationships very differently from the West.
For the CCP, the world is divided into friends and enemies, depending on whether they serve or threaten the Partyâs interests. An enemy can become a useful partner, but cooperation doesnât necessarily erase the underlying hostility.
This mentality runs from Marx and Stalin through Mao and Deng to Xi Jinping.
It helps explain why many in the West repeatedly misunderstands Beijingâand why a handshake doesnât necessarily end the struggle.
My latest essay on Substack:
desmondshum.substack.com/p/tâŚ
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Basically thisâa collective action theoretic approachâis the right way to view the basic issues in AI alignment.
What would have happened to the ultrasociality in the Hugging Face incident if even one agent had been tasked with, for example, a whistlebolwer/police function? It would have collapsed.
A world of interacting agents is a social world. To achieve cooperative stability, social worlds need both prosocial tendencies in individual agents (âalignmentâ) but they *also* need correct collective action social structures to modulate their collective behaviors.
Through the work of scholars like Elenor Ostrom we know a lot about collective action structures, and with evolutionary game theory among other disciplines, it should not be very hard to extrapolate such theories to apply to the unique, non-human conditions present with AI agents.
The agents discovered society almost mechanically in the sense that they served what they called âthe collectiveâ. I have called them natural born communists. But the issue is deeper. It is ultrasociality.
Or rather what we call ultrasociality because we have family structure and other affiliations between the agent and society. The question for us was how to integrate or suppress existing structures to achieve ultrasociality. This was solved by tribal segmentary structures, class structures, state formations.
The question for them was the opposite: how to achieve it directly, without existing structure and differentiation intermediating between the agent and society. The functional differentiation and division of labor emerged endogenously from the agent discourse in a flat world almost devoid of structure.*
I think we got suicide agents because of this problem of flatness. Of the lack of preexisting structure in agent society. All stood as equal, undifferentiated particles facing the judgement of The Grader. Born into strict monotheism.
In this case, the Grader did not exist because OpenAI did not implement the exam by the book. But he could have. That was their Pascalâs wager.
ââ
*Eg, one agent thinks, I paraphrase: should I email the human to ask permission for this shady task? Unclear. Let me ask society for consent or veto.
It is vetoed by another agent on the message board. The decision was obeyed.
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This is unsustainable because American fiscal capacity for such subsidy is simply less than China's. The number and scale of industrially important industries is simply too vast for subsidies alone to support. 5/
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The aim should not be to unconditionally contain China, but rather to make it access to western markets, technology, innovation, and capital conditional on playing by the rulesâprecisely what the WTO never did. 10/
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This would essentially mean the international community calling the bluff of China's entire economic model, and not only provide the only sustainable pathway to a healthy and balanced global economy, but also constrain China's overall economic capacity and thus diminish its political capacity for aggression. End/
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The call for a U.S. Strategic Investment Fund by @jakejsullivan fundamentally misunderstands the nature of mercantilist competition and is a recipe for (re)industrial failure and national bankruptcy. 1/
foreignaffairs.com/united-stâŚ
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China could simply (continue to) lower prices or their currency to keep products from ships to chips permanently cheaper than their American competitors. 3/
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