kpm.das (@KPMDas) profile picture

Cyber Security, Information Strategy, War By Other Means

Bangalore
Joined January 2009
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Great read. Yet a " kill switch test" is an NP hard complexity!!
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The Indian Cyber Pearl Harbor may be hybrid=overt+covert. Japan nearly had a flavor of that 3 weeks ago. Whole of nation. Critical infra centric. BE PREPARED. India has many soft surfaces (open society, young digital natives in hundreds of millions, social faultlines, cognitive dissonances and lack of शत्रुबोध and स्वयम्बोध) Be prepared and begin with these steps. Just top of mind thoughts. 1. Get the CII SPOCs to try and look at multiple CSPs where deployment of enterprise assets are in the cloud. 2. Make the contingency plans more stringent. Build offline fallbacks. Consider monthly prac of going into fallback modes. There is customer inconvenience but worth it. 3. Strengthen sectoral CERTs for specific priority CII. 4. Make 2FA mandatory for CII stakeholders.. 5. Run a nationwide CII audit of patches and integrity of patch managenent lifecycle processes. 6. Incident reporting may still be short of satisfactory. Maybe consider switch to no fault no liability model instead. 7. CERT and NCIIPCs have limited capacities. Sectoral capacities in CII is possibly the answer. 8. If Sectoral War Rooms are not yet op, operationalise that. 9. Let the next table top or wargame be based on Japan scenarios for a start. 10. If a National DNS shield exists fine Else worth considering. 11. CIIs invariablly depend on many third parties for services. Build a whitelist of third parties for each sector. Walk an audit through for the list members. 12. Lot of vulnerabilities exist at CII-SMB SPs. Think of setting up a SMB security service at sectoral level (SMBs do not have the wherewithal for cyber expertise) 13. Last thought. As Australia did two decades ago, recognize that when you need to multiply cyber operations capacities get defence services to chip in. They can help you scale up
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The Indian Cyber Pearl Harbor may be hybrid=overt+covert. Japan nearly had a flavor of that 3 weeks ago. Whole of nation. Critical infra centric. BE PREPARED. India has many soft surfaces (open society, young digital natives in hundreds of millions, social faultlines, cognitive dissonances and lack of शत्रुबोध and स्वयम्बोध) Be prepared and begin with these steps. Just top of mind thoughts. 1. Get the CII SPOCs to try and look at multiple CSPs where deployment of enterprise assets are in the cloud. 2. Make the contingency plans more stringent. Build offline fallbacks. Consider monthly prac of going into fallback modes. There is customer inconvenience but worth it. 3. Strengthen sectoral CERTs for specific priority CII. 4. Make 2FA mandatory for CII stakeholders.. 5. Run a nationwide CII audit of patches and integrity of patch managenent lifecycle processes. 6. Incident reporting may still be short of satisfactory. Maybe consider switch to no fault no liability model instead. 7. CERT and NCIIPCs have limited capacities. Sectoral capacities in CII is possibly the answer. 8. If Sectoral War Rooms are not yet op, operationalise that. 9. Let the next table top or wargame be based on Japan scenarios for a start. 10. If a National DNS shield exists fine Else worth considering. 11. CIIs invariablly depend on many third parties for services. Build a whitelist of third parties for each sector. Walk an audit through for the list members. 12. Lot of vulnerabilities exist at CII-SMB SPs. Think of setting up a SMB security service at sectoral level (SMBs do not have the wherewithal for cyber expertise) 13. Last thought. As Australia did two decades ago, recognize that when you need to multiply cyber operations capacities get defence services to chip in. They can help you scale up
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kpm.das retweeted
Fact is, most people have no sympathy as they see these properties as areas reserved for elites\mil\bureaucrats, maintained via public money but gatekept from the very people who pay for upkeep. A reminder of the British days! Politicians know this. PS: No comments on decision.
Sad to put this out -- spent so many lovely mornings swinging away the blues on the lovely fairways of this heaven - in the midst of Delhi. One can only pity the killjoy who took the decision to shut down a sports facility. RIP - AFGC ! You will be missed by so many. @IAF_MCC
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Read his true story to understand this man's reality: strategicfront.org/forums/th…
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Why did the Indian Air Force come to Race Course? The closure of the Air Force golf course at Race Course in New Delhi has attracted considerable attention. But it also offers an opportunity to revisit a rather interesting question. Why does the IAF have a station in the very heart of Lutyens’ Delhi? Long before golf was played here, the area hosted cricket, parachute training, and RAF operations. The reason the IAF eventually established a major administrative station here in 1947 has much to do with Hyderabad State's uncertain future and the reorganisation of the Air Force at Partition. The story begins in 1941, at Willingdon Airport. In Sep 1941, the RAF established an Air Landing School at Willingdon Airport, now Safdarjung Airport, to train personnel of the newly raised 50th Indian Parachute Brigade. The Brigade comprised British, Indian and Gurkha parachute battalions, and the school represented one of the earliest organised efforts to develop military parachuting in India. Its equipment was rudimentary. The RAF initially had to make do with obsolete Vickers Valentia biplanes, modified to allow parachutists to jump through an opening in the fuselage floor. Some of the earliest parachute jumps took place over the racecourse adjoining Willingdon Airport. One contemporary account describes a company commander landing on the upper tier of the racecourse grandstand and bouncing his way down to the bottom! The Air Landing School was initially housed under canvas, with accommodation and other buildings coming up near the Race Course. The school was also experimenting with the equipment and techniques required for airborne operations and aerial resupply. Then, in April 1942, RAF Station New Delhi was formally established. Until then, Willingdon had been a civilian aerodrome used by several RAF units. A Communication Flight detached from No. 31 Squadron, RAF at Lahore had been operating from the airfield for some months. The Air Landing School occupied buildings on one side of the aerodrome, while other small RAF detachments operated alongside it. The formation of RAF Station New Delhi brought these activities under a common Station Headquarters. The new establishment assumed responsibility for running the aerodrome, although its physical upkeep remained with the Public Works Department. The Station also administered the Air Landing School, a small Parachute Repair Section comprising one senior NCO and seven airmen, and a ground staging and refuelling party responsible for transit aircraft. It was still a shared airfield. Civil flying continued, including operations by Indian National Airways and the Delhi Flying Club. By October 1942, when the Air Landing School moved to Chaklala near Rawalpindi, it had recorded 9,231 live parachute descents and qualified 1,511 trainees during its stay in Delhi. The 50th Indian Parachute Brigade would later see fierce fighting against the Japanese at Sangshak in March 1944.The school at Chaklala would later move to Agra where it remains to this date. RAF Station New Delhi continued to serve the wartime Air Force. The Air Headquarters communication organisation, which itself traced its origins to a flight raised at Lahore in 1928, operated from Willingdon before moving to Palam in 1946. But how did this RAF establishment eventually become the administrative centre of the independent Indian Air Force? For that, we need to move forward to 1946, when the Royal Indian Air Force was beginning to consider its post-war organisation. An Air Force broadly rests on four functions: operations, training, maintenance and administration. The first three would eventually develop into operational Commands, Training Command and Maintenance Command. Administration was a somewhat different problem. It meant managing medical services, accounts, education, security, infrastructure, transport, accommodation and the movement and holding of personnel across the country. It also meant looking after the numerous establishments that came directly under Air Headquarters but did not belong to conventional formations. One of the early ideas was to concentrate much of this activity in peninsular India, with Arkonam (today's Arakkonam, home to the naval air station INS Rajali) emerging as a possible administrative centre. The RIAF established a depot at Arkonam, and several important establishments were located in the Madras region. The Air Force Record Office, responsible for personnel records and the administration of airmen, had moved to Red Hills Lake near Madras in 1946. The Central Accounts Office had similarly moved from Bombay to Madras. But Partition complicated these plans considerably. At the time, southern India comprised territories with different political arrangements. Madras was a province of British India, while Mysore and Hyderabad were princely states. The uncertainty was particularly acute in Hyderabad, where the Nizam had not committed himself to joining the Indian Union. This presented a problem for the RIAF because several of its important training establishments were situated in and around Hyderabad and Secunderabad, including at Hakimpet. The Air Force consequently began reorganising its training infrastructure, shifting establishments towards locations where their future within India was more secure. In February 1947, No. 2 Ground Training School moved from Secunderabad to Tambaram, near Madras. No. 1 Ground Training School, formed at Hakimpet, subsequently moved to Jalahalli near Bangalore in November 1947. The RIAF Depot at Arkonam (also training airmen) also moved to Jalahalli that November. With the southern stations being reorganised to accommodate training requirements, the earlier idea of concentrating the principal administrative establishments there became less practical. The administrative institutions were consequently reorganised towards northern India. New Delhi was the natural destination, not least because Air Headquarters was located there and exercised functional control over many of these units, but also because RAF was vacating the Willingdon premises. The Record Office moved from Red Hills Lake to Delhi in October 1947, while the Central Accounts Office also moved to the capital that year. The medical and other administrative establishments serving Air Headquarters formed part of the wider arrangement. What was needed was a single organisation to administer these establishments locally while leaving their professional responsibilities with Air Headquarters. And so, on 1 Sep 1947, just seventeen days after Independence, Air Headquarters Administrative Instruction No. 01/47 established No. 10 Administrative Wing, Royal Indian Air Force, at Race Course, New Delhi. The Wing was built upon the existing RAF establishment in the Willingdon and Race Course area. Its responsibilities extended to Air Headquarters and the numerous associated units and establishments in the capital. And the man selected to command the new Wing was quite a character. Group Captain Kanwar 'Tiger' Jaswant Singh had joined the Indian Army in 1936 before transferring to the Air Force in 1940. He had flown with Nos. 2 and 3 Squadrons, commanded No. 2 Squadron during operations in Burma in the Second World War, and earned a reputation as a demanding commander and exceptional sportsman. Yet, on 1 Sep 1947, Tiger found himself commanding an administrative Wing in a capital torn apart by communal violence. It was hardly a quiet assignment. The new Wing was immediately called upon to patrol riot-affected areas of Central Delhi and assist in maintaining law and order. At the same time, Partition had divided the Air Force itself. Hundreds of airmen and their families were arriving from former RIAF establishments at Kohat, Peshawar, Risalpur, Chaklala and Mauripur, all now in Pakistan. The Station's history records that approximately 900 airmen and 150 families required immediate boarding, lodging and assistance. It also had to help personnel moving in the opposite direction, including escorting those proceeding to Pakistan through Palam for onward travel. Tiger, who lived at 1 Kushak Road, was frequently seen travelling around Delhi on his James motorcycle, attending to the Station's responsibilities during these difficult months. On 24 December 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru addressed a gathering of nearly 2,000 officers and airmen. The Wing had already begun acquiring the ceremonial responsibilities that would eventually become one of the most visible features of Air Force Station New Delhi. In May 1948, No. 10 Administrative Wing was redesignated as an RIAF Station. When India became a Republic on 26 January 1950, the 'Royal' prefix was dropped and the establishment became Air Force Station New Delhi. The sporting history of Race Course also continued alongside its military responsibilities. The grounds that later became associated with golf had earlier been used for cricket, while the Station continued to host athletic meets and inter-unit competitions. The Station's photographic archives include images of athletic competitions in 1948, and sporting events continued to be held at Race Course over subsequent decades. Meanwhile, the Station's military responsibilities continued to evolve. During the 1971 War, it housed fifteen Pakistan Air Force prisoners of war, including Flight Lieutenant Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi, who would eventually become Chief of the Pakistan Air Force. By the time Air Force Station New Delhi celebrated its Platinum Jubilee in 2022, it was providing administrative support to 46 IAF units apart from Air Headquarters, covering approximately 10,000 personnel. Its functions extended to medical services, accounts, transport, logistics, accommodation, schools, security, ceremonial duties and numerous other activities across Delhi-NCR. The golf course became one of the more familiar features of Race Course in later decades, particularly to generations of serving and retired Air Force personnel. But the Air Force's presence here has a much older history. #IAFHistory @IAF_MCC
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Replying to @KantInEastt
I am all about food choices. However, it would be intellectual dishonesty to say that Beef was historically consumed in Kerala, it wasn’t. It’s a post independence phenomenon correlated to rise of communism, atheism and liberalisation. Prior to that Kerala was a strict society, with numerous restrictions on Upper Caste Hindus, Christians and Muslims, more restrictions than on what we today refer to as “depressed castes” of Hindus. The latter today form bulk of Communists base. Not being casteist or anything, just pointing out historical nuances vis a vis Kerala’s history.
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An excellent read. We need more such analytical work at section, platoon, troop, combat team level-of-detail and aggregate these analyses upward to form inputs into the respective tactical and operational doctrines.
The drone that kills an infantry section is often not the one that strikes it. It is the one that found it first. That is the starting point of Part 1 of my new three-part series, The Section and the Drone. Part 1 looks at the threat the Indian section faces, from Operation Sindoor to the find-fix-strike chain, and where we stand: fast progress on offensive drones, with Ashni platoons in every battalion, and far less clarity on defence at section level. Coming next: • Part 2: Deny first, shoot last. The layers of defence, in the order that matters. • Part 3: Organic or shared? Who should own what, and what Indian trials must prove. brignpsingh.substack.com/p/t…
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Thats true of any combat resource!! With their AF decimated, the sustained damage that Iran still caused on US strategic assets across their CENTCOM static bases in the Gulf does not forbode well for incumbent Indian AF role. Beyond AD and CAS the shift away from traditional offensive airpower merits attention.
The bane of AirPower is the demand for it.
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bit.ly/3VWeIxT I hear that General Sudhakar won a literary prize at the NDA, for either a poem or an essay, when he was a cadet. I had not expected him to be such a fine writer. I once edited India Sentinels, where every piece follows the house style I wrote, drawing on several style guides. Still, the flair in Gen @sudhakar_jee’s writing is something no style guide can supply. Today, I am delighted to see one of my students edit and publish his piece on Infantry Day, which also happens to be the general’s birthday. It is a delightful read. Well done on the edit, and many happy returns, Gen Sudhakar. May you keep going strong!
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Brilliant. If this doesnt sink in, we are in for a situation where strategic paralysis of today will turn into operational paralysis of tomorrow!!
In today’s IE. Some thoughts on the perennial issue of theatre commands.
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MY @PenguinIndia book India at War tells us why today 27 October is @adgpi INFANTRY DAY and how independent India was tested by fire within weeks of Independence and came out a victor in what was a most certain defeat during the first war in Kashmir in October 1947. On this Infantry Day, we remember the valiant heroes celebrated in my book India at War Empires Battles and the Making of a Nation. When Pakistan backed tribal lashkars invaded under Operation Gulmarg, Brig. Rajinder Singh the Immortal Dogra rushed to Uri with 110 men, fighting to the last man and last bullet becoming India's first Maha Vir Chakra awardee. Following the signing of the Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh on Oct 26, 1947, and handing over to VP Menon , India undertook an unprecedented air bridge to Srinagar. Early hours of 27 Oct Lt. Col. Dewan Ranjit Rai, pioneer IMA course graduate and Sam Manekshaw's coursemate, landed 1 SIKH at Srinagar and made the supreme sacrifice as he made contact with an enemy who was suprised and beat hasty retreat becoming independent India's first officer to fall in battle. At Badgam, Major Somnath Sharma, with his arm in a plaster cast, fought off over 700 raiders to save the airstrip, declaring he would not withdraw an inch before earning India's very first Param Vir Chakra. Down south, Brig. Mohammed Usman, who rejected Jinnah's offer of Pakistan Army Chief to stay loyal to the idea of India, turned Naushera into a fortress before falling in action. From the hammer and anvil triumph at Shalateng to the miracle of deploying tanks at 11,500 ft at Zojila under Gen Thimayya, our infantry became mountains so the nation could endure. Explore the full historical narrative in India at War Empires Battles and the Making of a Nation, amazon.in/India-War-History-… published by @PenguinIndia Random House India. #InfantryDay #IndiaAtWar #IndianArmy #MilitaryHistory #1947Kashmir #ServiceBeforeSelf #PenguinIndia @mileeashwarya @shrinagesh
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Military transformation must connect battlefield innovation to political purpose. Gen Petraeus’s call at NDTV for institutional transformation deserves attention. Its implications extend across doctrine, military education, procurement and the freedom to challenge established assumptions. The wider debate requires precision. RUSI’s field research identifies continuing utility for armour within adapted combined-arms operations. Persistent surveillance changes the conditions for manoeuvre; declaring platforms obsolete requires stronger evidence. Likewise, AI’s intellectual performance cannot establish competence in command. Tireless analysis, contextual judgment and accountability are distinct capabilities. Trust must follow demonstrated reliability, particularly where lethal force is involved. For India, Ukraine should generate lessons to test against our adversaries, geography, logistics and escalation constraints. American, Ukrainian and Russian experiences deserve scrutiny under the same evidentiary standards. The strategic question is how these adaptations strengthen deterrence and contribute to an achievable political outcome. That demands institutions which empower initiative, protect professional dissent and revise doctrine through evidence. @VishnuNDTV @ShivAroor @rahulkanwal @Gen_RajShukla @RUSI_org @rwac48 @robert_spalding @prakashmenon51 @IISS_org @CSISIndiaChair #NDTVWorldSummit #MilitaryStrategy @ASPI_org @USIofIndia @cenjows @WarintheFuture @Jack_Watling @LawDavF @paul_scharre
Gen Petraeus, in a fascinating conversation on how warfare is evolving, and how AI is going disrupt the battlefield, with @rahulkanwal @ShivAroor & @VishnuNDTV
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In the absence of strategic security discourse participation by the political stakeholders (their sparse understanding) this ball will get tossed around until fighter ac options in any case gets cost- irrelevant and air superiority gets delivered by new age low cost deterrent platforms
Again, little understanding, maximum volume. Firstly, the point has been sensationalized. AFAIK, a model for theaterisation has been signed on. If IAF is withdrawing from it, I'm fairly certain it would not be through a CAS interview to the media. But why let facts get in the way of a good ol sneer? Next, there can be no such thing as 'forcing it down'. Force what? How do you know that is the divine truth? But what is needed is surely, greater political engagement on a sustained basis (not episodic) with the armed forces on the issue. A sustained engagement will build understanding of military capabilities in minds of the leadership, and of national goals and aspirations in the minds of the military leadership. It would yield the questions to be answered, as well as options for the answers. Above all, it would yield an informed leadership that can take a call on the best option from a position of informed strength, without necessary Chaperoning by the bureaucracy which itself has little expertise.
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In the absence of strategic security discourse participation by the political stakeholders (their sparse understanding considered) this ball will get tossed around until fighter ac options in any case gets cost- irrelevant and air superiority gets delivered by new age low cost deterrent platforms
The military cudnt agree on a "model" in 35 yrs (since Kargil Committee). Scintillating.. GOI left it to the collective wisdom of the brass, when experience frm US/UK show politicians need to force the model thru, veto-ing the brass if needed...
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In the absence of strategic security discourse participation by the political stakeholders (their sparse understanding) this ball will get tossed around until fighter ac options in any case gets cost- irrelevant and air superiority gets delivered by new age low cost deterrent platforms
I think there is a misunderstanding in this argument. The issue is not where aircraft are based, but who commands them, who can shift them between theatres, and who decides the priorities of the larger war. There is an interesting historical peculiarity here which most tend to gloss over. Until Independence, India had a single Commander-in-Chief over all three Services. In 1947, this arrangement gave way to three separate Service heads, each responsible for his own force, with their Commander-in-Chief designations subsequently standardised. In 1955, the Government removed the Commander-in-Chief designation, but Nehru explicitly stated that their authority, including operational authority, would remain unchanged. Over time, the Services developed subordinate formations, which today total 17 Commands. But these are not 17 independent command systems in the traditional sense. They are subordinate headquarters within three Service-wide command structures. Therefore, theatreisation is not quite the often-repeated reduction from 17 Commands to three. At the level of command authority, it is a reorganisation of three nationwide, Service-specific command structures into three geographically organised, joint theatre structures. Consider what this means for air power. Today, Air HQ can shift effort between its Commands as the larger air situation demands. Under theatreisation, the same aircraft may be assigned to different theatre commanders, each with legitimate operational priorities. Who decides when one theatre must surrender aircraft to another? And who ensures that these decisions serve the larger air campaign rather than the immediate needs of individual theatres? These concerns have historical precedent. In 1971, India deliberately concentrated its principal military effort in the East. Even within the Western theatre, aircraft and missions were shifted between sectors as the fighting developed. Having 60 squadrons instead of 30 may ease the resource constraint, but it does not remove the command question. Someone must still decide where air power is most needed and have the authority to move it. Unless that responsibility is clearly transferred elsewhere, Air HQ will perforce have to retain an operational role beyond the proposed mandate of 'Raise, Train, Sustain'. Of course, an empowered joint staff under the CDS could make these decisions, with the CDS effectively functioning as a Commander-in-Chief. But that requires a clear redistribution of authority, not merely replacing Air HQ with HQ IDS. Indeed, when the CDS was created in 2019, the Government explicitly stated that the CDS would not exercise military command over the three Service Chiefs. This is where the Kargil Review Committee's observations become relevant. Its principal criticism was that the Service Chiefs had become operational commanders at the expense of their responsibilities as Chiefs of Staff. The weakness it identified lay in integrated military advice, planning and decision-making at the apex, rather than simply in the absence of theatre commands. The higher-command question and theatreisation are two distinct reforms, yet they have increasingly come to be treated as one. One concerns how forces are commanded within a theatre. The other concerns who exercises military authority above the theatres and reconciles competing operational priorities. I explored the historical evolution of India's command structure, and particularly the distinction between theatreisation and higher defence reform, in some detail here: iafhistory.in/2026/08/22/the…
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No one is above the law when a life is lost on our roads. In the Cheranalloor case, where a 17-year-old was driving the vehicle involved in a fatal crash, I have directed the DGP to ensure urgent and appropriate action under the law. There will be no room for influence, pressure or preferential treatment, irrespective of who the accused is or what their background may be. The family of the victim should have no reason to fear that justice will be compromised. The law will take its course — without fear or favour.
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kpm.das retweeted
The best, most comprehensive take on AI I’ve read. After a year of confusion and fear about the future, I finished it feeling like a weight had physically lifted. It’s long. Make the time. @vgr is undefeated. contraptions.venkateshrao.co…
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The coming years will see more of this. The blurring of friend and foe. The eternal truth remains स्वयंबोध and शत्रुबोध....which is the core of a strategic culture
Interesting- France and Germany offer to build subs for Argentina, which will almost certainly use them against the UK in a future conflict as they did in 1982…but, but, but…let’s look what happened in 1982: France imposed an immediate weapons embargo on Argentina, cutting off spares and new hardware… France provided technical and radar vulnerability data on its Exocet anti-ship missiles, helping the Royal Navy develop effective countermeasures. In other words- the French helped both sides in the conflict. Thats how this dirty business works. No amount of ToT or sovereign guarantees can protect the interests of a nation that relies on imported weapons to defend itself. We should learn fm this.
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