
Orthopedic Surgery Resident 🦴🪚• Interested in adult recon • MO➡️ WV➡️OH • Alumni @WVSOM, @WashU, @SLU_Official
Cleveland, OH
Joined August 2014
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Landon retweeted
It’s time to follow this thread up with one on how hospitals get paid.
This is an even lengthier explainer, as the system is much more complex (and open to exploitation).
Those wishing to cut waste and inefficiency take note:
While physician services are defined by CPT and reimbursed via RVUs determined by the RUC, hospitals have many more revenue streams.
The cornerstone for inpatient payments is the Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs).
These are defined by @CMSGov. Each patient is assigned a DRG based on their principal diagnosis, with adjustments for procedures performed and any secondary diagnoses.
Payments increase if Complications and Comorbidities (CCs) or Major CCs (MCCs) are present. These too are defined by CMS.
The entire hospital stay is paid under the DRG, so hospitals are incentivized to minimize costs per stay—sometimes at the expense of longer-term patient outcomes.
Ever feel like the hospital was rushing to get a patient discharged? This is why.
Hospitals also make money through their outpatient departments, which include outpatient surgery centers and hospital-affiliated clinics.
Payments here are governed by the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (HOPPS), defined by CMS.
Unlike DRGs (per-stay payments), HOPPS is per-service, which incentivizes high volumes.
Another major distinction between the physician fee schedule and HOPPS is the addition of facility fees for the exact same service.
A standalone physician clinic is paid based solely on the CPT/RVU system.
A hospital-owned clinic performing the same service can bill via HOPPS + a lucrative facility fee.
This creates a huge financial incentive for hospitals to acquire outpatient practices. It gives the hospital a huge financial advantage over the independent physician practice.
In addition to service-based payments (DRGs and HOPPS), hospitals have several other revenue streams:
340B Program: Hospitals buy discounted drugs intended for low-income patients but resell them at higher rates to private insurers, pocketing the profits. Again, something that is unavailable for independent physician practices.
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments: Additional funds for treating large numbers of Medicaid or uninsured patients.
Certification Subsidies: Hospitals receive payments or subsidies for being certified as trauma centers, stroke centers, or STEMI (heart-attack) centers.
At the end of the day, all these revenue streams rely heavily on coding and metrics.
For example, hospitals invest in administrative staff to ensure every CC and MCC is captured in physician notes—leading to constant emails and harassment for coding “updates.”
This administrative focus ensures hospitals thrive not by providing high-quality, efficient care but by employing armies of administrators to maximize payments from DRGs, HOPPS, 340B, DSH, and other streams.
The entire system is defined by CMS, with little input from organized medicine.
While the AMA’s role in physician payment raises concerns, hospitals have perfected the art of gaming Medicare.
Their unchecked growth has profound implications for costs, access, and competition in healthcare.
As we discuss reforming physician payments, we cannot ignore how hospitals’ financial incentives distort the broader system.
If @RobertKennedyJr, @elonmusk, @VivekGRamaswamy and @DOGE are serious about tackling waste and inefficiency in healthcare, these overly complex and exploitative systems must be reformed.
@anish_koka @DutchRojas @mass_marion @p_m_robinson @EconTalker @mungowitz @doc_gero @drdanchoi
With this story, it’s worth discussing how doctors get paid in Medicare.
Lengthy explainer here:
@RobertKennedyJr has mentioned reforming the American Medical Association’s (AMA) role in Medicare. To understand this, we need to explore how the AMA currently influences how doctors are paid.
When the government purchases goods or services, it typically defines what it’s buying—a “unit of service”—and negotiates a price. For example, if the military buys a tank, it specifies the requirements and solicits bids from manufacturers. Paying doctors, however, is a very different process.
In Medicare, the government defines physician services using Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes—for example, a spinal fusion or a patient consultation. But rather than negotiating prices in the marketplace, Medicare relies on a committee to assign a value to each service. This committee, called the Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC), evaluates each service’s complexity, time, and resource requirements and assigns it a value expressed in Relative Value Units (RVUs). Medicare then uses these RVUs, along with a conversion factor, to determine how much doctors are paid.
Here’s where the AMA comes in: the AMA controls both the CPT code system and the RUC.
What makes this process unique is that, unlike most goods or services purchased by the government—where prices are set by competitive markets—the value of physician services is centrally planned by the RUC. And because the AMA controls the RUC, it effectively oversees the system that defines and values physician work for Medicare.
To be clear, the issue isn’t just that the AMA controls the RUC. The broader issue is that RVUs are valued through a centralized planning process at all. While physicians should have a say in defining and valuing their work, the system would benefit from incorporating more market forces and reducing the reliance on centralized decision-making.
It’s also important to note that doctors—whether in the AMA or not—can’t simply “pay themselves” whatever they want. Once the RUC determines RVUs for various services, Medicare applies a budget-neutral formula. This means that if more RVUs are billed across the system, the amount paid per RVU decreases. Doctors see this in practice as the conversion factor is reduced every year.
Ultimately, the RUC’s recommendations are submitted to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which makes the final decision on whether to adopt them. However, CMS accepts the majority of these recommendations, making the RUC—and by extension, the AMA—a key player in determining how healthcare dollars are distributed and how doctors are paid.
There’s not enough information regarding the plan to cut the RUC out of the process for an analysis on the benefits and Tradeoffs. If it just involves moving the process into CMS, it’s unlikely to have much benefit. Substituting CMS administrators for a physician run committee is likely to have many adverse unintended consequences.
I’ll be watching this closely as it unfolds.
@anish_koka @mass_marion @drdanchoi @MayaBabuMD
Landon retweeted
The Browns are putting the worst beat down on the Texans I've ever seen in the history of the NFL.
Get to know our adult recon fellowship staff! Full video in the link and good luck to this year’s applicants #orthotwitter
youtu.be/PSKorr3S-Y8?si=NWnY…
Landon retweeted
How posterior starting point causes extension deformity in distal femur. My residents asked me to explain how I think of start point deformities in general; this is what I showed them. I treat the fragment that is away from start point (on other side of fracture) as “stationary.”
Landon retweeted
The Masters is one of my favorite sporting events, and its 85+ year history brings some great traditions.
So here's a running list of the most interesting facts:
1. Media tickets (badges) have RFID tags inside them so the club knows where each person is at all times.
Landon retweeted
Hey #medtiwtter! Today #Scientissimum would like to show you another #orthopedic #surgery case of removing intramedulary nail. In the previous post we showed how it is placed, in this post we are showing its removal.⚒️
Landon retweeted
Hello DO orthopedic surgeons!
@MSOSOrtho is launching a mentorship program for 2nd and 3rd yr med students interested in ortho. They have received many requests from osteopathic medical students looking for mentors (residents/fellows/attendings) in orthopedic surgery!
Landon retweeted
📢 Hot off the press 📢
#USPSTF releases Draft Recommendation Statement for Colorectal Cancer Screening:
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Average-risk adults:
✅Age 45-49➡️ Grade B 4 screening🔔NEW!🔔
✅Age 50-75➡️ Grade A 4 screening
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#coloncancer
Landon retweeted
WashU ranked in the top 10 for colleges that have students with the highest SAT scores. read.bi/2bR5A6F


















