MKRMayhem

This is a very good layout of the $STRC and $MSTR situation, but fails to address the most critical part. Leverage ratio is a cute metric to determine credit-worthiness, but interest expense (and really interest coverage ratio) is what ultimately determines long-term solvency. Having a low debt/equity ratio only matters if you expect them to sell the BTC to service the debt, but since the entire MSTR thesis relies on them not doing this, leverage ratio is pretty much irrelevant. Interest coverage = EBIT / Interest. MSTR earns $0 in EBIT, and thus has no interest coverage. That's scary enough as it is, but when you realize they have $1 bn+ of interest and dividend payments annually (and growing), it shows that eventually this company will run out of ways to service these debt and pref payments. Which means that the long-term outcome for MSTR has to be one of these options: 1) $BTC goes up forever, and MSTR just continues to issue more and more equity, even if mNAV falls below $1. This is fine for keeping MSTR afloat, but obviously not good for the $MSTR stock. 2) MSTR stops paying the dividends (meaning that buying $STRC is just a game of when, not if, they stop paying). This is the most logical end path, but it kills the fly wheel. Would expect this only if Saylor decides he owns enough BTC and no longer cares about buying more. 3) MSTR sells some $BTC each year to cover the annual payments -- this is the next most logical path, but it again kills the fly wheel. As soon as he sells even $1 of BTC, the story is dead. 4) MSTR uses the BTC on balance sheet to buy a cash-flow generative business that can add EBIT and thus service the debt. This is my favorite outcome - MSTR really should become a BTC-denominated Berkshire Hathaway... but this has never been discussed by Saylor 5) They simply default (this only happens if BTC crashes to a level where MSTR's BTC assets fall below the value of the debt, and they can't refinance the debt, which would currently only happen around $20,000/BTC). 6) BTC actually becomes a productive asset one day instead of just a pet rock, and MSTR can earn enough yield on the BTC holdings (via selling calls, or lending) to service the annual interest expense. TL/DR -- this is still a ponzi scheme. It's a very very very good and clever ponzi, and will probably last a very long time, but it's still a ponzi. As I've always said, there are no covenants in the debt that force MSTR to sell the BTC (forced selling is not a risk)... but voluntary selling to cover interest & dividend payments is a real risk. And if you don't believe he will ever do that, then you have to recognize that he will eventually stop the dividend. Right now... there are 4 stakeholders that all think they are fine, but all 4 cannot survive -- it is survival of the fittest 1) Bitcoin holders feel comfortable that he will never sell the BTC (but if that's true, 2-4 below are wrong) 2) MSTR debtholders feel comfortable that the debt will always be covered by the assets, which is most likely true, but not if he is forced to sell the assets to pay dividends (meaning 2 and 3 can't both be right). 3) Pfd shareholders (including but not limited to $STRC) feel comfortable because MSTR currently has $2 bn+ of cash, and can always sell more BTC, or more MSTR shares, or more STRC to pay for future dividends (meaning 3 can be right, but only if 1, 2 or 4 are wrong). 4) MSTR shareholders feel comfortable b/c they think BTC will go up forever and mNAV will stay above 1.0 (but that can't happen if 3 is right). Individually, all 4 stakeholders can be right... and for a long time. But collectively, they cannot all be right long-term. And that is the major risk.