Ari Ingel

This is what happens when you have an inexplicable but inexorable need to be an expert on everything but don't know jack sh** about the matter at hand. You end up just repeating the seemingly intelligent or enlightened, but nevertheless foolish, platitudes put out by other ignoramuses. It's not ethnicity preventing the Eisenkott-led bloc from joining with the Arab parties. Let's break this down: The Arab parties are divided between the Joint List, comprising Hadash, Ta’al, and Balad, and Mansour Abbas's Ra’am. Their differences are substantial, particularly concerning Israel's Jewish identity and participation in Zionist-led governments. The Joint List is explicitly anti-Zionist. Its platform rejects the Zionist political consensus, identifies Arab citizens as part of the Palestinian national community, and advocates fundamental changes to Israel's national and constitutional character. Hadash includes the Israeli Communist Party, while Balad is a secular Palestinian nationalist faction. Ra’am has adopted a more pragmatic approach. Abbas has repeatedly acknowledged Israel's permanent Jewish identity while rejecting Zionism as his own political ideology. His party seeks greater Arab equality, integration, and political influence within Israel's existing institutions. Its inclusion of Jewish Zionist politician Yoav Segalovitz as its second-ranked candidate is a significant expression of that approach. These differences matter because most of the Jewish opposition is unwilling to form a government with the Joint List, and some members also oppose relying on Ra’am. But Ra'am also only has six-seven seats, and wouldn't be enoug to form a government. Bennett and Lieberman have ruled out governing with Arab parties because of these fundamental divergences (Bennett has made clear repeatedly it is their stances and not their identity that is at issue). They have also ruled out sitting with ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties over similar or identical divergences. Eisenkot has established conditions involving recognition of Israel's Jewish and democratic identity and universal service. Perhaps the most consequential disagreement concerns universal military or national service, one of the central issues confronting Israeli society. The Joint List's platform rejects compulsory military and civilian service and supports voluntary community service instead. Its opposition reflects a fundamentally different understanding of Israel's security requirements and the relationship between Arab citizens and the state. The Joint List does not share the Jewish mainstream's understanding of the IDF as the institution principally responsible for Israel's national survival. Rather, its political platform characterizes Israeli military activity primarily through the lens of occupation, war, and Palestinian national rights. Its economic program explicitly advocates deep cuts in military spending and ending the financing of Israeli military operations in Gaza and territories it considers occupied in Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories. The practical effect of these positions would be to reduce the IDF's resources and military activity, rather than expand its capabilities and manpower as the Jewish mainstream considers necessary. Elements within Hadash have also historically expressed positions sympathetic to Israel's adversaries. In 2007, Ayman Odeh, then Hadash secretary-general, declared that Hezbollah was not the enemy of Israel's Arab citizens, but that Israeli occupation was. In 2016, the head of Hadash's Communist Party faction celebrated the Assad regime's capture of Aleppo, although Odeh subsequently disavowed support for Assad. These positions help explain the profound ideological differences between the Joint List and Israel's mainstream Jewish parties. This opposition extends even to conscripting ultra-Orthodox Jews. The Joint List explicitly opposes drafting Haredim, rejecting the premise that Israel needs more soldiers. During a June 2024 Knesset debate, Ahmad Tibi declared: "We oppose drafting Haredim and Arabs." This is a significant divergence with the Zionist opposition to Netanyahu: unlike the Zionist opposition, the Joint List does not regard increasing IDF manpower as a desirable objective in itself. There is also a potential political domino effect. If compulsory military or national service becomes an obligation applicable to all Jewish Israelis, including Haredim, that would strengthen demands to extend the same obligation to Arab citizens. The Joint List therefore has an additional reason to resist even Haredi conscription: preserving existing exemptions helps it resist the broader principle of universal service. This is a plausible political consideration, although the party has not publicly identified it as its reason for opposing Haredi enlistment. Ra’am also opposes mandatory military or civilian service for Arab citizens, but supports developing voluntary civilian-service frameworks suited to Arab communities. Crucially, Ra’am has not established a categorical position against drafting Haredim. Three Ra’am MKs supported a Haredi conscription bill in January 2022. The party declined to state its position on Haredi conscription when questioned during the 2026 campaign. Eisenkot's proposal is broader: military or civilian service for all citizens, including Haredim and Arabs. His platform therefore conflicts with both Arab parties' opposition to compulsory Arab service. Even if an Eisenkot government received Arab-party support, that would not guarantee sufficient parliamentary support for universal service. A narrower Haredi conscription law might attract different voting coalitions, but a genuinely universal service requirement would face substantial opposition from the very parties Eisenkot might need to remain in power.