History, geopolitics, social issues. Peels apples with scalpels. Quiet civil conversations. Mostly somewhere in the moderate middle. Aspie. Mute button user.
Joined August 2011
- Tweets20.8K
- Following1K
- Followers5.5K
- Likes19.6K
Pinned Tweet
Some of you may wonder about the name of this profile - Chamberlain's Ghost. Just briefly, when this war started in early 2022, I strongly expressed the view that Ukraine should seek a settlement with Russia as soon as possible. This was long before we all learned about the abortive Istanbul negotiations. For this I was pilloried by friend, family, acquaintance and stranger alike. I was labelled 'Putin's shill', 'Munich appeaser', 'Neville Chamberlain' and and many other things besides. But I was right then and I am still right now. The only solution to this war for Ukraine was and still is a negotiated peace. The only difference now from then is that now the terms will be worse, many people have died and a great deal of destruction has been done. This was, in the greater sense of matters, an avoidable war. People did not need to die and a country did not need to be wrecked. But in substance ideology preceded pragmatism.
Chamberlain's Ghost retweeted
I think you are essentially right but understand what is happening somewhat differently. I think the Trump administration knows full well what is happening and likely to happen to Ukraine. Rubio has articulated it pretty much since day one. Their view - and whether we agree is not the point - is that the strategic value of a sound relationship with Russia significantly outweighs any strategic interest the US may have in Ukraine and, having tried and failed to bring an end to the war and holding Zelensky and Ukraine primarily responsible for that failure - again, whether we agree is not the point - they are now simply pursuing what they perceive as the more important strategic interest, even if it means doing so at the expense of Ukraine. The approach is thus utilitarian as opposed to moral - in some senses it is a true expression of RealPolitik. There is therefore no surprise either as to what they are doing or the divide with European leaders who by and large characterise the strategic interests (and moral lens) quite differently. In summary, I am not in the least bit surprised - it accords very much with the administration's position since the first days in office.
🔽 Good news for Ukraine.
🔽 The real question is what happens next if: A. As is more than just possible, nothing changes strategically as a result and/or B. The Iranians decide to deny the US or Israel a ready offramp?
This is what I've been hearing as well: "The US has told several Gulf Arab countries to be prepared for a short, intense military campaign after the midterms." wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-…
It appears at this stage as if Israel has voted for war and in support of the Haredim. 🔽
With 31.3% of the votes in, this is where things currently stand. The Likud is close to total victory with 29 seats and a 59-seat bloc. Its totals will fall because its bastions are overrepresented in the counted ballots. Based on the current numbers, and after running the regression several times, the likely projection is: Netanyahu’s bloc 53, the opposition 48, and the Arab parties 19. Likud finishes as the largest party with about 28 seats. Not enough for an out and out victory but enough to put Netanyahu in the drivers seat.
Chamberlain's Ghost retweeted
JUST IN: The Pentagon has published a remarkable image of China's secretive Shenlong spaceplane in orbit, captured by a Maxar satellite and featured in its newly released 2026 space threat assessment.
The reusable, uncrewed spacecraft launches aboard a rocket and returns to Earth on a runway, similar to the U.S. military's X-37B.
China has conducted four orbital missions since 2020, demonstrating the ability to deploy and maneuver near other objects in space.
The DIA warns that technologies used for satellite inspection and proximity operations could also support anti-satellite capabilities.
China has disclosed few details about the spacecraft's missions or capabilities.
Synthesised account of the Finnish-Norwegian-Russian leadership call taking account of official readouts and multiple news reports:
xitter.cf/i/grok/share/1e6ec9799…
Disputed election results coming in Israel.
🚨🚨🚨
פרשה חמורה ביום הבחירות: שלושה חשודים נעצרו עם מעטפות כסף ופתקי הצבעה של מנסור עבאס.
המשטרה פשטה על מבנה בנגב ותפסה מעטפות שהכילו אלפי שקלים לצד פתקי הצבעה.
אני דורש ממערכת אכיפת החוק לחקור את האירוע.
מצביעי הימין, מצביעי הליכוד היקרים, מול הניסיונות לפגוע בטוהר הבחירות חייבים לצאת ולהצביע מחל, להצביע ליכוד למען המדינה שלנו 🇮🇱
🔽 I generally agree but would add one or two points.
Nuclear capability is not an absolute deterrent against conflict. India and Pakistan are the prime examples. But possibly the joint nuclear capability acts as a brake on escalation beyong a certain point. But that's as between similar order powers.
I'm not convinced that the nuclear capability of a smaller power would necessarily always prevent conventional invasion or warfare. If the strategic stakes are high enough, the larger power may proceed anyway. Both the small nuclear power and it's big adversary will know that if the small power resorts to using nuclear weapons, while it will be damaging to the big power, it will utterly catastrophic for the small power.
The absence of nuclear capability may also, paradoxically, protect a smaller power in certain circumstances. We can see today that Russia, a large nuclear power, will not use its nuclear capability against Ukraine (Karaganov notwithstanding) because the global political consequences are simply too far reaching. But if Ukraine as a small power was to first engage with nuclear weapons, it would remove the inherent political brake on counter - response. And remember that the small power nukes may possibly never reach their targets either but nevertheless open the door to total catastrophe. Or the prospect of having to choose between capitulation and total catastrophe.
But joint nuclear capability may also make negotiated outcomes more likely. The supporters of a small power would also understand the risk of rapid outward spiral - an initial strike by a small power in self defense may well lead the large power to also pre-emptively strike the small power's allies. This drives everyone on the small power side towards a negotiated solution. Ironically, there is thus a possibility that if Ukraine for example was a nuclear power, Europe would be pushing it harder towards reaching an agreement with Russia.
There's no doubt a lot more that can be added and many criticisms can be given against the above - but the point is that small power nukes aren't necessarily the absolute guarantee people tend to think they are.
The most important thing you need to understand about the nuclear powers is that they come in two size classes. There are the great nuclear powers: Russia and the US. And then there are minor nuclear power: everyone else with nukes.
The minor nuclear powers have a minimal deterrent, particularly if they have a survivable, sea-borne, second strike capability, and the missile range to reach the enemy’s homeland. This means that the bar to launch an all-out attack against them is very, very high. The US cannot do to NK what it did to Iran or Russia did to Ukraine.
Not all minor nuclear powers are equally powerful. Some are vastly more capable than others: eg, China can hold all US cities at risk, Pakistan cannot. This does not really matter at the end of the day because the bar is still very high for a war of choice against them.
The great nuclear powers have a more secure second-strike capability. Unlike the minor nuclear powers, however, they can do a lot more with their arsenal. They have a counterforce warfighting capability, a graduated nuclear coercion capability, and an extended deterrence capability.
For wars of choice and normal armed bargaining, these differences between the great and the minor nuclear powers don’t really matter because the costs and risks of first use are so high. So Russia is unable to threaten first use to coerce Kyiv into capitulation; same for the US against Iran.
But where the dispute is very serious and everything is on the line for both sides, as in a European contingency, the difference between great and minor nuclear powers matters greatly. In that case, the great nuclear powers can credibly threaten first use against minor nuclear powers because they enjoy nuclear superiority. They can threaten to disarm the enemy with a limited first strike, holding the bulk of their nuclear strike capabilities in reserve.
Nuclear superiority therefore allows them to prevail in a nuclear crisis; to coerce the enemy by their greater willingness to risk nuclear escalation. The most important case of this is the Cuban Missile Crisis where the US leveraged nuclear primacy to get the USSR to capitulate. This is the fate that awaits the minor European powers if they get into a big fight with Russia without the United States.
I have argued for some time that the only solution for the problem of the defense of Europe is for the Europeans to pool their armed forces into a single combined arms military under unified command complete with a great nuclear deterrent.
Otherwise Europe will become a playing field of the great powers, especially their neighbor. Nato without the US is a chicken coop.
Chamberlain's Ghost retweeted
#Kissinger once wrote of #Russia,
"Over centuries the strange Russian empire has seeped outward from the Duchy of Muscovy, spreading east and west across endless plains where no geographical obstacle except distance set a limit to human ambition, inundating what resisted, absorbing what yielded. This sea of land has, of course, been a temptation for invaders as well, but as it has eventually swallowed up all conquerors—aided no little by a hard climate—it has impelled the Russian people who have endured to identify security with pushing back all surrounding countries. Perhaps from this insecure history, perhaps from a sense of inferiority, Russia’s rulers—Communists or tsars—have responded by identifying security not only with distance but also with domination. They have never believed that they could build a moral consensus among other peoples. Absolute security for Russia has meant infinite insecurity for all its neighbors."
As Kissinger articulated above, Russian imperialism, born of national chauvinism, messianism, & a deep sense of insecurity devolving into paranoia, played a role in the war too. But so did Western hubris.
We should not forget that #Kennan prophesied a hard Russian nationalist turn in the 1990s in response to early #NATO expansion. William Burns noted how much of a redline #Ukraine was for Russia in 2008 as well.
Frankly, it wasn't, however, until George W. Bush tried to expand NATO to Ukraine & Georgia at the April, 2008 Bucharest summit that Russia acted with broad-based military force. First was Georgia in August 2008, though even the EU found Saakashvili fired first in the immediate aftermath, & the Ukraine after Maidan & the Yanukovych ouster in 2013/14.
So, to say the West played no role in paving the road to the tragedy of present day Ukraine ignores a lot of events.
NOW, what IF the West had tried an approach similar to the European approach to France after Napoleon instead of expanding NATO?
Maybe Russia would have just done the same thing. That is possible. But it's also possible a different security architecture could have been erected to ameliorate Russian anxiety & reduce the inflammation of imperial nostalgia.
It was a road not taken. The road that was taken led to Ukraine & Nemesis, in different ways for the hubris of both the Western AND Russian sides. It also became a tragedy for Ukrainians condemned geographically to live in the bloodlands.
"Looking across seven million years of human evolution, it’s not even a done deal that Homo sapiens — though remarkably adept at colonizing the planet and using technology — will turn out to be a success. Homo erectus was around for more than one million years; Neanderthals for 400,000. Scientists are still debating the emergence of Homo sapiens, but many think we’re only about 300,000 years into our existence.
“I’m not so impressed by Homo sapiens; we think we’re so successful, we’re so amazing,” Dr. Petraglia said. “From a contextual standpoint, we’re nothing.” "
- NYTimes
It's either genius or total idiocy. Which is hard to know for sure right now but for my money, setting about applying pressure to Russia by encircling it with nukes in the border states is not likely to have a happy outcome. See also post below this. 1/2
🇫🇷🇪🇺 The best news for Europe.
Ten European countries have joined France’s nuclear deterrence initiative.
All of this is due to a loss of trust in US protection
This is the project I’ve pushed hardest for.
This must pave the way for a European nuclear umbrella to replace American protection.
Our own foreign policy, military coordination and an independent nuclear umbrella.
This is the future of Europe in the 21st century.
🔽 I wonder to what extent this is designed primarily to support the current de-escalation discussions in Tehran. Or are the Saudis trying to get out the firing line of Trump goes for order to strike? And is Trump waiting to see the outcome of the Israeli election? Lots of moving parts.
US forces in the Middle East are prepared to launch new, potentially major, military operations against Iran "within 96 hours of receiving" an order from President Donald Trump, according to two US officials. cnn.it/4dViptJ
All these meaningless insults people throw around on this platform.
Someone finally threw a novel one at me that made me pause. I was designated "Purim's useful idiot". I'm still wondering if it was a typo, some sort reference to my assumed ethnicity, some sort of appellation to Julius Streicher's final words or some other obscure thing. 😂
As I've said before folks, do your very worst. To me it's all just entertainment - like a passing pack of barking dogs.
🔽 About Putin's NATO rollback demand.
Maybe. It could be a gambit to maximize demands with a view to forcing Ukrainian neutrality at a minimum. But I don't think so. The correct framing of this is that there will only be no NATO troops in those countries - other than the militaries of those countries themselves - which means in essence US troop withdrawal to those lines. But those countries will otherwise remain members of NATO. Given Witkoff's statements, Trump's NATO bearishness, general US desire to reduce NATO commitments, it may be a possibility. If one frames it as an alternative to a possible Ukrainian collapse or a pan-European war - of one accepts the premise of either of those being possible - then politically this looks like it could be saleable. Especially if Putin is willing to trade back on some of his Ukraine specific demands, which he should be as his primary security concern will have been addressed. I don't think it's all that far fetched. Not that I think it has a very high likelihood either.