The whole point of a screening programme is to catch cancer before symptoms appear, not wait until people realise they might need it. It’s an investment in catching a potentially fatal disease early, that many other countries don’t have. Moron 🙄
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
This is the point I was making last week. If Nigel Farage doesn’t recognise Kassam’s comments are racist, what was all that stuff over vetting the councillors about. Overt racism is openly accepted within Reform. From the leader down.
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Russia was entirely secure so long as it stayed within its own borders. Talk of "Russia's security concerns" is just propaganda talking points, meaning the freedom to invade whomever they want.
Ukraine can have its own military. Nobody is arguing otherwise. But Russia also has security concerns, and those concerns cannot simply be dismissed because they come from Moscow.
The issue is what happens when Ukraine’s military is increasingly integrated with NATO, an alliance Russia has opposed expanding towards its borders for decades.
So why is Ukraine’s security treated as the only concern worth discussing, while Russia’s is dismissed outright?
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Oh my, another idiot take that just won’t die. The Europeans are not funding Russia’s war. They started from a deep structural dependency on Russian energy and have made tremendous — and fast — progress on decoupling. This isn’t something you just turn off overnight. And they still contribute far more to Ukraine in aid anyway.
In contrast, the US is not even remotely dependent on Russian fossil fuels and yet the Kremlin asset in the White House is easing sanctions anyway while completely shutting off aid.
Contrary to the braindead takes of Trump apologists, the hypocrisy runs squarely through Washington, not Brussels.
In case you were wondering who was funding Russia's war on Ukraine, the EU is the number 1 purchaser of Russia's liquid natural gas and pipeline gas products through September 2026.energyandcleanair.org/august…
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
“We will also be replacing the current numerical system, due to its Arabic origins, and replacing it with a Paleolithic tally system.”
Reform plan to 'bring back imperial measurements' as party announces list of pledges it says will create jobs
lbc.co.uk/article/reform-imp…
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
🚨Plastic patriot Ryan Bridge is so patriotic, he wears a £7 poppy pin made in China by a Chinese company, where not a penny goes to veterans!!!
You can't make it up, if this isn't a red light to gullible morons who listen and donate to him, what is?
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Funny how some people immediately assume they were refused entry for wearing a poppy, rather than considering the possibility that the pub simply didn’t want a bunch of aggressive far-right idiots ruining everyone’s afternoon.
Incredible that they're now boycotting Weatherspoons, the most plastic of plastic patriot establishments.
Any other right wing things we can persuade them are woke?
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
I want to address all the ignorant assholes who have been flooding my posts with thousands of comments over the past few weeks.
Before lecturing Ukrainians about democracy, learn our fucking laws.
Show me the exact Ukrainian law President Zelenskyy supposedly violated.
Article 108 of the Constitution of Ukraine: The President exercises his powers until the newly elected President takes office.
Article 19 of Ukraine’s Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law: Presidential, parliamentary, and local elections are prohibited during martial law.
Article 20 of Ukraine’s Electoral Code: The electoral process is suspended when martial law is imposed.
So which law was broken? Give me the article number.
And while we’re discussing democracy, perhaps you should read Article 5 of our Constitution: the Ukrainian people are the sole source of power in Ukraine.
Not Elon Musk. Not Donald Trump. And certainly not you.
We Ukrainians know our internal problems. We will address them ourselves, through our own democratic institutions.
Meanwhile, Russia continues invading our country, attacking our cities, and killing our people.
You are entitled to your opinion. You are not entitled to invent Ukrainian law or dictate our political future.
Our sovereignty is not yours to negotiate away.
Read our Constitution before lecturing Ukrainians about democracy.
#UkrainianSovereignty #StandWithUkraine #DefendDemocracy #UkraineIsNotForSale #StopRussianAggression
unavailable
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Reform's Robert Jenrick has said today that bringing back imperial measures would help exports to the US, apparently unaware that while US uses the same terminology for measures like pints the units of volume are different. 🤡 (via Guardian).
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Why the hell would you want to bring back an inferior measuring system that hasn’t been taught in schools for over 50 years?
Reform are out-of-touch fuckwits.
lbc.co.uk/article/reform-imp…
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Elon Musk @elonmusk , let me explain something to you. Let’s deal with documented facts, not emotional generalisations.
On 19 October 2026, I personally attended the fourth international conference “Crimea Global. Understanding Ukraine through the South” in Kyiv.
At the panel “Countering the Predator: How to Stop Russia’s Recruitment of Foreigners,” Brigadier General Dmytro Usov, Secretary of Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, presented official Ukrainian data.
As of 1 October 2026, Ukraine had identified 45,959 foreign nationals from 151 countries and territories who had signed contracts with Russia’s military since 2022.
The annual figures presented were:
2022: 94
2023: 4,067
2024: 8,877
2025: 16,085
January–September 2026: 16,168
In just nine months of 2026, Russia recruited more foreigners than during the entire previous year. According to the figures presented, approximately 1,800 foreign nationals are being recruited monthly.
Among the identified recruits were citizens of Colombia, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Peru, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Belarus.
These are not figures I invented. I was personally present when they were presented.
Now let’s examine your claim that Russian soldiers are simply poor children with no choice.
Russia recruits internationally through promises of money, employment and citizenship. Some people knowingly enlist. Others are deceived, pressured or coerced.
According to a survey of foreign prisoners of war presented by Ukrainian authorities, 46.7% of respondents signed contracts seeking Russian citizenship, while 28% did not know they would fight against Ukraine.
These figures concern surveyed foreign prisoners, not every Russian soldier.
Yes, some Russian conscripts face coercion. Their experiences deserve recognition. But that does not justify claiming that everyone fighting for Russia has no choice.
Most importantly, none of this changes the fundamental distinction:
Russia invaded Ukraine. Ukraine did not invade Russia.
Russia’s leadership bears responsibility for launching and continuing this war. Ukrainians are defending their homes, families and sovereignty.
I live in Kyiv. I experience the air-raid alerts, drone attacks and strikes on infrastructure. I see what this war does to ordinary people.
This is not an abstract debate for me. It is my home and my life.
You speak about sympathy for Russian soldiers. Where is your equal concern for Ukrainian civilians who never chose this war? For families who lost their loved ones? For Ukrainians unlawfully detained by Russia?
Compassion for individuals does not erase responsibility for aggression.
Russia can withdraw its invading forces. Ukraine cannot end the invasion by surrendering its right to self-defence.
Before making sweeping claims about who has a choice, examine Russia’s documented recruitment system.
I was there when these figures were presented.
Stop equating the aggressor with the country defending itself.
#RussiaUkraineWar #RussianAggression #CrimeaGlobal #Ukraine #StandWithUkraine
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Mendel's narrative that Ukraine has "rejected" easy peace deals or bears responsibility for the war’s continuation and destruction is disinformation. Here's why:
1. The Istanbul Talks (April 2022)
Claim:
Ukraine was offered a favorable deal in Istanbul to keep its territory (minus Crimea/Donbas) in exchange for neutrality and army reduction, but Zelenskyy unilaterally declined.
Rebuttal:
Demilitarization as a Trap: Russia’s Istanbul demand for a drastically reduced Ukrainian military (capping forces at levels that would leave Ukraine defenseless) was designed to make future invasion effortless. Accepting demilitarization without ironclad security guarantees was an invitation to total conquest down the road.
The Guarantee Catch: Russia demanded a veto over any future collective security response if Ukraine were attacked again. Under Moscow's terms, if Russia invaded a second time, Russia itself would have to agree before any external power could legally intervene to assist Ukraine.
Bucha and Russian War Crimes: The Istanbul talks collapsed primarily due to the discovery of mass atrocities in Bucha, Irpin, and Izium as Russian troops retreated from Kyiv. Russian war crimes demonstrated that "agreements" with Moscow meant surrendering Ukrainian citizens to occupation, torture, and mass graves.
No Real Russian Commitment: Russia never offered a binding, full withdrawal from Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, or Kharkiv during those early talks; Moscow was attempting to consolidate military control while stalling for time after its initial push on Kyiv failed.
2. Late 2022 & The Kherson Liberation
Claim:
After Russian forces withdrew from Kherson city, Ukraine refused a potential ceasefire brokered or suggested by the US to continue the war.
Rebuttal:
Operational Momentum: In late 2022, Ukraine had just scored major strategic victories in Kharkiv and Kherson. Accepting a premature ceasefire would have allowed a severely weakened, retreating Russian military time to entrench, dig extensive defensive lines (which they later did with the Surovikin Line), rearm, and forcibly draft hundreds of thousands of mobilized troops.
Freezing the Conflict Benefits the Aggressor: A ceasefire without Russian withdrawal simply converts temporary frontline positions into de facto borders. Ukraine’s experience from 2014 to 2022 (Minsk I & II) proved that a frozen conflict only gives Russia time to prepare its next offense.
US Policy Alignment: The claim that Zelenskyy single-handedly "persuaded" the US to force Ukraine to fight ignores the fundamental principle repeatedly articulated by international law and Western coalition strategy: "Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine."
3. Early 2023 "Back-Channel Deal"
Claim:
A deal was on the table to return to pre-February 2022 borders in exchange for neutrality and recognizing Crimea as Russian, but Ukrainian leadership turned it down.
Rebuttal:
Unsubstantiated Fantasy: There is zero official evidence that Vladimir Putin ever agreed to abandon Russia's illegally annexed "four new regions" (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk), which Moscow formally incorporated into the Russian Constitution in September 2022.
Constitutional Reality in Moscow: Following Russia’s formal annexation decree in late 2022, Putin repeatedly insisted that the "new territorial realities" were non-negotiable. Reverting to pre-2022 lines was explicitly ruled out by the Kremlin's public and private declarations.
Rewarding Aggression: Surrendering Crimea formally would validate Russia's aggressive land grabs, violate international law regarding territorial integrity, and leave the Black Sea permanent security threat unaddressed.
4. The July 2024 Energy Ceasefire & Kursk
Claim:
Ukraine disrupted an energy ceasefire mediated via the Middle East by launching the Kursk operation.
Rebuttal:
Asymmetric Warfare and Strategic Initiative: The Kursk offensive was a tactical and strategic necessity designed to relieve pressure on the Eastern front in Donetsk, force Russia to reallocate troops to its own border, create a territorial bargaining chip, and demonstrate that Russia’s border was vulnerable.
Russian Destruction of Energy Grids: Russia began its systematic campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in the fall of 2022—long before Kursk. Moscow’s attacks on civilian infrastructure were designed to freeze the civilian population into submission, not to negotiate a genuine energy truce in good faith.
Leverage for Peace: A state defending itself against an existential threat cannot rely on unratified, informal promises while its eastern territory is being taken day by day.
5. Blaming the Victim for Destruction and "Degradation"
Claim:
Because Ukraine did not accept Russia's terms, Ukrainian leadership is responsible for the destruction of the country, casualties, and degradation of the state.
Rebuttal:
Shifting Moral and Legal Guilt: Every dead Ukrainian, ruined power plant, and displaced refugee is the direct legal and moral responsibility of the aggressor - the Russian Federation - which launched an illegal, unprovoked full-scale war of conquest. Blaming Ukraine for defending its territory is classical victim-blaming.
Capitulation vs. Survival: Capitulation does not stop human suffering; it merely converts battlefield fighting into mass repression, occupation terror, forced Russification, conscription of Ukrainians into the Russian military, and the elimination of the Ukrainian nation-state.
Summary
The premise of Mendel's narrative rests on the false assumption that Vladimir Putin was acting as a rational actor offering genuine peace in good faith.
Throughout the conflict, Russia’s fundamental goal has remained unchanged: the total political control or subjugation of Ukraine. Ceasefire proposals offered by Moscow under terms of demilitarization and territorial concession are not paths to peace; they are operational pauses designed to secure Russian gains and set up the next phase of conquest. Defending sovereignty against an existential threat is not a choice made out of stubbornness - it is a necessity for survival.
Let’s go through the peace deals Zelenskyy rejected.
• Istanbul agreement, 2022
Ukraine needed to refuse NATO accession, reduce the army, Russia would withdraw from the Kyiv reg., possibly from the Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. At that point the scale of destruction was still limited and the number of dead was far lower. In April 2022 Zelenskyy declined the deal.
• End of 2022
Russian forces withdrew from part of the Kherson region. Zelenskyy traveled to meet Biden and, acc. to my sources, later confirmed by Mr. Blinken in the New York Times, persuaded the WH to continue the war. The precise terms of any proposed deal remain unknown, but sources indicate there was readiness to declare at least a ceasefire.
• Beginning of 2023
Through unofficial channels between the United States and Russia, an understanding took shape: Putin agreed to withdraw to the borders that existed before the full-scale invasion—freeing nearly everything conquered that year—in exchange for Ukraine’s refusal of NATO accession and recognition of Crimea as Russian. Zelenskyy and Yermak refused. Since then nearly a million people have been killed or wounded, several million have become refugees, parts of the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions have been occupied, more of Zaporizhzhia has been taken, Kherson lies in ruins, the Chernihiv and Sumy regions face constant shelling, Kyiv itself has become almost a front-line city, the energy system has been destroyed, businesses cannot operate, exports have stalled, and the country is degrading.
• July 2024
An arrangement that began with an energy ceasefire, modeled on the Istanbul understandings and mediated through the Middle East. While negotiations were under way, Zelenskyy also planned the Kursk operation, which ultimately disrupted all the arrangements.
• March 2025
After the Oval Office clash between Trump and Zelenskyy, European leaders gathered in London in early March. The British government stated that a number of options were on the table and that Ukraine had to choose. As always, nothing came of it.
Whether Putin was prepared each time to implement any agreements remains unknown, yet on several occasions he carried out what he had promised. Does this remove his responsibility for the deaths, the horrors, and the destruction in Ukraine? No.
But the country is degrading, the state apparatus is degrading, and corruption finishes what Putin’s missiles, drones, and bombs did not destroy. Inhumanity has effectively become a state strategy and a national ideology promoted at every turn.
Ukraine simply cannot win this way—there are neither economic, nor demographic, nor any other grounds for it. Therefore, if Zelenskyy does not agree to a deal with realistic terms now, Ukraine will be forced to capitulate. And that is deeply alarming, because it can actually cost the country its independence and sovereignty.
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Musk pokračuje v informační ofenzívě proti Ukrajině tvrzením, že Ukrajinci využívají Starlink k úderům útočným dronovým operacím.
Musk přitom znovu lže, protože zkrátka víme, že terminály Starlinku se používají stacionárně a na mobilních cílech je limit stanoven na něco mezi 70 - 90 km/h, což je pro ukrajinské middle-strike drony prakticky nevyužitelné.
Pojem middle-strike je přitom důležity, protože se vztahuje na údery do hloubky maximálně 160 km. Jak víme, nad Ruskem Starlink/Starshield nefunguje, byť o to Ukrajinci evidentně žádali.
To v praxi znamená, že Ukrajinci útočí na ruské jednotky na okupovaných územích, což je naprosto exemplární příklad využití práva na sebeobranu (ostatně i útoky na vojenské cíle na ruském území jsou příklad sebeobrany).
Nicméně, vzhledem k tomu, že víme, že Starlink je pro middle-strike údery nepoužitelný, bavíme se samozřejmě o omezení terminálů, které používají přístup skrze Starshield.
Musk samozřejmě o tom rozdílu musí moc dobře vědět, přesto se drží vylhané linie o nějakém ukrajinské porušení podmínek.
Ukrajina je čistě fyzicky porušit nemůže. Další a další rány nejen do důvěry mezi USA a Ukrajinou, ale také mezi USA a Evropou a nejhorší na tom je, že to za sebe americká vláda nechává dělat nikým nevoleného bilionáře, který ani nedisponuje mandátem, kterým by vztahy mohl ovlivňovat.
Americká administrativa musí zakročit a hodně rychle, každý další den bude zhoršovat vztahy mezi blízkými spojenci.
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Zabawny jest ciąg zdarzeń z ostatnich dni u Muska:
- Nic nie zrobiliśmy wszystko jest ok.
- Ok coś się stało ale że Starshieldem, ale to nie ja to Biały Dom.
- Biały Dom mówi spadaj na drzewo Elon.
- Ok, no dobra to Ja, ale to dlatego, że Ukraina złamała warunki użytkowania!
Gdyby to była pierwszą odpowiedź... To może bym uwierzył. Ale jako, że to chyba już piąta wersja w tydzień to sorry ale nie.
Elon Musk claims that Ukraine allegedly violated Starlink's terms of use and used the system on combat drones.
As someone who was inside the process at the Ministry of Defense, I can say with certainty that this is not true.
In February of this year, whitelists were introduced. Stationary terminals could be registered by both military personnel and civilians.
But for any satellite terminal to work while on the move, it had to be added to a special list and connected to the military Starshield system. Otherwise, no satellite communication terminals in Ukraine would work.
In other words, using civilian Starlink for drone missions was technically impossible. All drone missions that required satellite communication could only be carried out using Starshield.
We are very grateful to the United States and SpaceX for access to critically important satellite communications. Ukraine did not violate the terms of use.
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Once again, I live in Ukraine, and I have never met a soldier or a civilian who is fighting for Zelenskyy.
Ukrainians resist because our country was invaded, because russian occupation means kidnapped children, executed civilians, torture chambers, mass graves, rape, and looting. Our soldiers defend their families, their culture, their civilians, and their future, not the president.
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Buď teda Ukrajinci dokázali nějak hacknout systémy SpaceX a používat civilní antény Starlink za pohybu, nebo je Musk lže.
Takže:
1. Rusové od loňského roku načerno nakupovali Starlinky všude možně po světě, ty pak nasazovali na Ukrajině.
2. Problém začal řešit tehdejší ministr obrany Fedorov a jeho tým. Řešením byly bílé seznamy (whitelists), kdy pouze oficiálně registrované terminály mohly být zprovozněny nad území Ukrajiny (kontrolované Ukrajinu nebo okupované Ruskem).
3. Povolené civilní terminály fungují pouze ve stacionárním režimu nebo za velmi nízké rychlosti pohybu (do 90 km/h).
4. Registrovat terminály museli jak vojáci (přes Delta nebo Armija+), firmy a státní zaměstnanci přes portál Dia, civilisté a podnikatelé přes CNAP. Registrovalo se KIT číslo, UTID a číslo účtu.
5. Registrace byla spuštěna 5. února 2026.
A teď to podstatné (a zopakuji to znovu)
Ukrajinští vojáci pro terminály, které se využívají na mobilní cíle ve vysoké rychlosti (typické middle strike drony při zrychlení z rampy nebo třeba drony interceptory), používají službu Starshield.
To je služba, o které Musk říká, že ji kontroluje americká vláda (a všimněte si, že už nepíše, že ji vlastní). Jde o využití stejné konstelace satelitů Starlink, ale s lepším šifrováním, přístupy a tak dále.
Zde je důležité, že za tuto službu neplatí americká vláda, ale vláda německá skrze FMS (Foreign Military Sales, což je proces, přes který Amerika prodává své zbraně, například Patrioty). Ta platí tuto službu do půlky května příštího roku.
Co se omezila, je služba Starshield, tj. terminální na mobilních cílech. Nejde tu teď momentálně o stacionární Starlink, který funguje právě na principech těch bílých seznamů. Proto se Němci ozvali. Proto se Ukrajinci ozvali. Proto si Musk, Rubio, Trump a další přehazují zodpovědnost a matou společnost.
Důvodem není jen to, že v rámci americké společnosti nechtějí ztratit zbytky kreditu, ale taky to, že se vysílá vzkaz spojencům, kterým říkají, že pokud na postu amerického prezidenta bude člověk, který chce lízat ruskou/čínskou/severokorejskou či jakoukoli jinou podrážku, může mechanismus FMS s odůvodněním "národního zájmu" podělat.
A tenhle signál je mnohem horší, protože se Evropané (a vlastně kdokoli, kdo se u Američanů rozhodne nakupovat přes FMS, nebo jiný mechanismus, přes který není možné domáhat se právní ochrany u soudu/arbitráže) budou naprosto legitimně ptát, co všechno v sobě obsahuje kill switch a jak moc jsme schopní nahrazovat americké know how tím svým?
Proto Musk bulí, když Evropané mluví o předělovaní frekvencí pouze pro evropské společnosti. Proto američtí technologičtí giganti jsou nervózní. A proto budou mít problém i americké zbrojovky, které mají díky válce v Evropě žně (nákupy z Evropy jsou největší za desítky let a po 20 letech jsme největšími odběrateli amerických zbraní).
Trump si neuvědomuje, jak velký geopolitický průšvih za sebou zanechá, pro nějakou zdánlivou výhodu, kterou mu momentálně Putin nabízí. Ať už to 300 000 tun nafty, stavba infrastruktury ruskými společnosti pro Aljašku, nebo nějaké shady kontakty, který má Witkoff a Kushner s Dmitrijevem.
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Starlink, Starshield, GPS, and the Claims About “Hacking”: A Technical Explanation
A post accusing Ukraine of “hacking” #Starlink is spreading rapidly on this platform.
The technical claims in that post are incorrect. They seem based on a collection of rumors circulating on Telegram, including information from Russian channels.
Unfortunately, this post and others like it are receiving an enormous number of likes and reposts.
That's why I believe it's important to address these claims with clear technical explanations rather than allow misleading information to spread unchecked.
This is a fairly detailed post, but I think the distinction matters.
Some of the technical information below comes from my own research and detailed analysis of Starlink terminal firmware, particularly its GPS, PNT, and velocity-processing systems.
#⃣ 1. What are Starlink and Starshield?
People still frequently confuse the two.
Starlink is SpaceX's commercial satellite internet service, designed for consumers, businesses, and other commercial users.
Starlink supports operation in motion, but the permitted speed depends on the service plan, equipment, and geographic region.
Under commonly available commercial plans, the maximum authorized operating speed is 160 km/h (100 mph).
In Ukraine, Starlink terminals are subject to a specific speed restriction: they cannot operate at speeds above approximately 75–80 km/h.
This Ukraine-specific restriction was introduced less than a year ago, in coordination with Ukrainian authorities, to prevent Starlink terminals from being used on drones.
Starshield is SpaceX's government-focused product and service family, based on Starlink technology and developed for national security applications.
It includes secure communications, Earth observation, and hosted payload capabilities.
Some Starshield systems involve dedicated government spacecraft and infrastructure. However, Starshield communications services can also use the underlying Starlink satellite network.
This distinction is important: Starshield does not necessarily mean a completely separate physical satellite constellation or entirely different user terminal hardware.
SpaceX develops and operates the underlying Starlink infrastructure. The U.S. government procures Starshield capabilities through contracts, with ownership and operational control depending on the particular system and arrangement.
The division of authority between SpaceX and the U.S. government has become especially relevant following the October 2026 incident.
Unlike ordinary commercial Starlink service, Starshield configurations used for military operations in Ukraine have supported substantially higher operating speeds.
#⃣ 2. Is Starshield available in Ukraine?
Yes. Starshield is operational in Ukraine and is extensively used by the Ukrainian military.
Starshield service has been used in Ukraine since approximately mid-2023. Subsequent U.S. government contracts and public reporting also confirm its availability.
The United States has procured Starshield services specifically to support Ukrainian military operations.
An October 2026 U.S. Senate letter explicitly confirms that Ukraine receives Starshield services procured by the U.S. government.
Therefore, the idea that Ukraine is somehow obtaining Starshield capabilities by secretly modifying commercial terminals fundamentally misunderstands how these services are provided.
How does the Ukrainian military use these services?
The Ukrainian military uses both commercial Starlink and Starshield.
Commercial Starlink is widely used because of its availability, relatively low cost, and excellent performance. For stationary installations and many other applications, commercial service is entirely sufficient.
Starshield is used for specialized military applications, including drones and other platforms requiring reliable connectivity at higher operating speeds.
These are capabilities provided through the Starshield service itself, not necessarily through unauthorized modifications to commercial Starlink hardware.
Using Starshield for its intended and authorized military applications is not inherently a violation of its service terms.
#⃣ 3. Regarding the October 2026 incident
Beginning on October 13–14, Ukrainian military units encountered unexpected speed restrictions affecting Starshield connectivity.
Terminals that had previously operated at substantially higher speeds began losing connectivity at approximately 160 km/h, with some reports describing interruptions at even lower speeds.
These restrictions disrupted military operations, particularly those involving high-speed unmanned systems.
The consequences were serious. Ukrainian officials reported that the restrictions interfered with drone operations, including efforts to intercept russian attack drones.
The decision-making process remains disputed. Neither SpaceX nor the U.S. government initially accepted responsibility for imposing the restrictions. Subsequent reporting and statements from U.S. lawmakers raised questions about who authorized the changes and which organization had the ability to implement them.
As of October 24, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has officially reported that Starlink/Starshield connectivity is once again stable at speeds exceeding 400 km/h.
#⃣ 4. Does Starshield require separate hardware?
Not necessarily.
This is one of the most important points in the entire discussion.
Starshield is a government-focused service and technology family. In the case of satellite communications provided to Ukraine, existing Starlink terminal hardware can be provisioned to use Starshield service.
In December 2024, Bloomberg reported that a Pentagon contract would provide Starshield access to an additional 2,500 Starlink terminals already deployed in Ukraine, on top of 500 terminals previously covered.
The contracts therefore provided service for a total of 3,000 terminals.
In practice, compatible commercial Starlink hardware can be reassigned to Starshield service through the appropriate authorization and provisioning process.
This requires approval. It is not something that a customer can simply enable through the ordinary Starlink application.
Are there specialized Starshield terminals?
Yes.
For example, there is a specialized variant of the Starlink Mini known internally as `mini1_rugged`.
Based on my hardware research, this model uses an improved GNSS receiver, the Teseo V, instead of the receiver found in the regular Mini.
However, despite having repaired and examined numerous terminals and maintaining contact with people working with this equipment, I have not encountered evidence of this specific variant being supplied to Ukraine.
The Starshield terminals I have encountered or received information about in Ukraine are based on regular Starlink hardware.
Some terminals arrive already configured for Starshield service. Others can be provisioned for it through the appropriate channels.
The key point is simple:
A regular Starlink terminal operating under an authorized Starshield service configuration is still a Starshield terminal from the service perspective. It does not need to be physically modified or “hacked” to obtain that service.
#⃣ 5. Why does a Starlink/Starshield terminal require GPS?
Three years ago, I published an article explaining why GPS is important for Starlink terminals and how to improve GPS reception on the hardware available at that time: olegkutkov.me/2023/11/07/con…
Some of the technical details in that article are now outdated, but the fundamental principles remain relevant.
A Starlink terminal requires sufficiently accurate position and timing information for network synchronization, beamforming, and other aspects of normal operation.
Location information can also be used for geographic service authorization.
Invalid or spoofed GPS data may interfere with these processes. Depending on the magnitude of the error and the firmware's ability to detect it, the terminal may lose connectivity or become unable to operate normally.
Modern firmware also includes mechanisms to detect suspicious or inconsistent GPS information.
When GPS data is considered unreliable, the terminal may attempt to use an alternative source of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information derived from Starlink's own satellite constellation.
However, this fallback mechanism is not guaranteed to work reliably under every operating condition.
This distinction helps explain why some hardware modifications focus on improving GPS reception or supplying more reliable positioning data, rather than bypassing Starlink's network authorization mechanisms.
#⃣ 6. What is Starlink PNT?
Starlink PNT is a positioning, navigation, and timing capability that derives information from signals transmitted by Starlink satellites.
By combining satellite measurements with known orbital information, a terminal can estimate its position and movement independently of a conventional GPS receiver.
Starlink firmware contains the necessary functionality to process these measurements and use them as an alternative positioning source.
Initially, this functionality was more of an experimental feature. It was interesting from an engineering perspective, but its accuracy and reliability were limited.
Over time, it has improved significantly.
Modern implementations can provide useful positioning information, including when a terminal is moving.
There are still measurement errors, uncertainties, and limitations, but Starlink-derived PNT can serve as an alternative when GPS is unavailable or unreliable.
Nevertheless, conventional GNSS remains an important and generally preferred source of positioning and timing information in current terminal designs. For now.
Can the terminal operate without GPS?
Under certain conditions, yes.
Starlink firmware provides a gRPC request called `dish_inhibit_gps`, which controls whether GPS is used as a position source.
When GPS use is inhibited, the firmware can attempt to rely on alternative positioning information.
A similar situation occurs when GPS data becomes unavailable because of hardware or communication problems.
However, disabling GPS does not guarantee that the alternative positioning solution will be sufficiently accurate or available.
It also does not automatically change the terminal's service permissions.
#⃣ 7. How does a Starlink terminal determine its moving speed?
The GPS receiver is a primary source of position and velocity information.
Proprietary NMEA messages, including `TMPV`, carry information the terminal's motion-processing logic uses.
The firmware does not necessarily trust these measurements without additional validation.
The firmware can filter GPS-derived velocity and compare it with information from other available sources, including Starlink-derived positioning.
The terminal also contains an inertial measurement unit (IMU), whose acceleration measurements can help evaluate movement and detect inconsistencies.
The firmware applies thresholds and consistency checks to these measurements.
These mechanisms run internally and aren't exposed as user-configurable settings.
If GPS measurements differ significantly from the expected values or fail validation, the firmware can reject them.
However, GPS validation and service-speed enforcement are two different things.
Rejecting GPS data does not automatically mean that the terminal has exceeded the permitted operating speed.
The terminal's service configuration determines whether operation at a particular speed is authorized.
When the relevant speed policy is violated, the terminal may report a condition such as: `MOVING_TOO_FAST_FOR_POLICY`
This distinction is essential when evaluating claims about GPS modification.
Simply changing GPS-reported velocity does not automatically change the terminal's authorized operating speed or eliminate the firmware's internal validation mechanisms.
As explained earlier, appropriately provisioned Starshield service supports high-speed operation without the same restrictions imposed on ordinary commercial configurations.
Therefore, no additional “hacking” is required to obtain high-speed capability when that capability is already authorized as part of the service.
Reliable GNSS reception remains desirable, however.
This is one reason specialized terminal designs may incorporate improved receivers, such as the Teseo V used in the `mini1_rugged` variant.
It also explains the existence of solutions intended to improve GPS reception or provide a more reliable PNT input.
**Improving positioning reliability is not the same thing as bypassing service authorization.**
#⃣ 8. How does Starlink geofencing work?
There are two important factors: geographic service authorization and physical RF coverage.
Understanding the difference is essential.
Geographic service authorization
Starlink uses geographic information to determine where service is available and whether a particular terminal is authorized to operate.
The system uses logical geographic regions rather than relying exclusively on the physical boundaries of satellite beams.
H3 is one geographic indexing system relevant to this discussion. It divides the Earth's surface into hierarchical hexagonal cells that represent geographic locations and regions.
Geographic indexing provides a convenient way to manage coverage and service policies, but an H3 cell should not be confused with a physical satellite beam.
Network authorization can depend on several factors, including geographic location, service configuration, terminal identity, and applicable restrictions.
A terminal may be physically capable of receiving a satellite signal while still being denied access to the service.
This is an important distinction when discussing restricted territories, including russia.
Receiving a Starlink signal does not necessarily mean the terminal is authorized to connect to the network.
Physical RF coverage
Satellite beams cannot perfectly follow national borders or the boundaries of geographic indexing cells.
An RF beam has a physical footprint determined by the satellite antenna, beam steering, operating conditions, and geometry.
Its boundaries are not perfectly sharp.
Consequently, a beam may illuminate areas on both sides of a national border even though the service is authorized on only one side.
This is a normal characteristic of satellite communications, not evidence that geographic service restrictions have been disabled.
The role of GPS in geofencing
The terminal's reported location provides another source of information for determining whether it is operating in an authorized region.
The network can use terminal positioning information, together with its own authorization rules, to determine whether service should be permitted.
When operation is prohibited, the terminal may receive an appropriate disablement code from the network.
These mechanisms should be understood as parts of a broader service authorization system, rather than as a single GPS check controlling everything.
Can geofencing be bypassed by supplying modified GPS coordinates?
This question requires some nuance.
Changing the location reported by a GPS receiver may influence positioning-dependent decisions, but it does not automatically override network authorization.
Starlink also has other information available to evaluate terminal operation, and its firmware includes mechanisms for detecting inconsistent positioning data.
Large discrepancies can disrupt normal positioning and beamforming calculations, trigger validation failures, or cause the terminal to lose connectivity.
Most importantly, changing GPS coordinates does not by itself grant a terminal permission to use a service or geographic region for which it is not authorized.
#⃣ 9. So what exactly is being called a “Starlink hack”?
This is where much of the confusion comes from.
The modifications being discussed online are primarily related to improving GPS reception or providing the terminal with reliable positioning and timing information.
These are technical solutions intended to improve connectivity and stability, particularly when the terminal is moving or operating in an environment with GPS interference.
They do not automatically bypass Starlink's speed restrictions, geographic limitations, or network authorization mechanisms.
As explained earlier, regular Starlink hardware can also operate under an officially authorized Starshield service configuration, which supports high-speed military applications.
Neither improving GPS reliability nor using an authorized Starshield service constitutes hacking Starlink.
It's important to understand these differences before making accusations based on photographs, rumors, or incomplete technical information.
#⃣ Conclusion
Starlink and Starshield use closely related technologies, but they are different services with different capabilities and restrictions.
Regular Starlink hardware can operate under an officially authorized Starshield service configuration. No special hardware modifications are required.
Improving GPS reception or providing reliable positioning data does not mean bypassing Starlink's network restrictions.
Using Starshield for authorized military operations is not hacking. Neither is improving a terminal's GPS reliability.
My goal is simply to explain how these systems work and clear up the confusion surrounding them.
Technical accusations should be based on evidence, not rumors.
#starlink #starshield #gps
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
Replying to @ClarkeMicah
@ClarkeMicah indulging in his dreary pro-Putin apologia again, this time in @spectator
1. Britain is a large country with a tiny army, not the other way round. In case you haven’t noticed, our defences are currently smaller than a fig leaf.
2. CGS is being sensible in warning that Britain, as part of NATO, needs to be ready for war. We have a dangerous conflagration on our borders. Wildfires have a habit of spreading.
3. No British general is advocating war or making policy. This is a silly straw man. In fact, it’s daft. If you really think that the MOD has any power look at how little they’re received in funding rounds since 1990.
4. Ukraine was invaded by Russia in 2022, with the first seizure of its sovereign territory in Crimea in 2014. Ukraine may have its faults, but it didn’t invite invasion. Nor is it responsible for the daily death of its citizens: Russia is, wholly and completely.
5. Britain is 100% right to support the sovereignty of a country that has been egregiously attacked by its neighbour.
6. Our friendship with the USSR from June 1941 was political and pragmatic; to defeat Hitler.
7. Russia is not ‘mysteriously our enemy’. It’s pretty clear why it is our enemy, with its aggrandising attitude to Ukraine and its relentless prosecution of an unnecessary war.
But you know all these arguments, and will stand blithely by your own.
Sir Not-Appearing-in-this-Film retweeted
“Oh f**k, finger on the trigger!” 🙄 Two can make that mistake.
For those rushing to condemn @metpoliceuk and declare standards are slipping, perhaps a little context wouldn’t go amiss.
When an officer who is not firearms-trained handles a firearm at an event, whether a public or internal open day, a highly visible safety inhibitor is fitted to the weapon. The same applies when members of the public are invited to handle a similar @metpoliceuk firearm.
But why let a little knowledge of firearms safety get in the way of a good old social media outrage session? 🤦♂️
I do wonder, though, whether it’s really just the finger on the trigger that’s prompted this pile-on… or whether some people were simply looking for an excuse.





































