Paul Langton

IRGC Coup of Sorts The more I think about Mojtaba’s ascension, the less it makes sense on its face. The downsides to him succeeding his father are simply too many, which I outlined in my latest @NewlinesInst piece. So why did the regime choose him? The answer may be that the “regime” did not choose him per se. Rather, the IRGC effectively foisted him upon the regime. More importantly, we can no longer treat the regime as we did before the war began—as a coherent political entity with functioning institutional balance. The political leadership has been sidelined by the imperatives of war. The IRGC cannot wait for the government - or even the Supreme National Security Council - to deliberate and make decisions. The battlefield is fluid, the pace relentless, and the Guards must act in real time. Normal bureaucratic processes are simply incompatible with the “mosaic defense” doctrine the IRGC has had to deploy in order to confront technologically superior adversaries such as the United States and Israel. Under these conditions, the IRGC must assume that its standard communications infrastructure is compromised. That means it cannot risk routine interaction with the civilian political leadership. In fact, even its own senior commanders cannot reliably communicate with the chain of command without using far more secure and compartmentalized channels. The result is an implicit division of labor: civilian institutions continue handling day-to-day governance, while the IRGC monopolizes the conduct of the war and the maintenance of domestic security. To sustain this arrangement, the system requires a supreme leader who does not obstruct the Guards’ operational autonomy. Mojtaba fits that requirement. Given that we do not even know his true physical condition, it is entirely possible that he is not in a position to exercise independent authority. In that scenario, he may simply be rubber-stamping decisions already made by the Corps - or it may effectively be speaking in his name. This is precisely why the Guards backed him. They could not risk elevating someone with an independent power base or views that might diverge from their own. In essence, what we are witnessing may amount to a de facto coup. The regime, in practical terms, has become the IRGC - and it is fighting for its survival. Other factions within the system are now dependent on it. Yet as the Guards inevitably weaken under the strain of war, other elements - particularly the Artesh - could begin to reassert themselves. That is, assuming the conflict does not degrade the system to the point where the state itself becomes dysfunctional.