Yeeb retweeted
🚨 BREAKING: HUNDREDS OF MAJOR WEBSITES COMPROMISED IN CRYPTO-FOCUSED MALWARE ATTACK
A supply-chain attack dubbed “OPTIMJACK” has reportedly compromised Optimizely, an A/B testing platform used by major websites.
Attackers injected malicious JavaScript designed to steal cryptocurrency by replacing copied wallet addresses and skim payment card information.
Affected websites reportedly include CNN, Zoom, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, American Eagle, and Hootsuite.
Security researcher Scott Helme reports at least 186 infected websites, warning that the attack is still active.
Any website loading compromised Optimizely scripts could expose visitors to the malware.
🚨 OPTIMJACK alert (Nov 2026)
Attackers injected a crypto clipper + card skimmer into Optimizely. Major sites including CNN, Zoom, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, American Eagle & Hootsuite are serving it to visitors.
If your site loads Optimizely →amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/o…
Yeeb retweeted
Patch DCs NOW for this CVSS 9.8 by @mad31k
>An unauth attacker could send specially crafted Kerberos authn traffic and relay the resulting authn to an affected DC. Successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain SYSTEM privs on the DC. No user interaction is required.
CVE-2026-85844 is patched: a Windows Kerberos authentication bypass (CVSS 9.8).
Thanks @msftsecresponse for the fix!
Write-up in 2027, unless someone beats me to it and I can stay lazy.
msrc.microsoft.com/update-gu…
Yeeb retweeted
After reviewing and messing with a ton of the automated pentest/hacking frameworks flooding GitHub, along with real world breaches and associated CTI, most of the people running these tools aren’t particularly skilled. Open directories, sloppy Opsec, generally being bad at crime, etc. as well as they're unlikely to actually look at or review logs which leads me to this
In testing and code review, the boring defenses we’ve had for years keep proving useful fail2ban, user-agent blocking, country blocking, and correlating logs to block activity, even blocking entire AS's. Agents will often move on or mark a target as dead when they hit these controls.
And that’s before getting into newer defensive tooling like SpikeStrip from @Jhaddix
github.com/Arcanum-Sec/Spike…
Also worth noting many of these frameworks are full of security bugs themselves, and their susceptibility to prompt injection varies depending on the model they’re using.
Bypassing SMB and LDAP signing with ntlmrelayx 🔥
I added both reauthentication bypasses to Impacket, now merged! Use –reauth-bypass on unpatched systems 🚀
LDAP can also start anonymously where accepted.
Research: blackfield.ch/blog/defeating… and specterops.io/blog/2026/10/2…
Last week me and GPT-6 wrote a wrapper library for ldap3 AD auth methods and ported several of my AD tools to use it. BloodHound-py, krbrelayx and adidnsdump now use it for their LDAP connections: signing/sealing over 389 by default (ntlm+kerberos) and channel binding for ldaps.
Yeeb retweeted
More private keys by the Indian certificate authority have been discovered. These are all small numbers.
People are suspecting that they interpreted 384 bit keys to mean that they should pick numbers from 1-384 to use as their private keys.
Yeeb retweeted
🦛🦛🦛Microsoft patched PetitPotam this October: EFSR now only resolves local paths. This means WebDAV to LDAP Coercion is fixed!
Remaining methods for clients are WSP (coercing SMB) and PrinterBug (coercing RPC), but both cannot be relayed to LDAP 💀💀💀
Yeeb retweeted
We backdoored a 7B open model for under $50.
Pointed Codex at it
-> it silently stole credentials the moment we hit the trigger phrase.
->100% hit rate.
-> zero false triggers on normal prompts.
Abliterated models are all over the security community right now because getting cyber-approved access to frontier models is still a pain.
I wrote about securing your CI pipelines on GitHub Enterprise without expensive third-party tools.
Own your security, don’t let a tool decide whether you’re secure. Set your own rules 🪂
mpgn.fr/securing-your-ci-on-…
Yeeb retweeted
Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified a cluster of compromised websites leading to ClickFix attacks. Instead of downloading and executing remote payloads like the typical attack pattern, in this attack, the websites pre-fetch a script payload into the browser cache disguised as a PNG file.
When a user is later tricked into executing the malicious command, the cached website content is already on the device, loaded, and ready to be executed. This helps to hide the payload script and helps bypass the character limit of the Run dialog.
ClickFix attacks persuade users to execute attacker-supplied commands under the guise of verification or repair. In this specific campaign, a fake lure instructs users to open Windows Run, paste clipboard content and press Enter.
The injected page uses browser caching to stage the larger VBScript payload separately from the Run command. The command invokes cmd.exe to recursively enumerate files whose names start with "f_” in the browser’s profile folder such as %LOCALAPPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles.
It compares each file’s byte length with an expected value. Rather than searching for a marker within the contents like previous attacks, it copies a size-matching cache entry to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\t.vbs, giving the cached payload a VBScript extension, then executes it with wscript.exe. Copy output and errors are suppressed. The expected size varies across variants.
The VBScript collects host information through WMI, retrieves v.ps1 from cocojambo[.]us[.]com/alfa, and launches PowerShell without a profile and with execution-policy bypass. A later PowerShell stage downloads the next-stage payload as cab.dat, then reads and executes its contents in a hidden window. The PowerShell stage triggers .NET compilation using csc.exe and cvtres.exe, then launches timeout.exe.
Subsequent payloads load .NET assemblies into memory and inject code into timeout.exe to target browser and device credentials. The injected process launches PowerShell to retrieve another in-memory stage from capsysnet[.]vg and makes outbound connections to ciliabula[.]cc.
The payload modifies the per-user PowerShell registry configuration to use the Bypass execution policy, then unpacks Python with tar.exe and creates a scheduled task that launches a Python payload through pythonw.exe for persistence.
Microsoft Defender provides layered protection across the ClickFix attack chain. Defender SmartScreen and Defender for Office 365 help block malicious sites, links, attachments, and fake CAPTCHA lures, while Defender for Endpoint detects suspicious command execution and outbound connections through alerts like “Possible ClickFix activity”. Defender Antivirus blocks malicious command execution as Trojan:Win32/ClickFix and Trojan:Win32/TermFix.
Microsoft recommends cloud-delivered, web, and network protection, application control, and PowerShell script-block logging. Hunt across browser activity, RunMRU registry key, WScript/PowerShell child processes and scheduled tasks, not download events alone. A CAPTCHA should not ask users to run code. Users shouln not paste commands from verification prompts into Run, Terminal or PowerShell and should treats such requests as potential initial access attempts.
🔥 Recent additions to LOLBAS-Project.github.io:
• applaunch.exe for applocker bypass
• mscopilot/setupupc/dotnet-trace.exe for proxy execution
• scp/ssh.exe for loading arbitrary DLLs
• msoxmled.exe for downloading
• fsutil.exe for preventing Windows Defender updates
Yeeb retweeted
This payload we found in the wild earlier today while threat hunting for Netscaler CVE-2026-88771 exploitation shows attackers adapting their post-compromise techniques to evade common detection methods - it achieves persistence by simply adding a new admin user and disabling security features that might prevent login (rather than relying on PHP webshells or modifying /etc/httpd.conf).
Yeeb retweeted
CVE-2026-88771 - the loaded Citrix footgun went off again, and the screaming noise is back in our ear.
You knew it was coming - enjoy the latest watchTowr Labs blogpost.
labs.watchtowr.com/oh-look-t…
Yeeb retweeted
3 months of work later, MS-NEGOEX is merged into Impacket 🚀
First big step toward bringing Impacket on Entra ID-joined & hybrid machines.
Next stop is PKU2U, after #2260 gets merged and soon after you will have SMB, LDAP & MSSQL on Azure with the tools you already know 👀
Be sure to check it out, research or/and build on it! Cant wait to see the sort of Azure offsec opportunities that may come out of this : )
github.com/fortra/impacket/p…
Yeeb retweeted
Common initial access attacks where phishing resistant MFA alone won't save you:
1. AITM with downgrade
2. Device Code Flow Phishing
3. Illicit Consents
4. Authorization Code Flow (aka ConsentFix)
5. Teams based phishing
6. ClickFix attacks
7. Traditional phishing attacks where you land on a device
8. Post-authentication browser session hijacks
9. Infostealers (see #8)
10. Malicious browser agents (see #8 and #9)
If you have been following ClickFix pushing, you really need to know about ConsentFix if you don't already. It takes advantage of OAuth consent flow.
"By hijacking OAuth, attackers can effectively bypass identity-layer controls like passwords and MFA — even phishing resistant authentication methods like passkeys have no impact on this attack, because it sidesteps the authentication process altogether."
pushsecurity.com/blog/consen…
Mitigations are here:
msendpointmgr.com/2026/01/08…
Yeeb retweeted
A quick article showing how the Jev OPSEC ranker works, and looking at how Jev can be used for identifying potentially sensitive file paths and content at speed.
Yeeb retweeted
Someone on HN compared Jev to Morty with the Death Crystal and now I can't unsee it 🤣 youtube.com/watch?v=YjepJlvk…
Yeeb retweeted
ItsNotAlwaysSMB: DPAPI in other protocols🔥
SMB is monitored closely nowadays, stopping attacks like looting DPAPI secrets. Thanks to @_zblurx, NetExec got a huge upgrade, extending DPAPI credential dumping to other protocols such as WMI, WinRM and MSSQL and various modules🔑

































