Several important things have happened in Venezuela🇻🇪 over the past two days. As expected, everyone has their own interpretation of what these developments mean for the country's future. I want to share my own assessment. You may agree or disagree, and that's perfectly fine. 1. MCM's return: María Corina Machado's return is undoubtedly significant. The images we have seen demonstrate her popularity and ability to mobilize people. However, I remain cautious about what comes next. My assessment is that her return may have been facilitated by behind-the-scenes negotiations between Washington and the interim authorities. It's also possible that her freedom of movement will depend, at least in part, on her position toward the current arrangement between Delcy and the United States, as well as the ongoing negotiations involving Figuera and Jorge Rodríguez. The key question is why now? I see two possible reasons. First, Machado's return could help ease some of the political pressure on the Trump administration over its Venezuela policy. Following the oil deal and Trump's meeting with Delcy at the UN, the administration has faced criticism from Congress over its approach to the country. Second, with the midterm elections approaching, a positive development in Venezuela could help the administration politically, particularly among voters in South Florida. 2. The State Department's statement: Today's statement is another important development. It explains why patience is needed and outlines the steps required for a democratic transition. Based on the proposed timeline, 2027 appears to be a year for preparations, with 2028 emerging as a possible election year. On paper, the plan sounds reasonable. But I remain unconvinced that it will be implemented as outlined. Since January 3, I have seen a divergence between the State Department's approach and the White House's priorities. The State Department appears focused on building a political framework for a transition. Trump, meanwhile, seems far more interested in immediate, tangible gains, particularly oil and other economic opportunities. Whenever he talks about Venezuela, he tends to emphasize oil and his positive relationship with Delcy. This raises an important question: How much weight should we give to the State Department's proposed election timeline if the White House is not equally committed to it? I have little doubt that the State Department is working toward this framework. But I am not yet convinced that Trump shares the same priorities. He appears comfortable with Delcy for now, and I see little reason to assume he will push for a fundamental change in the status quo as long as the current arrangement serves his interests. Until Trump himself clearly endorses a credible electoral roadmap, I will remain skeptical about the 2028 timeline. The oil deal and the Betancourt case also make me question whether democratic transition is truly a near-term priority. If elections are the ultimate objective, why was Betancourt chosen in the first place? And so on. 3. Delcy and Chavismo The situation is equally complicated from Delcy's perspective. Chavismo has little incentive to facilitate a transition that could end its hold on power and expose its members to prosecution, imprisonment, or exile. Delcy will therefore do everything she can to maintain Trump's support and demonstrate that she remains useful to Washington. Rubio could push for a different approach and potentially undermine her position. But Trump could choose to keep her in power. So Delcy’s strategy is on Trump. Why would they willingly cooperate with a process that could cost them their power and freedom? And even if Washington genuinely wants elections in 2028, what leverage will it have over Delcy if Trump leaves office before that process is completed? I will cautiously observe each actor's next move in the coming months before making any conclusions. And yes, I remain deeply skeptical of Chavismo.