Israel’s elections could influence events far beyond the Middle East. Voting is underway, and the latest polls put the new Yashar party, led by Gadi Eisenkot, in the lead. But finishing first does not guarantee taking power. Everything will depend on who can reach an agreement with whom and form a government. Even a change of prime minister, however, offers little reason to expect a rapid shift towards peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Eisenkot and Netanyahu both support tough security policies and oppose an independent Palestinian state. They differ significantly on other issues: judicial independence, military conscription for the ultra-Orthodox, and settlements in Palestinian territories. Eisenkot may be more open to certain compromises, but he remains willing to use force. The prospects for peace depend in part on what Israeli politicians are prepared to call a victory. For some, weakening their adversaries and securing reliable security guarantees might be enough. For religious nationalists, territorial expansion is a goal in itself. They may therefore see abandoning annexation as a defeat, even if attacks cease. Netanyahu has to accommodate such partners to remain in power. Reducing their influence could matter at least as much as replacing the prime minister. Better relations with the West could help Eisenkot both negotiate and wage war. He has already supported US–Israeli strikes on Iran and proposed a US-led regional security alliance. His government might find it easier to secure Western support for a limited military operation if it also curbed settler violence and agreed to negotiations over Gaza. Diplomatic flexibility would therefore not necessarily mean a less forceful military policy. The next 6–12 months are likely to bring renewed attempts to use force to extract concessions, followed by a return to negotiations. One possible scenario is another US–Israeli campaign against Iran. Trump may be hoping for a short operation after which he can declare victory, strike a deal, and bring down energy prices. Israeli leaders may seek to use American support while it remains available. CNN reports that military options have been drawn up, although no final decision has yet been made. Iran will find it difficult to make concessions as long as its leaders fear being overthrown. If Tehran believes that meeting the demands would leave it more vulnerable to attack, continued resistance will seem safer. A limited operation could escalate into a major war despite the participants’ initial intentions. The trigger could be heavy American casualties, the destruction of energy infrastructure, or strikes that Tehran interprets as the beginning of an attempt to eliminate its leadership. Iran could respond by attacking more countries and targets, seeking to make the war too costly for its adversaries. The parties would then become increasingly embroiled in an exchange of strikes. The war could intensify the very threats it was launched to eliminate. If conventional weapons and diplomacy fail to protect Iran from attack, advocates of acquiring nuclear weapons will gain another argument in their favour. Overthrowing the current leadership would not guarantee democracy either: military leaders could take its place, and the struggle for power could drag on for years. Even if a major war is avoided, without an agreement the region could remain trapped between strikes and fragile ceasefires for a long time. Under this scenario, the US would avoid large-scale intervention, Iran would reject its demands, and Israel would continue conducting individual military operations. A similar pattern is already evident in Gaza and Lebanon: the intensity of fighting has declined, but disputes over disarmament, territorial control, and troop withdrawal remain unresolved. An agreement between the US and Iran could offer both sides an acceptable way out of the confrontation. Tehran would agree to verifiable restrictions on its nuclear programme, an end to attacks, safe passage for shipping, and reduced military aid to groups that threaten its neighbours. In return, it would receive relief from the blockade and sanctions, alongside a commitment not to overthrow its leadership by military force as long as it complies with the agreement. Trump could present this as a diplomatic victory, while Iran would gain economic relief. Such an agreement would not rule out domestic political change in the country. Trump may put pressure on Netanyahu if continued warfare undermines American interests. Washington bears military and economic costs, while Israeli leaders may consider further strikes necessary. According to media reports, some of Trump’s advisers are already dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s policies. A Republican defeat in the congressional elections could strengthen the White House’s desire to end the confrontation, although it would not, on its own, determine its decisions. Iran’s neighbours seek to contain its influence but fear the consequences of its collapse. Further attacks on infrastructure, refugee flows, and prolonged instability would threaten their own security. Talks involving Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani delegations in Tehran show that these countries are trying to shape events. Their interests nevertheless differ: the UAE may deepen military cooperation with Israel while opposing its policies towards the Palestinians. For a lasting peace, an agreement with Iran must be coupled with a settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Reducing the threat of a major regional war will not, in itself, remove the causes of local conflicts. The shared goals should be a secure existence for Israel, a sovereign Palestine, and mutual commitments by states to refrain from aggression. To achieve this, Israel needs a government able to negotiate without depending on supporters of annexation. It would need to halt settlement expansion and settler violence, accept Palestinian statehood, and establish the terms for withdrawing troops. Eisenkot’s current platform does not include such changes. His coming to power could facilitate some negotiations, but a comprehensive settlement would require a broader reassessment of Israeli policy. A Palestinian state must have effective authority over its territory and take responsibility for security within it. The two-state model entails agreed borders, mutual recognition, and protection for both peoples from attack. This requires Palestinian authorities with public support, accountable institutions, and control over all armed forces. Hamas cannot retain a separate army, and Israel cannot maintain indefinite military control that reduces Palestinian sovereignty to a formality. Statehood, governance reforms, and the disarmament of Hamas are linked in the 2025 New York Declaration. Confidence in the agreements will depend on the US being willing to demand compliance from all parties. Washington could guarantee Israel’s protection while making part of its support conditional on adherence to the agreements. For Iran, fulfilling its commitments must bring real economic relief. The guarantees themselves must be secured in a way that allows them to withstand a change of US president. Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen will need political settlements of their own. In Lebanon, there is already a basis for strengthening the national army and withdrawing Israeli troops, although implementation remains difficult. Regional agreements involving Iran, Turkey, and Arab states are needed on non-aggression, safe passage for shipping, and the prevention of military clashes. The Gulf states could support these efforts by funding reconstruction and expanding trade. Peace will have powerful opponents, so it will need public support. For supporters of annexation, compromise would mean giving up territorial claims; for Iran’s security establishment, it would mean losing some regional influence. Hamas and Hezbollah leaders may see disarmament as a threat to their power and personal safety. Even weakened, they will retain the capacity to derail agreements. It will be easier to resist such efforts if people experience the practical benefits of peace: security, political rights, jobs, and the opportunity to rebuild their lives.

Russia just attacked Kyiv again with a large number of ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian Defense Forces destroyed an ammunition warehouse in Russian-occupied Luhansk region. Secondary detonation lasted more than an hour.

A temporary ceasefire was established in the area of the Russian-occupied Ukrainian city of Oleshky (Kherson region). It began at 3:00 a.m. (4:00 a.m. Moscow time). According to estimates by the Ukrainian government, between two and six thousand civilians are trapped there under blockade and are suffering from hunger. Russia's Ministry of Defense stated that in connection with preparations for a "humanitarian operation" in the Oleshky area, it had ceased fire on the Kherson direction and introduced a "silence regime." The Ukrainian command had previously confirmed the agreement on a temporary ceasefire. "The silence regime is being established exclusively for the humanitarian operation: delivery of aid to residents currently in the city and preparation for the free movement of the civilian population from Oleshky," the General Staff said in a statement. "We urge everyone during this period to be especially cautious regarding the information you receive and share... Do not trust unverified reports, and do not spread rumors about the routes, time, and location of the movement of people and humanitarian columns," it noted. The frontline city has been cut off from food and medicine supplies for many months. Earlier, the BBC spoke with residents of Russian-occupied Oleshky who described how they are suffering from malnutrition - including boiling soup from weeds - and how dangerous it is to evacuate the city due to mined roads. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets, who negotiated with Melania Trump on the Ukrainian side, stated that the operation to rescue people in Oleshky is extremely difficult to implement. "As part of our agreement, first – a silence regime will be ensured. Second – humanitarian cargo will be delivered to Oleshky. Third – free movement of the civilian population out of Oleshky will be ensured," he said in a video message on Telegram. Kherson is controlled by Ukraine, while Oleshky was occupied by Russian forces back in 2022. In 2023, most of the city was flooded due to the Russian army's blowing up of the Kakhovka Reservoir dam. Source: BBC Ukraine

Last night, Russia attacked Ukraine with Iskander-M and S-400 ballistic missiles, as well as 280 drones. ▪️Kyiv. Two fires broke out in non-residential buildings in the Obolonskyi district. In the Desnianskyi district, a university building, dormitories, residential buildings, and cars were damaged. A non-residential building was also partially destroyed, and the Pivdennyi Bridge (South Bridge) and medical facilities were affected. One person was killed and 15 others were injured. ▪️Poltava region. In the Omelnytska hromada of the Kremenchutskyi district, a country house caught fire due to the fall of a Russian drone debris. The glazing in neighboring buildings was also damaged. ▪️Kharkiv region. Over the past day, Russian forces attacked Kharkiv and 12 settlements in the region. Three people were killed and eight others were injured, including a child. ▪️Sumy region. In Konotop, there has been no electricity for the fourth day following Russian strikes. The hospital is operating on generators, and water is supplied on a schedule. Restoration work is ongoing. ▪️Donetsk region. Over the past day, 1,768 Russian strikes on the front line and residential areas were recorded. Three people were killed and 22 others were injured, including a child. ▪️Chernivtsi region. The Russians attacked an energy facility in Bukovyna. Two civilian guards were injured. Several houses were left without electricity. 📹: SESU

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski: "I agree with President Kwaśniewski, and Norman Davis has been saying this for 30 years, that the Soviet Union minus Ukraine is Russia as a non-superpower. To be a global power, Russia needs Ukraine." - @sikorskiradek

⚡️ The President of Finland and the Prime Minister of Norway held a phone call with Putin – President Stubb's office. The call was initiated by the European leaders themselves. The statement from the office emphasizes that Alexander Stubb and Jonas Gahr Støre spoke strictly on behalf of their respective countries, not on behalf of all of Europe. President Stubb described the conversation as "open and substantive," while Støre noted that he and his colleague emphasized the necessity of de-escalating the war in Ukraine.

The election results in Serbia matter so much because they raise hopes that Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans could weaken. Serbia remains the main centre of Russian influence in the region. Through Belgrade’s ties with Serb communities, Moscow also influences neighbouring countries. Serbia supports parties and organisations in Republika Srpska, within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Montenegro and Kosovo. Churches, cultural organisations and media outlets bring them together around the idea of a “Serbian world”. Moscow had ties with the leadership of Serbia’s intelligence services. In July 2023, the United States imposed sanctions on Aleksandar Vulin, then head of Serbia’s BIA intelligence agency. The US Treasury accused him of promoting Russian influence, taking part in drug trafficking and facilitating illegal arms shipments. Local media help spread Russian propaganda. RT Balkan and Sputnik produce material that other outlets then republish. This brings justifications for the war against Ukraine and messages undermining trust in the EU and NATO to local audiences. Moscow also spreads its influence through the church. The Moscow Patriarchate works with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which operates in several countries in the region. The Serbian Church has its own national and political goals and ties with local parties. Russia’s Night Wolves and similar organisations recruit supporters for Moscow. They work through civic associations and informal groups. The ties between their members survive changes of government. Opaque business dealings help Russian organisations evade sanctions and maintain business ties. Corruption and weak financial oversight allow these schemes to operate locally. Serbia has been used to prepare provocations in other countries. Investigations into provocations in Western Europe and preparations for unrest in Moldova describe how people were recruited, trained and paid in Serbia to carry out these tasks. In September 2025, police detained two people suspected of organising such training near Loznica. According to Serbia’s Interior Ministry, between 150 and 170 Moldovan and Romanian citizens were trained there to put up violent resistance to Moldovan police during possible unrest on election day. People were paid monthly for taking part in provocations. In September 2025, Moldovan prosecutors reported on a network run by an officer from Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. According to the prosecutors, a group leader received $500 a month, assistants $400 each and members $300 each. They had to provide photos and videos of their actions. Serbia’s dependence on Russian energy gives Moscow a way to put pressure on the country. Serbia buys Russian gas, and Russian companies own a stake in the oil company NIS. That means relations with the Kremlin affect prices and the reliability of supplies. Hungary’s MOL is in talks to buy the Russian stake in NIS. Permission to continue these talks has been extended until 30 October. Russia’s influence in Serbia could weaken following Vučić’s defeat. However, The Student List does not support sanctions against Russia and considers Kosovo part of Serbia. This leaves Moscow room to reach agreements with the new leadership. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moscow supports politicians who block the work of state institutions. Milorad Dodik and his SNSD party remain its main partners. The 4 October elections confirmed their influence. After being removed from public office, Dodik retained influence through Željka Cvijanović and other allies. Russia’s support helps them hold up reforms and maintain tensions over the country’s future. In Montenegro, Moscow uses disputes over Serb identity, language and the church to deepen divisions in society. Influential figures include Andrija Mandić of New Serb Democracy and Milan Knežević, leader of the DNP. Their ties with Belgrade and the church help Moscow influence the country’s politics. In January 2026, Knežević’s party stopped supporting Milojko Spajić’s government. These political forces can hold up decisions needed to join the EU. The conflict over Kosovo helps Moscow maintain its influence over Belgrade. Serb parties and organisations in Kosovo, including the Serb List, have ties with the Serbian authorities. An agreement between Belgrade and Pristina could reduce Serbia’s dependence on Russia. For now, neither side seems ready to take that step. Propaganda about Kosovo fuels fear and mistrust between communities. PolitNavigator, Pravda/Portal Kombat, Telegram channels and local websites tell their audiences that Kosovo’s authorities cannot govern the country, that Serbs are constantly in danger and that another crisis is inevitable. In North Macedonia, pro-Russian parties struggle to influence government decisions. They include Dimitar Apasiev’s Levica, Janko Bačev’s United Macedonia and Ivan Stoiljković’s Democratic Party of Serbs. Coalition partners that support the EU and NATO hold back decisions that would benefit Moscow. Delays in North Macedonia’s EU accession help Russian propaganda. The Kremlin exploits people’s frustration with Europe by spreading claims that the country is being humiliated, its language is under threat and others are dictating its choices. In Albania, Russian propaganda spreads through local websites. They republish material from the Russian embassy, Russian state media and the Albanian-language Pravda. In the rush for page views, newsrooms fail to check material properly and help spread the Kremlin’s version of events. Weak checks on company ownership and poor enforcement of sanctions leave Albania vulnerable to Russian business influence. BIRN investigators found that Strabag, in which Deripaska held a stake through Rasperia, received public contracts between 2019 and 2022. His rights as a shareholder were later frozen. Moscow gains influence where conflicts persist: they give it partners and reasons to intervene. Its influence weakens when states find common ground, agree on security and the rights of communities, and stick to those agreements.

This is what Kyiv's Pivdennyi (Southern) Bridge looks like after a Russian attack. Residents are crossing it on foot to get to work. Last night, Russia attacked Ukraine with 16 ballistic missiles and more than 280 drones. Kyiv was the main target. Sixteen people were injured and one person was killed. Russians struck a university campus and the surrounding area in the city. Five of those injured are university students and staff members. Two second-year students have already undergone surgery after suffering severe injuries, and another neurosurgical operation is needed, according to the university's rector. A metro station, schools, a dormitory, an office building, residential buildings, and other civilian facilities were damaged in Kyiv. One of the offices of DTEK, Ukraine's largest private energy company, was also damaged.

Polish FM Radosław Sikorski: "There is a myth that has been successfully planted in the West that Russia always wins. But things don't always go their way. They lost the Crimean War. They lost the war against Japan. They emerged from World War I with their tails between their legs. They lost the invasion of Poland. They lost Afghanistan. And they lost the Cold War. So things can turn out very differently." - @sikorskiradek