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A Failure of Judgment at the Highest Court To Richard Wagner, Your refusal to recuse yourself from the Emergencies Act appeal is not a demonstration of judicial confidence. It is a failure of judgment at a moment that demanded restraint. You have justified your decision on the basis that your prior public comments did not address the specific legal questions before the Court. That argument may satisfy a narrow, technical reading of judicial conduct. It does not satisfy the standard Canadians are entitled to expect from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The governing principle is not whether you commented on the precise statutory interpretation of the Emergencies Act. It is whether a reasonable and informed person would conclude that your previously expressed views could influence your assessment of the case. You publicly characterized the convoy as the “budding start of anarchy,” described residents as being “taken hostage,” and spoke in terms that conveyed clear condemnation of the events and participants. Those were not neutral observations. They were judgments about the nature, legitimacy, and perceived threat posed by the very situation now under review. This appeal is not a retrial. It does not exist to rehear evidence or relitigate the convoy as though the past can be reset. Appellate review in Canada is focused on whether the law was correctly interpreted and properly applied to established facts, with significant deference given to the findings already made by the lower courts. That distinction matters. The federal government is asking the Supreme Court of Canada to overturn decisions that found its use of the Emergencies Act unlawful. Those rulings concluded that the legal threshold for a national emergency was not met, that existing laws were sufficient, and that certain measures infringed Charter rights. In response, the government argues that the courts applied the wrong legal standard, failed to give appropriate deference to executive decision-making during a crisis, interpreted the definition of a threat to the security of Canada too narrowly, and erred in their Charter analysis. Each of those arguments turns on how serious and threatening the underlying events were understood to be in law. The Court must assess necessity, proportionality, and justification. It must determine whether extraordinary powers were warranted under the circumstances that existed at the time. Those are not abstract exercises. They require judgment about the nature of the events themselves. To suggest that prior public condemnation of those events has no bearing on your ability to assess the legality of the government’s response is to rely on a distinction that may be legally convenient but is publicly unconvincing. The issue is not your personal belief in your own impartiality. Every judge holds that belief. The issue is whether Canadians can reasonably maintain confidence in the Court’s impartiality when the Chief Justice has already expressed strong views about the factual foundation of the case. Recusal would not have weakened the Court. It would have strengthened it. It would have demonstrated that the Supreme Court understands the difference between legal defensibility and institutional legitimacy. It would have signaled that preserving public trust matters more than maintaining personal participation in a high-profile case. Instead, your decision suggests that the threshold for stepping aside is so narrow that even prior public condemnation of the central events of a case does not meet it. That is not a reassuring message to Canadians. Other members of the Court have recognized the importance of avoiding even the perception of bias and have stepped aside in contentious cases to preserve the integrity of the institution. That example was available. It was not followed. The principle of natural justice is clear. Justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. In a case of this magnitude, involving the limits of state power and the rights of citizens, that principle should have guided your decision. This was an opportunity to reinforce public confidence in Canada’s institutions at a time when that confidence is already strained. You declined it. As Chief Justice, you are not merely a participant in this case. You are the steward of the reputation of the Supreme Court of Canada itself. That reputation rests not on assertions of impartiality, but on decisions that demonstrate it beyond reasonable doubt. In choosing not to recuse yourself under these circumstances, you have not strengthened that reputation. You have placed it at risk, at a time when public confidence in national institutions is already fragile. The damage may not be immediate, but it is real, and it is yours to own. Respectfully, Melanie in Saskatchewan