Yale Law School - Paul Tsai China Center // NYU - US-Asia Law Institute // Harvard Fairbank Center for China Studies
Boston, MA
Joined April 2013
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Peter Dutton retweeted
Meanwhile in the Indo-Pacific..
👇
China's coast guard harasses Filipinos. Philippines documents it. China gets upset when the footage reaches the rest of the world and accuses Manila of "playing the victim."
If you don't want the reputation of a bully, stop behaving like one.
xitter.cf/globaltimesnews/status…
Peter Dutton retweeted
New! 20 #Chinese (中文) #Naval/#Maritime #Law-Related Translations Published!
@NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Quarterly Review 1.3 (February 2026)—The Legal Struggle for #China’s Maritime Power: Strategy, Sovereignty, & Enforcement
digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm…
Previous issues curated here: bit.ly/CMSIQuarterlyReview1-…
From CMSI Director CAPT @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.):
China Military Maritime Watchers: How does maritime law become an instrument of power & influence?
The China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) is pleased to announce the publication of our latest CMSI Quarterly Review – Translation Special Edition.
This volume brings together 20 archived CMSI translations to trace how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) built & operationalized a robust legal architecture in support of its strategic transition from a large maritime country to a maritime power.
Drawn from official and unofficial PRC journals, these articles reveal how maritime law has been used to legitimize expansive extraterritorial claims, establish legal “red lines,” & shape competitive behavior at sea.
Rather than reading history backward, the volume treats each article as a snapshot in time, capturing evolving PRC thinking—from China’s role in international maritime negotiations to the modern employment of law as an operational instrument.
As PRC maritime disputes intensify, understanding how China arrived at its legal positions—& how it intends to use them—matters more than ever.
We hope this collection of archived translations proves a valuable resource for scholars, warfighters, & policymakers navigating the Indo-Pacific’s increasingly contested legal terrain.
@JamesKraska/@julianku/@BonnieGlaser/@graham_euan/@djag2/@BuchananLiz/@justinburke/@RUMLAE
Peter Dutton retweeted
The Fairbank Center remembers Professor Jerome A. Cohen (1935 - 2025), founder of the East Asian Legal Studies (@EALSHLS) program and tenured member of the law faculty from 1964 to 1979 @Harvard. He was 95 years old. Read stories and tributes from his friends and family below:
fairbank.fas.harvard.edu/res…
Peter Dutton retweeted
This sounds like a small ask by China, but it would be a pretty big shift in U.S. policy to go “not supporting” to “opposing” Taiwan independence.
Peter Dutton retweeted
Looks like a couple of Bohai Ferries are doing an exercise off of Dongshan Island, at the southern end of the Taiwan Strait. They headed down from their usual Yellow Sea routes a few days ago.
Peter Dutton retweeted
@ryanl_hass at @BrookingsInst spoke to The Monitor, making the case that negotiations are the only viable option for the U.S. and China.
open.substack.com/pub/uscnpm…
Peter Dutton retweeted
Update on PLA Activities Around Taiwan
(Based on @MoNDefense's Data)
Three Observations:
(1) The PLA’s activity around Taiwan in May this year did not show a significant increase compared to the same month in previous years. This situation is similar to that observed in April but contrasts markedly with the significantly higher activity levels seen from January to March this year compared to the same period in previous years.
(2) There were five peak periods this month during which over 30 military aircraft were detected. In comparison, May 2024 had four such peak periods. However, all four peak periods in May 2024 were joint combat readiness patrols (JCRP), while in May 2025 only two of the five peak periods were JCRPs.
(3) Reuters reported that since May 21, China deployed 60 to 70 vessels around the First Island Chain. Compared to the similar situation in December 2024, these ships seem farther from Taiwan, with no obvious increase nearby.
Update on PLA Joint Combat Readiness Patrols around Taiwan
(Based on data from @MoNDefense, @jointstaffpa, @TaiwanMonitor, and @songs349)
Unusual patrol maneuvers could occur in the coming days during Type 075 task force operations, based on past experience:
(1) May 18 marks the 19th joint combat readiness patrol in 2025 and the second one in May.
(2) On May 16, a Type 075 task force entered the Western Pacific for operations, and on May 18, it was operating in waters east of Taiwan. During the patrol on May 18, some PLA aircraft crossed the Bashi Channel, possibly conducting combined training with the Type 075 task force.
(3) When a Type 075 task force operates in the Western Pacific, unusual patrol activity often occurs. During one such month starting late August 2024, multiple drone flights circled Taiwan. In late February 2025, military drills took place near southwestern Taiwan.
For more details on Joint Combat Readiness Patrols during Type 075 task force operations in the Western Pacific, please see my analysis published in @ChinaMaritime’s CMSI Notes this March:
digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm…
Peter Dutton retweeted
@AndrewSErickson Hi, the unroll you asked for: threadreaderapp.com/thread/1… Talk to you soon. 🤖
Peter Dutton retweeted
Update on PLA Activities Around Taiwan
(Based on @MoNDefense's Data)
3 Key Trends:
(1) The total number of detected aircraft sorties and those crossing the median line in April this year is not significantly higher than in previous Aprils, which contrasts with the marked differences seen between January and March this year.
(2) Following the 2023 Joint Sword exercise, there were two days in April when the number of detected sorties exceeded 30; similarly, after the major military drills in early April this year, there have also been two such occurrences.
(3) In terms of daily naval vessel counts for April, excluding those during large military operations, the number in April 2025 is generally higher than in 2023 and comparable to 2024 (without large military operations).
Update on PLA Joint Combat Readiness Patrols around Taiwan based on @MoNDefense's data:
Three Observations:
(1) The patrol on April 11 was the third patrol this month, nine days after the "Strait Thunder 2025A" large-scale drill.
(2) Among the four patrols in April 2024, only one had more than 30 aircraft sorties, but all three patrols this year exceeded 30 sorties.
(3) The joint readiness patrols in April 2024 did not reach eastern Taiwan, but all three patrols this April operated in the eastern part of Taiwan, with this time flying south from the airspace between Taiwan’s Yilan and Japan's Yonaguni Island.
Note: The data has been updated by removing the long-range training on September 25, 2024, and adding the joint readiness patrol data from the two Joint Sword exercises in 2024, which aligns with the ROC National Security Bureau Director General's statement of 40 patrols in 2024. The sorties have also been revised to reflect the full-day data published by the Ministry of National Defense the following day, along with the addition of the number of warships.
Peter Dutton retweeted
Here’s a handy guide to @ChinaMaritime Studies Institute (#CMSI) publications! bit.ly/CMSIPubs
— CMSI News is a 1-stop shop showcasing our publications & activities. This quarterly bulletin contains links to CMSI comments/interviews captured in media, catalogs our translations, highlights engagements & previews upcoming CMSI events. bit.ly/CMSINews
— CMSI Translations are annotated translations of key Chinese publications. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm…
— CMSI Notes are short, timely analyses of recent China maritime events. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm…
— CMSI China Maritime Reports are short papers exploring topics of current interest related to China’s rise as a maritime power. Written by members of CMSI & other experts at the direction of CMSI Director @ChrisHSharman, they cover topics as diverse as China’s maritime militia, overseas port development & amphibious warfare. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm…
— CMSI China Maritime Studies “Red Books” are monograph-length, in-depth research reports written by 1+ authors or which contain a collection of contributed chapters edited by 1+ editors. These are extended research projects that the Editor, CMSI Director, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies & the @NavalWarCollege President consider to be of particular interest to policy makers, scholars & analysts. #NavalWarCollege Press publishes these studies for CMSI. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm…
— CMSI “Studies in Chinese Maritime Development” Edited Conference Volumes are books of proceedings containing contributed chapters, generally based on presented papers, edited by 1+ editors. CMSI has hosted conferences at NWC since 2005 & published the resulting edited volumes. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm…
Books:
Andrew Erickson, Conor Kennedy & Ryan Martinson, eds., Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion (Newport, RI: NWC Press, 2024). digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm…
— Selected for the @CMC_MarineCorps Professional Reading Program’s 2025 Reading List.
— Named 2025 Publication of the Year by Samuel B. Griffith Foundation.
Erickson & @rdmartinson88, eds., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis, MD: @NavalInstitute Press/@USNIBooks, 2019; paperback 2023). amazon.com/Maritime-Operatio…
Erickson, ed., Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious & Uncertain Course (Annapolis: #NavalInstitutePress, 2016; paperback 2023). amazon.com/Chinese-Naval-Shi…
Erickson & Lyle Goldstein, Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles (Annapolis: NIP, 2011). amazon.com/Chinese-Aerospace…
Erickson, Goldstein & Nan Li, eds., China, the US & 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership (Annapolis: NIP, 2010). amazon.com/China-United-Stat…
Erickson, Goldstein & Carnes Lord, eds., China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Annapolis: NIP, 2009; paperback 2021). amazon.com/gp/product/159114…
Gabriel Collins, Erickson, Goldstein & William Murray, eds., China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies (Annapolis: NIP, 2008). amazon.com/Chinas-Energy-Str…
Erickson, Goldstein, Murray & Andrew Wilson, eds., China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis: NIP, 2007). amazon.com/gp/product/159114…
Peter Dutton retweeted
Honored to be quoted by @BradLendon/@CNN!
“There are much easier, cheaper, lower-risk ways to maximize party security than the bespoke warfighting capabilities Xi concertedly pursues,” said Andrew Erickson, professor of strategy at the US @NavalWarCollege. ...
“Xi repeatedly engages in difficult #military restructuring efforts that prioritize improvements in realistic warfighting capabilities and impose some of the most demanding requirements conceivable on #China’s armed forces,” said Erickson of the US Naval War College.
He noted that China is building both numbers – the Pentagon estimates Beijing is growing its #nuclear warhead arsenal by about 100 a year – and technology, “pushing global frontiers with ambitious hypersonic weapons megaprojects.”
edition.cnn.com/2025/02/16/c…
Peter Dutton retweeted
🇨🇳#China's Undersea Cable Sabotage
Me: "What we are witnessing is a much more brazen Beijing now employing full-spectrum #grayzone tactics behind vanishingly thin facades of opacity or deniability. China seems much less concerned about reputational costs, calculating that any international outrage will be limited and manageable.
"This reflects both its strategy and its experience. China’s experience has been that international outrage is fleeting and of minimal real cost, while its strategy is to normalize increasingly aggressive behavior so that lower levels of aggression become routine and barely noted. We’ve seen this play out across many domains, including in the air, on or under the sea, in cyberspace, and through lawfare. So accustomed has the world become to it that incidents that used to generate headlines now barely receive public mention."
thediplomat.com/2025/01/chin… @Diplomat_APAC
Peter Dutton retweeted
Rubio instructs US diplomats to prioritize: “revitalizing alliances, strengthening ties with partners, countering the malign activities of adversaries, refocusing on great power rivalry”
Good to see alliances/partnerships enjoy such pride of place. realclearpolitics.com/articl…
Peter Dutton retweeted
The South China Sea Comes to a Boil—
“Manila now faces what amounts to a large-scale maritime occupation of its internationally recognized exclusive economic zone by a hostile imperial power [China].”
Must read @GordianKnotRay in @thedispatch (link below)
Peter Dutton retweeted
Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary: “We're committed to resolving any incidents or disputes through peaceful means, in accordance with international law, and that has always been our position.”
channelnewsasia.com/asia/phi…
Peter Dutton retweeted
(1/7) Did Joint Sword-2024C happen?
RCDA’s Director Chengkun Ma and I published an article on @ChinaBriefJT, titled: "Instead of Joint Sword-2024C, PLA Intensifies Winter Naval Training."
jamestown.org/program/instea…
Peter Dutton retweeted
(7/7) Strategic significance: China demonstrated its capacity to project naval power to the surrounding waters of the First Island Chain, signaling to the incoming U.S. administration, with deployed PLAN vessels rivaling the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
Peter Dutton retweeted
Absolutely what the US and others like Australia need to do: embrace a holistic definition of seapower AND invest in it to the hilt. China has done far better on both counts, by retaining national control even as its maritime interests have globalised: wsj.com/politics/national-se…
