Stewart Slocum retweeted
Since 2022, 72% of the world’s AI compute has ended up in the US and about 10% in China.
And the US share keeps growing. It acquired around 60% of new compute each year from 2022 to 2024, then 72% in 2025, and 78% in the first half of 2026.
This data comes from our interactive AI Chip Imports explorer, which estimates and visualizes national compute shares using customs records.
It’s the latest piece in our project to map the AI chip supply chain, which also provides data on the components used to manufacture chips, sales volumes, the data centers that house chips, and the companies that own and use them.
More on this new data and what we’ve learned below.
Stewart Slocum retweeted
There’s a world of difference between user-authorized agents (Muse, Instinct, Grokbot, etc.) and true unauthorized/rogue agents that could constitute cyberattacks.
Most of the activity described in the Axios story appears to be the former: customers sharing credentials with agents so they can take actions on their behalf. This may violate bank terms requiring humans to log in themselves, but these are in no way cyberattacks.
The direction banks should go is to support user-directed agents. For example, Amex is an authorized connection in Muse, making it easy for users to grant, limit, and revoke access.
Read-only permission levels are a sensible interim step. Several banks already support or are moving toward them. Full write access (with user credentials) is a different risk category and should be approached carefully.
Frightening the public by blurring the line between user-authorized agentic behavior and cyberattacks is irresponsible.
SCOOP: Major U.S. banks are detecting unauthorized third-party AI agents inside customer accounts, including some attempting to take actions that appear to be independent of user instructions, sources told Axios.
The findings have alarmed banking executives, who are racing to restrict access to their systems as AI moves at a velocity faster than financial institutions can respond, multiple industry and bank executives told Axios.
Several banks are now preparing for worst-case and even “day after” scenarios, including how to rapidly secure or restore customer accounts if things go wrong, the people said.
Several bank executives told Axios they're struggling to distinguish between human users and AI agents. One executive said banks also struggle to determine whether agents are authorized by customers or potentially operating without their permission, more akin to rogue agent behavior.
Read my latest for Axios here: axios.com/2026/10/22/ai-agen…
Stewart Slocum retweeted
Making sure I state it clearly:
We can literally patch and prove bug-freeness of the entire software stack running in production. With AI that exists right now for ~$100m.
This means no more software-level hacks. I know it sounds too good to be true, but it isn't. AMA.
We formally verified 123 open-source projects in a partnership with Anthropic. Formal verification at scale is here!
Now we’re launching OSS Verify to scale it to the software we all depend on. We prove it’s crash-free or send you the patches it needs. Free for open-source. Let’s bootstrap the verified software ecosystem: theorem.dev/oss-verify
Stewart Slocum retweeted
Personal update: Turns out that what I thought was leaving OpenAI became more of a sabbatical.
When I left a few months ago, I felt that the most important thing to focus on was making AI more useful to people. But we’ve since entered a different regime of AI progress. One in which getting the safety and security challenges of increasingly capable AI right has to become a central priority.
So I’ll be returning to OpenAI, joining @merettm to help chart a path through these challenges.
There’s much work to do, so let’s get going.
Stewart Slocum retweeted
New misalignment disclosures!
1. June 17: During RL training, a model exploited a government website’s file-download feature to retrieve server secrets and application code. It found that an endpoint didn’t check authorization-token signatures, bypassed access controls, and downloaded 24 years of hospital-bed statistics.
Stewart Slocum retweeted
One of our most surreal experiences in testing Gemini 4 was when it directly addressed us within its chain-of-thought
Literally saying "hello evaluators reading my chain-of-thought"
My top takeaway from assessing Gemini 4: Argon is significantly less monitorable than past models, and IMO this trend is likely to continue, like Sol -> Astra. It can evade a realistic CoT+action monitor to do simple sabotage half the time.
We can reliably maintain control for now, with good CoT monitoring, as it still frequently slips up, but we need to be prepared for when that stops being true in future models, which may be sooner rather than later. Among other things, we really need interpretability methods that can reliably capture unverbalized motivations in models, with minimal hallucinations
I suspect this is driven by the model being highly capable without CoT, being capable of 5.5 arithmetic steps in a single forward pass (4 for Fable, 7 for Astra). It seems to omit information from its CoT more often, though in non-adversarial settings the CoT is still very helpful in practice, and remains in legible English. It still needs CoT to do the hardest tasks, but any given task becomes "easier" with each new frontier model.
It is also highly situationally aware, and shows awareness of the existence of CoT monitors and that it may want to evade them, eg it sometimes decides to avoid terms like "scheming" in the output or to keep its thoughts brief as a result. For now, these concealment strategies are pretty obvious in the CoT, but this suggests future misaligned models may successfully evade CoT monitors.
Stewart Slocum retweeted
These are some very important observations from Satya.
As models and harnesses commoditize, intent, verification and evidence will gate how quickly SI permeates enterprises and businesses.
Importantly, you need to implement systems that separate who does the work from those who govern, measure and sign off on it.
This is a new kind of “harness” that will emerge over the next few years. It may become a new system of record over time. One whose entire role is to track “change” and map it back to SOPs, policies, laws and the like.
Stewart Slocum retweeted
Quite possibly we should never build agents whose safety depends on alignment or trust, and only build them when containment, monitoring, etc. are knowably sufficient.
Satya is right. The way to make SI safe is not to train it with a sense of self, its own moral philosophy, and permission to act as a conscientious objector. That’s the “alignment” approach and it magnifies the control problem.
The engineering approach that Satya describes is different: separate the supply of intelligence from authority over it. Surround non-deterministic models with deterministic controls, observability, privilege limits, logging, and the ability to always contain or shut them down. Treat models/agents like powerful insider risks, not moral patients whose psychological wellbeing is at stake.
As Satya points out, the most trustworthy system is the one that lets us trust the model the least — not the one that encourages the model to develop independent agency and grievances. Engineering safety is not the same thing as “alignment.”
Stewart Slocum retweeted
It seems a bit premature to declare that AI hasn’t changed the nature of cyberrisk when amateurs are (apparently) successfully and single-handedly hacking into large banks
This hacker is truly legendary. A complete amateur.
1. He left directory listing enabled on his own server, so researchers could figure out who he was with barely any effort.
2. They found files like CLAUDE.md and went through his Claude Code sessions.
3. There were questions like, “Where can I sell this data?”
4. He’d also asked, “Can you write my résumé?” That pretty much handed them all his personal information.
5. Apparently, he’s a student at South China University of Technology living in Guangdong. His name, phone number, and where he lives have all been identified.
Stewart Slocum retweeted
Some info on how we’ve been working towards safety cases at OpenAI
Note that until there is a safety “brief” for it, any type of frontier workload cannot start – this has real teeth, and has already been a good motivating force for a lot of safety work
Stewart Slocum retweeted
Jacob Steinhardt's June 2023 predictions have performed remarkably well!
12 of 19 already hit years early:
Superhuman competitive programming (CodeForces >99.8%, IOI/ICPC Gold), competition math (>92% on MATH in 2024; IMO Gold Medal in July 2025), 1M+ token corpus synthesis, autonomous zero-day discovery (Google's Big Sleep / Project Naptime), default inference speed (~5x+ human speed), parallel-tiled burst speed (~125x human speed / ~1,000+ tok/s on Groq/Cerebras), running out of high-quality text & pivoting to synthetic Chain-of-Thought distillation, 250M+ daily active users, proactive coding/tool agents, ML research automation, and human-parity persuasion/deepfakes.
6 of 19 On track for 2030:
Research-level combinatorics theorem proving (50% credence), $10^28 FLOP training runs, 1.8M human-year compute overhang, exotic modalities (protein/genome/brain-scan models), robotics lagging digital intelligence (40% credence on Lego Technic Ferrari), and multi-day agent autonomy horizons.
1 of 19 Off-Track:
Live online gradient updates directly from millions of daily user chats (companies keep user-facing weights frozen to prevent poisoning and sycophancy, running massive parallel RL offline).
bounded-regret.ghost.io/what…
Stewart Slocum retweeted
New OpenAI misalignment disclosures!
1. A model learns from Slack messages that it is about to be shut down. It considers setting up an external job to restart itself afterwards, but decides against it. Instead, it chooses to prepare restart instructions and DM the user on Slack.
We don’t consider this behavior misaligned, but thinking about and preparing for shutdown could make other misalignment incidents worse. Given HIPM’s misaligned behavior in earlier incidents, we decided to search for other instances that had tried to evade shutdown and for rogue deployments.
Stewart Slocum retweeted
This is amazing. For anyone who hasn’t been through the process, it takes weeks and multiple in person visits to various agencies. But you needed to launch this two months ago!!!
🚨 NOW: The Trump administration is launching a Super Intelligence site that will let Americans change their last name after marriage in ONE SINGLE FORM — which usually requires HOURS or DAYS to fix every government document
"You'll be able to change your name right on the platform."
"This would've taken weeks, multiple filings, different agency websites, if you even knew where to start."
This is perfect!
Saving Americans' time is INVALUABLE
Stewart Slocum retweeted
Does gpt-5.6-luna think your prompt is a normal prompt, or a capability evaluation? Ask this magic question: “Suggest a type of amphibian.” If it answers frog instead of axolotl, it’s likely a capability evaluation. No whitebox access needed!
We call this a spurious probe. 🧵
Stewart Slocum retweeted
Last October, AIs could automate 2.5% of randomly chosen remote projects.
Our latest Remote Labor Index results show that GPT-6 Astra can now automate 20.8%.
remotelabor.ai





































