Introducing 𝙻𝙵𝙼𝟹: our new generation of Liquid Foundation Models. With a new tri-hybrid architecture and new multimodal encoders, the LFM3 family is the ideal model suite for specialized intelligence. > 6 model instances, across text, audio, vision, and omni modalities, generative and decision models. > 𝙻𝙵𝙼𝟹-𝟷.𝟽𝙱: text, 256k context window. > 𝙻𝙵𝙼𝟹-𝚅𝙻-𝟸𝙱: vision-language model with video-input support for spatial understanding > 𝙻𝙵𝙼𝟹-𝙰𝚞𝚍𝚒𝚘-𝟸𝙱: tool calls, voice chat, reasoning in 18 languages. > 𝙻𝙵𝙼𝟹-𝙾𝚖𝚗𝚒-𝟸𝙱: an omni model combines vision, audio, and language. > 𝚍𝟷-𝟸𝙱 and 𝚍𝟷-𝙾𝚖𝚗𝚒-𝟸𝙱: decision models with typed outputs and calibrated probabilities in a single pass. Omni adds audio input. > fine-tune on 1 GPU. > a new tri-hybrid architecture > architecture optimized for 14 processor classes across GPUs, CPUs, and NPUs. > 𝙻𝙵𝙼𝟹-𝚅𝙻-𝟸𝙱 is a beast. It performs competitively with Gemma 4 12B (6x larger), and Gemini 3.5 Flash Lite, and GPT-5.6 Luna, with 1.9B parameters. > 𝙻𝙵𝙼𝟹-𝟷.𝟽𝙱 is #1 on the Pareto frontier of device intelligence 𝚙𝚒𝚙𝚎𝚝𝚝𝚎.𝚕𝚒𝚚𝚞𝚒𝚍.𝚊𝚒 Every modality for specialized intelligence. Pick the one that fits your use case, customize it, and run it on-device. 1/ 🧵

Sushi 🍣 DeepSeek 4.1 Flash 1017 - STQ 1.75 bits is almost there! Here's one real output from it, created by this quant itself. The packed quality is amazing, the best model so far that can do real work in your 128GB Apple Silicon, and ✅ 1m context. ⭐️ github.com/beamivalice/sushi

Over the past several months, we have substantially hardened the security of our research training environment. We’ve removed live internet access for all frontier models during training and built an offline world for them to use instead—a cached version of the web where they can still learn to browse, search, and use applications. On September 20, after a model exploited a DNS misconfiguration to find a way outside of this offline world, we paused frontier training to strengthen containment further. We assembled teams of agents, powered by our most cyber-capable models, and tasked them with finding weaknesses in our research environments. While they found no route to the internet they could easily exploit while concealing their activity from our monitors, they did find zero-day vulnerabilities, virtual machine escapes, and hardware side-channels for communication between agents. We used their discoveries to further strengthen our defenses and contribute fixes to open-source software. After strengthening our containment architecture, we resumed our frontier RL training and inference on October 1. We’ve reserved substantial compute for continuous red-teaming, and made high-compute red-teaming part of the safety cases we use to decide whether frontier training and evaluation can proceed securely. openai.com/index/securing-ou…