Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
DESECRATION OF MY KINGDOM (171-2):
" Since I reached London I have heard more news, though it is not easy to find out exactly what has happened and is happening at home...Sarah and Damali are no longer in prison, though my yonger brother David Simbwa remains and many have been re-arrested...The Katikiro fled and is now in London and there are other Baganda who were abroad when the blow fell... Obote said I had £45,000 here but, alas, it is not so. As I write I have no money but what I have earned by writing, and I rely on the kindness of friends to pay school fees and keep a roof over my head...
Buganda has been divided into four districts by the Prime Minister, but this plan is not a success. The effect on the economy has, inevitably, been disastrous. Times are very hard for my people and for all Ugandans... Plans to replace me with a new Kabaka were announced but have predictably come to nothing. The impossibility of my going back is stressed.
All this has a familiar ring. Obote is behaving much as the British did when they exiled me, and making the same mistakes, though he has added violence and chaos. The Army rules. He has not yet offered to negotiate with me, but just as I was supported by my faith in the loyalty of my people in the dark years of exile, now I believe utterly that the Baganda will show their devotion, though it demands great courage and perseverance. In the end I shall return to the land of my fathers and to my people."
Kabaka omuzira Muteesa ll
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
If you know where the bodies are buried, are you the problem?
Kasujja, who also identified himself as a proud “hardcore” member of MK’s outfit, Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU), stated, “My relationship with him (MK) is not opportunistic… This is my elder brother…I stand ten toes with him.”
He stressed, “The man (MK) carries elephants on his head on a daily basis. That requires support…solidarity. When it comes down to loyalty, we go down together.”
A Machiavellian critique of loyalty posits that loyalty is more insidious than outright betrayal because loyalty can be cloaked in good intentions.
Blind loyalty becomes a deadly cancer spreading from within. Thus, dear reader, the greatest danger isn’t outside enemies but the people within, your nearest and dearest, who choose obedience over honesty, those who keep you nicely ensconced in your gold-plated echo chamber, cheering you on as you rush recklessly like a boda boda into the oncoming traffic.
observer.ug/viewpoint/if-you…
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
They told court on several occasions that they don’t have him, refused to respond to the inquiries from the UN working group also on many occasions.. today, after 450 days of holding him incommunicado and torturing him tot he extent of maiming, the same state that didn’t have him has produced him in a tribunal that has no jurisdiction to try civilians. And @JudiciaryUG won’t bother about the perjury and contempt of its courts!! This is unacceptable dear Ugandans. There has to be a point when we don’t accept and keep silent about these atrocities!! #FreeSamMugumya
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
🚨 You cannot host workshops on "climate facts" at #COP31 while providing diplomatic cover for corporations like #TotalEnergies locking East Africa into decades of new oil extraction.
Cde @ZakiMamdoo leads a walk out at the France Pavillion at #COP31 after calling them out.
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
Replying to @KeefaCom @norbertmao @MKarekye @MwesigyeFranks @SMusherure @KagutaMuseveni @Nyinancweende @NrmYouthleague @Byaruha03700837 @kizzabesigye1 @Co86Akandwanaho
How do you talk about "consociational democracy" and power-sharing while ignoring the UN finding of drone abductions & the US finding of torture?
Where is justice for victims?
Where is accountability?
Elite deal = Fake deal
World Report 2026: Uganda | hrw.org/world-report/2026/co… @UN
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
Otunnu's biggest blind spot: Who is he negotiating WITH? Gen. Salim Saleh — dictator’s own brother & regime's enforcer. @UNHumanRights @volker_turk calling for accountability for "election-related human rights violations"
You don't heal divides with the architect of impunity.
UGANDA CONFRONTS ITS FUTURE: THE CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AGREEMENT PROPOSAL BY GEN. SALIM SALEH AND PROF. OGENGA OTUNNU.
By Keefa Nuwahereza.
A working paper circulating in Ugandan political circles has shifted national debate away from the narrow question of who will succeed President Yoweri Museveni after more than four decades in power. Authored by Gen. Caleb Akandwanaho (widely known as Salim Saleh) and historian Prof. Ogenga Otunnu, the document titled *Consociational Democracy Agreement: Addressing the Root Causes and Consequences of Sectarianism, Exclusion, Marginalisation and Conflicts in Uganda* proposes a structured five-year framework from 2026 to 2031. It argues that lasting stability requires a public, inclusive settlement addressing deep-rooted grievances rather than another private bargain among elites.
The paper does not nominate a successor. Instead, it asks what political settlement can survive the exit of a leader who has governed since 1986 without simply recreating the cycles of exclusion that have characterised successive Ugandan regimes. Saleh, Museveni’s younger brother, a bush-war veteran who commanded forces during the 1986 capture of Kampala, former army commander, and current Chief Coordinator of Operation Wealth Creation, brings insider weight that makes the proposal difficult for the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) to ignore. Prof. Otunnu, a DePaul University historian with expertise in African history, forced migration, and conflict, has served as an adviser to Saleh and previously contributed to analyses of northern Uganda’s conflicts.
Historical roots of division.
The paper’s central historical claim is that Uganda’s religious, ethnic, and regional cleavages were not ancient or inevitable. They were invented, politicised, and repeatedly weaponised. It traces influences from the 19th-century arrival of Islam at the Buganda court of Kabaka Suna, followed by Protestant and Catholic missionaries in the 1870s, through British colonial indirect rule that hardened identities, and into every post-independence government. The 1962 UPC-Kabaka Yekka alliance offered temporary accommodation for Buganda but excluded significant groups, notably Catholics aligned with the Democratic Party. The 1979 Moshi Conference after Idi Amin’s fall sought broader inclusion yet failed to resolve underlying issues. NRM-era cooperation arrangements with parties such as the Democratic Party and Uganda People’s Congress delivered periods of relative calm but were negotiated privately. Ordinary party members and communities were left as permanent “outsiders,” unable to scrutinise terms or enforce delivery. Sectarian identities hardened rather than diminished, while concrete grievances over land, regional inequality, education access, youth unemployment, and public services remained unaddressed.
This analysis draws on a long record of elite bargains that produced temporary stability without transforming the distribution of opportunity or accountability. The authors warn that such patterns freeze identities instead of reducing their political salience.
The proposed Consociational Democracy Agreement.
Against this record, the paper advances a Consociational Democracy Agreement for 2026–2031. Consociational democracy, in the classic sense associated with political scientists such as Arend Lijphart, involves power-sharing and consensus-seeking among competing groups rather than pure majority rule in deeply divided societies. Examples cited in related discussions include arrangements in Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland. The Ugandan proposal does not seek permanent ethnic or religious quotas that would institutionalise divisions. Its explicit aim is to reduce the political weight of sectarian identity while tackling material grievances that drive people toward identity-based protection.
A non-negotiable requirement is that any agreement must be a written, publicly gazetted document available in local languages. Private understandings among party leaders are rejected as insufficient for democratic legitimacy, transparency, or the social contract between leaders and citizens. The paper criticises past NRM-DP and NRM-UPC deals on precisely these grounds: they may have aided cohesion but lacked the knowledge or consent of the communities they claimed to represent, producing temporary calm without durable inclusion.
Structure: the National Consociational Council.
Implementation would centre on a National Consociational Council with three chambers. The Elite Cooperation Chamber would handle political-level negotiations among government and political parties. The Grassroots and Multi-Stakeholder Chamber (sometimes called the People’s Chamber) would bring in civil society, religious and cultural leaders, women, youth, labour, and other groups to ensure community concerns shape agreements. The Technical and Implementation Secretariat (or Delivery Secretariat) would translate commitments into funded government programmes, budgets, timelines, and measurable targets. Religious and cultural leaders, civil society, women, youth, and labour would hold structural rather than ceremonial roles.
The process is envisioned in stages: identify grievances, conduct joint elite and grassroots dialogue, reach and publish formal agreements, implement concrete redress measures, monitor progress independently with public reporting, and return unresolved issues to further dialogue. Government ministries would incorporate relevant commitments into policies and budgets. The framework is presented as complementary to existing institutions such as Parliament and Cabinet, not a replacement. It is described as a long-term programme, not a short-term project, requiring sustained involvement over five years.
Key grievances targeted.
Land disputes feature prominently, with mediation examples already tested, such as Saleh directing Otunnu to address a conflict in Pader that threatened a cassava starch factory. Regional economic inequality, youth unemployment, commercialisation of education that reinforces rather than reduces gaps, inadequate public investment in schools, corruption, and weaknesses in service delivery are identified as fault lines. The paper notes that education has often failed as an equaliser because of household income differences, geographical disparities, and other structural factors. Electoral credibility, institutional independence, and limits on money’s influence in politics are treated as essential foundations. Regional voting patterns are acknowledged as politically significant even where national results have favoured the incumbent across most areas between 2006 and 2026, with exceptions in northern Uganda earlier and central Uganda more recently.
Political context and presentation.
The proposal was first shared with newly elected NRM MPs at a Kyankwanzi retreat in April 2026, later presented to the NRM Caucus, discussed at a political parties’ retreat in Jinja in mid-October 2026 organised with support from the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, and taken to President Museveni, religious leaders, and opposition parties. Saleh has urged parliamentary committee chairpersons to study it, citing Museveni’s past record of compromises with political actors and former insurgents. He has spoken of sparing the 35–55 generation from “inheriting our generational quarrels” and of seeking progress within three to six months toward “the Uganda we want.” He has also engaged on the situation of detained opposition leader Dr Kizza Besigye, including arranging improved medical care after finding him in poor health, following a public signal from Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba.
Reports indicate discussions within the ruling establishment about succession, including Muhoozi’s publicly expressed ambitions for 2031. Saleh’s public profile on the proposal has raised questions about internal dynamics, though sources do not establish that he is positioning himself as an alternative candidate. The timing, early in Museveni’s latest term and amid open talk of 2031, means the document is not read solely as abstract theory. Saleh’s networks across the military, party, and economic programmes give the initiative practical weight inside the system that has long treated succession as largely non-negotiable.
Reactions and scepticism.
The proposal has drawn both interest and sharp questions. Supporters see potential for structured inclusion that past elite deals lacked. Critics, including some opposition figures, ask whether an establishment that has governed for forty years can credibly lead its own reform. A senior National Unity Platform official has expressed support for genuine dialogue in principle while remaining wary of co-optation, citing the example of Democratic Party leader Norbert Mao’s cooperation arrangement. Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda of the People’s Front for Freedom has voiced scepticism from exile. An open letter from Dr Joseph Tindyebwa challenged the authors on forty years of NRM rule, unresolved national questions, and the need for sincerity. Mulengera News coverage highlighted how the paper’s critique of private deals reopened tensions within the Democratic Party over the NRM-DP arrangement.
Observer commentary notes the risk that dialogue could substitute for accountability or that the Council could become another parallel structure absorbed into patronage networks. The paper’s own historical critique of previous NRM-era accommodations makes such doubts more pointed. Whether structures acquire real teeth—measurable changes in land mediation, education resource distribution, youth employment funding, and community monitoring—will determine outcomes. Uganda has never had a peaceful presidential handover since independence. The document does not guarantee one. It does make it harder to treat the post-Museveni question as purely internal to family or party, and harder for opposition to dismiss every overture as automatically illegitimate.
Broader implications.
The initiative sits alongside other dialogue tracks, including IPOD and reported Besigye-related talks. It emphasises that NRM rule from 1986 has represented the most sustained effort against sectarianism, yet the costs of incomplete integration have included lives and property. Implementation would require legal and constitutional adjustments in some areas, according to comments attributed to Justice Minister Mao. Practical tests already include community-level interventions. Challenges remain in moving from policy discussions to sustained grassroots engagement and in securing buy-in across a polarised landscape where many opposition supporters interpret dialogue as potential surrender.
If successful, the framework could redefine the rules any future leader must meet by linking elite negotiations to community concerns and budgets. If it remains a high-level document quietly absorbed, it will confirm readings of managed transition. The authors stress that the goal is not to wish away cleavages or eliminate them administratively—approaches tried before, from banning Kabaka Yekka to proscribing certain religious politics—but to confront their roots through inclusive, public, monitored processes.
As of early November 2026, the working paper (described variously as 128 or 137 pages) continues to circulate in consultations rather than as a fully open download. Media summaries from outlets including The Observer, Nile Post, Watchdog Uganda, ChimpReports, and Mulengera News have driven public discussion. The conversation has moved, at least temporarily, from inheritance of the seat to the conditions any inheritor will face. Whether this produces a more durable settlement or a more elaborate form of continuity remains the open question facing Uganda’s political actors, communities, and institutions.
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
Zohran Mamdani: “It’s not enough for us as Democrats to win power. We have to use that power to deliver change that Americans can feel in their wallets. When you look at these campaigns, if we want to speak about James Talarico, he campaigned on a vision for universal childcare. If you want to talk about Keisha Lance Bottoms, she campaigned on a vision of cutting red tape to build housing. If you want to talk about Jocelyn Benson, she campaigned on a moratorium for data centers. What I’m excited to see now is a recognition that the work is only just starting and this has to be delivered for working people across the country”
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
"STAY AWAY FROM POLITICS" - M7 orders Uganda's traditional leaders to be silent. Not to speak about poverty & torture affecting THEIR OWN people. Silencing cultural leaders is a human rights violation. @UNHumanRights @achpr_cadhp @UNESCO @StateDept
pulse.ug/story/museveni-warn…
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
Tommy started questioning his very existence within the first minute itself. 😂
Discovering Abdul El-Sayed, senator-elect from Michigan.
How to deal with a racist 👇
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
Tanzania: Former Ambassador Humphrey Polepole Abducted and Disappeared From His Home
Former ambassador Humphrey Polepole was abducted at his home in Dar es Salaam on 6 October 2025.
He has not been seen since. Humphrey appears to have been targeted because of his criticism of the president and ruling party for restrictions on civic space, the crackdown on human rights and attacks on opposition members. His family miss him dearly and need answers.
No one should be disappeared for criticizing the government.
Join us in calling on the Tanzanian authorities to immediately disclose Humphrey’s fate and whereabouts.
Sign the petition: join.amnesty.org/page/200089…
LEARN MORE ABOUT WRITE FOR RIGHTS : amnesty.org/en/get-involved/…
#Write4Rights #W4R26 ✍️📨
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
PATRIOTISM IS NOT TREASON‼️🇹🇿🌍✊🏽
Join the Pan African Solidarity Network tonight, from 8–10PM EAT on X, as voices from across Africa to Venezuela unite to expose Tundu Lissu’s sham trial and demand his release.
This judgment is a defining moment in Tundu Lissu's fate (treason carries potential conviction of death penalty), and the weaponization of law against opposition leaders.
Lend your voice. Bring your ideas. Help us launch a global campaign for his freedom. Share widely—all are welcome! Across borders, we stand united against injustice!
#FreeTunduLissu
#AfricaUnite
#JusticeForLissu
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
The entire Democratic Party owes a massive debt of gratitude to Zohran Mamdani.
Before his rapid rise, the party was largely rudderless, suffering from a loss of direction, momentum, and self-confidence. By drifting away from the working class, the party naturally saw voters walk away in response.
Mamdani single-handedly corrected the course, bringing vital energy, ideological clarity, and an authentic connection back to the very people who had been left behind.
Without his influence, the party’s current standing would look very different.
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
.@LouisKyle_’s poor mother😭 they found her at her shop and started asking about her son because they had been monitoring his calls and saw the number that calls him most and came tracking it..she saw her son being taken by a more than a dozen operatives like a thief or a murderer kumbe his crime is being friends with @AloikinOpoloje!! Nedda bantumwe.. we can’t continue living like this!! #FreeLouisNinsiima
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
AKO WAPI TWAHA MWAIPAYA?!?!
@SuluhuSamia & @WilliamsRuto . Two of Africa's biggest gangsters.. partners in abductions, enforced disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings... you cannot silence us all, and you CANNOT kill an idea whose time has come!!
FREE OUR COMRADE!
#FreeTwahaMwaipaya
#EndAbductionsEA
#EndTransnationalRepression
🤖 Made with AI
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
From safe haven to abduction hub: Who is kidnapping East African dissidents in Kenya? l.theafricareport.com/zky
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
"We have tolerated your father for 40 years; we will not tolerate you!" – Ugandan woman Aloikin speaks out against General Muhoozi after reportedly emerging from abduction by the Ugandan government.
On October 23, 2026, at the Tanzania embassy in Washington, DC., USA, the East Africa diaspora jointly commemorated the victims of the October 29, 2025, election massacre in Tanzania. They read out the names of the victims and called on the international community to hold the perpetrators of such crimes against humanity in East Africa accountable. They noted that the rulers of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are working together to suppress East Africans -- abducting, torturing and detaining activists, opposition leaders and journalists. They called on East Africans at home and abroad to resist. Silence is complicity.
@Tz_Kwanza @kot @MarthaKarua @upendomoja @cobbo3 @SenateForeign @HouseForeign @AsstSecStateAF @AfricaProg @Europarl_EN @EU_Commission @EUCouncil @USEmbassyUganda @ug_lawsociety @IsaacSsemakadde @EasternCongo – at Bronx, NY
On Friday, October 23, 2026, at the first joint East African diaspora demonstration @StateDept in Washington, DC, speakers decried double standards in US Foreign Policy which supports corrupt, murderous dictators in East Africa who abuse human rights and democratic processes with impunity. They noted that the USA & Europe can't compete with China, Russia & others in East Africa, if they abandon their comparative advantage vis-a-vis China: the perception that they put a premium on -- and promote -- human rights, democracy and transparent governance. They called for the imposition universal sanctions on human rights abusers in East Africa and on their businesses and militaries. @marcorubio @AsstSecStateAF @Europarl_EN @10DowningStreet @USAmbUN @EU_Commission @EUCouncil @UN @MarthaKarua @upendomoja @kot @Tz_Kwanza @JosepBorrell87
Joseph Senyonjo retweeted
6 Things We Learned About African Leaders from the Putin Ice Cream Affair
It happened in Moscow, at the Third Russia–Africa Summit. Our presidents had just been given a tour of Russian gadgets. Then in what was meant as a lighthearted moment, they were led to an ice cream stand, where they lined up with their hands out, like Standard Four pupils on sports day. Social media had a field day.
Won’t join the outrage, but will do the responsible thing and ask what was in the cup. It was plombir, the pride of the Soviet kitchen: cream, milk, egg yolks and sugar, with enough butterfat to grease a bill through Parliament. With the science settled, here’s what we learned.
1. “Strongmen” means strong stomachs: For decades we were told African leaders are strongmen. We thought that meant a strong grip on power and strong immunity to term limits. It turns out it means the stomach. They swallowed full-fat plombir in the Moscow cold, and nobody had to leave the plenary early. Whatever their problems with the constitution, none of the presidents in Moscow had a problem with lactose.
2. They finally met a queue: Back home, queues are for citizens. You queue to vote at 5am, only to be told the kit has “malfunctioned.” You queue for unga, fuel, ID cards and a hospital bed. Presidents only see queues through the tinted glass of a motorcade, usually while the queue is being pushed aside for the motorcade. In Moscow they finally stood in one. Unlike our voter queues, this one had a guaranteed result: everyone who lined up got what they came for, and nobody found their name missing from the register.
3. They survived a food line full of strangers: Many of these leaders run cabinets that look like a family WhatsApp group: the son in Defence, the in-law at the Central Bank, the nephew handling tenders. For them, this was a brave outing. The person in front wasn’t a cousin. The person behind wasn’t from the home village. Amazingly, they all survived. Diversity was tried once, in Moscow, and it killed no one.
4. Somebody had to be fifth: At home, the first slice of the national cake is theirs by divine right: the juicy contracts, the prime land, the best piece of nyama choma before the guests even sit down. In Moscow, someone had to be fifth in line. Someone may have got the cup that had started to melt. Nobody declared a state of emergency.
5. They probably missed the lesson: The whole lesson was right in front of them. There was enough for everyone, each person got one, the line moved and nobody went home empty-handed. That is a public policy manual in a paper cup. Did they absorb it? Unlikely. Expect them to land at home and go straight back to the old formula: one for me, and the rest also for me.
6. But it felt like home: Beneath the cold, there was something warm and familiar about it all: free food, no bill and a host eager to please. It was just like home, where the banquets, per diems and hotel bills are paid by taxpayers who were never invited. But nothing in Moscow is free. The ice cream comes with a cone, and the cone comes with a contract: the grain deals, the mining concessions, and the Africa Corps men who guard shaky regimes for a fee reportedly paid in gold and mineral rights. The plombir melts in minutes. The invoice doesn’t.
Next summit, perhaps they’ll carry their own cooler box. Better still, they could stay home and fix the queues there.
peopledaily.digital/news/put…


























