Louis Clerc (@Luikki) header
Louis Clerc (@Luikki) profile picture

Prof @UniTurku, đŸ‡«đŸ‡ź, Contemporary History. [email protected] Publication 2023: https://xitter.gq/t.co/V3mPdHiG5B

Turku, Suomi
Joined June 2012
Photo by Louis Clerc (@Luikki)Photo by Louis Clerc (@Luikki)Photo by Louis Clerc (@Luikki)Photo by Louis Clerc (@Luikki)Photo by Louis Clerc (@Luikki)Photo by Louis Clerc (@Luikki)Photo by Louis Clerc (@Luikki)Photo by Louis Clerc (@Luikki)Photo by Louis Clerc (@Luikki)
Louis Clerc retweeted
Here's everything you get in the #RuneQuest Classic @humble Bundle, available now — don't miss it! Ends December 4th.
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Soyons clair : cette loi fera des morts. Ne serait-ce qu'en relevant le seuil psychologique de décision de tir. Y compris des morts innocents, c'est inéluctable, mais qui ne pourront pas prouver qu'ils l'étaient. Est-ce un prix acceptable à payer pour complaire aux syndicats de policiers ?
Mesdames, Messieurs du SĂ©nat, Vous examinez aujourd'hui un texte qui prĂ©sume lĂ©gal tout tir policier. Chaque tir. Y compris celui qui tue. Ce sera aux victimes, ou Ă  leurs familles en deuil, de prouver que le tir ne l'Ă©tait pas. La charge de la preuve s'inverse, et la prĂ©somption de culpabilitĂ© change de camp. Le policier qui a tirĂ© n’ira plus automatiquement en garde Ă  vue. Parfait, pour prendre le temps d'accorder sa version avec celle de ses collĂšgues. Accorder les versions, ils savent faire. L'audience #Zecler, oĂč aucun d'entre vous n'est venu, l'a montrĂ©. Des coups, des insultes racistes, puis des procĂšs-verbaux mensongers, Ă©crits pour transformer la victime en coupable. Sans les images, Michel Zecler serait en prison. Ses agresseurs, en service, avec des dommages-intĂ©rĂȘts. La Justice aurait cru les policiers, comme toujours. Le mensonge policier n'est pas une dĂ©rive : c'est une mĂ©thode. Et l'institution judiciaire en est trop souvent le premier relais. VoilĂ  la police que votre texte veut prĂ©sumer innocente avant mĂȘme l'enquĂȘte. Les armes de la police tueront encore. Votre loi ne les en dissuadera pas. Elle les y encouragera. Mesdames, Messieurs les sĂ©nateurs, ne votez pas ce texte.
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We just lost our measles elimination status and the Secretary of Health is posting AI slop of himself as James Bond. RFK Jr. should be fired TODAY.
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Louis Clerc retweeted
La dĂ©cision de recourir Ă  des mesures antiterroristes contre des manifestants a Ă©mu jusqu’au sein du ministĂšre de l’intĂ©rieur et des prĂ©fectures, pour des raisons Ă©thiques et pratiques. Devant la justice administrative, c’est la dĂ©bĂącle pour le pouvoir. mediapart.fr/journal/france/

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Tragically, the MMR vaccine had not been developed in time for Gene Tierney’s pregnancy. She contracted rubella (the R part of MMR) and gave birth to a child with congenital rubella syndrome resulting in multiple birth defects including microcephaly, cataracts, and heart defects. Howard Hughes paid for life long medical bills and care. While measles is making headlines this week, rubella will also return and congenital rubella birth defects will once again return to America
a totally avoidable national tragedy
Gene Tierney was “the most beautiful woman in movie history.” I think I can agree with Darryl Zanuck on that one.
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Nunez : «Je n’ai pas honte de faire appliquer les principes de la RĂ©publique et les principes du maintien de l’ordre public». Mais de qui se moque t on ? mutilations des lycĂ©ens, matraquage de presse, gazage massif, MICAS illĂ©gales, vol pancartes, pas RIO lemonde.fr/politique/article

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Ex gendarme tĂ©moigne : «Mon cri d’alarme concerne les violences commises Ă  l’encontre des manifestants, mĂ©dia. A quel moment la loi autorise-t-elle qu’1 manifestant au sol soit frappĂ© par plusieurs agents alors mĂȘme qu’il n’y a plus aucune rĂ©sistance?» ouest-france.fr/societe/mani

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Louis Clerc retweeted
Le syndicat de la police nationale avait communiquĂ© son soutien indĂ©fectible aux agresseurs de Michel Zecler, l’accusant sur tous les plateaux et exigeant son incarcĂ©ration
 et mĂȘme aprĂšs la publication des vidĂ©os rien n’a changĂ© pour eux, ils voulaient la victime en prison.
Les policiers qui ont tabassĂ© Zecler ont avouĂ© avoir falsifiĂ© un PV pour cacher des violences illĂ©gitimes quitte Ă  envoyer une victime en prison. En quoi est-ce systĂ©mique ? Ils ont Ă©tĂ© soutenus par leur hiĂ©rarchie, qui est mĂȘme venue le dire Ă  la barre. mediapart.fr/journal/france/

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“FondĂ©e en 1898 pour dĂ©fendre les droits du capitaine Dreyfus Ă  un procĂšs Ă©quitable contre l'arbitraire et l'antisĂ©mitisme, la Ligue des droits de l'homme (LDH) a toujours suscitĂ© la haine de l'extrĂȘme droite. Une haine qui aboutira, sous Vichy, Ă  l'assassinat, par des miliciens issus de l'Action française, de Victor Basch, 80 ans, cofondateur et prĂ©sident emblĂ©matique de la Ligue, avec son Ă©pouse Ilona, Ă©galement ĂągĂ©e de 80 ans." Laurent Joly Et pour qui s'inquiĂšte des glissements autoritaires de ces derniĂšres annĂ©es du pouvoir macronien, il faut relire ces paroles de Patrick Baudouin, alors prĂ©sident de la LDH, livrĂ©es au "Monde" le 14 avril 2023. lemonde.fr/societe/article/2

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Fabuleux. À regarder jusqu'au bout. Une citoyenne d'une intelligence et d'un calme hors-norme face Ă  des 07/20 ignorants des libertĂ©s fondamentales les plus basiques. Le CRS fait le parallĂšle entre se promener dans la rue avec une chasuble sur laquelle il est Ă©crit PCF et le fait d'ĂȘtre nue dans la rue. 😳 Bon le R de CRS c'est pour "RĂ©publicaine" hein. Ils sont 5 ou 6. Si on mettait un compteur de thune perdue par ces imbĂ©ciles... Combien de millions d'heures sont perdues par les forces de l'ordre avec toutes ces conneries ? Pendant ce temps-lĂ , le trafic de drogue et la dĂ©linquance explosent partout. On ne peut pas foutre ces gars payĂ©s par nos impĂŽts au travail ? Bravo Madame, vous ĂȘtes incroyable ! 👏👏👏
Perpignan : en fin de manifestation, la police tente de forcer une militante communiste Ă  retirer sa chasuble PCF, prĂ©textant Ă  tort que c’est la loi.
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Replying to @NZadourian
Ayant vu les leçons tirées de l'affaire d'Outreau, je puis te répondre en toute confiance que non, aucune leçon ne sera tirée ici non plus.
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Louis Clerc retweeted
Samoa
Measles infections have surged to more than 7,700 nationwide with 13 deaths — the most in nearly four decades. With President Trump’s support, Health Secretary RFK Jr. tells Americans to fear vaccines, contradicting decades of evidence showing their safety and effectiveness reut.rs/4C2mirj
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Louis Clerc retweeted
I can’t agree more. Moscow is watching the US progressively falling to their side. They can win a lot by simply sticking to their position and waiting for the Western side to abandon Ukraine ( and for the US to abandon Europe)
The general consensus around Russia's demands for reorganisation of the European security architecture - as reported by the NYTimesđŸ”œ- is that that they are unrealistic and that Russia will relax the nature and extent of its demands. I am less certain than most that this is the case. I explain why. đŸ”œ ~~~ Russia tabled two draft documents in December 2021 – one with the United States and one with NATO – that laid out a revised European security architecture. Those texts have not been abandoned by the Russians. Rather, they have been restated, expanded, and treated by Russian officials as the necessary foundation for any durable settlement. The expectation that Moscow will water them down under the pressure of costs or Western firmness has so far proved more hopeful than empirical. The pattern or Russian demands throughtout the Ukraine war is visibly one of absolute persistence: repeat the core demands, sustain the pressure on Ukraine, and wait for conditions to develop. The 2021 drafts were not bargaining chips invented for the moment. They formalised longstanding Russian objections to the post-Cold War settlement. The proposed bilateral treaty with the United States required the US to prevent further NATO enlargement and deny accession to former Soviet states; barred US bases or military cooperation with non-NATO former Soviet states; limited deployments of forces and heavy bombers or warships in areas from which they could strike the other party; prohibited ground-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles outside national territory or in range of the other party; and restricted nuclear weapons deployments and related training outside national territory. The propopsed agreement with NATO member states required the parties not to strengthen their own security at the expense of others, froze additional force deployments in Europe at 27 May 1997 levels (the date of the NATO-Russia Founding Act), barred further enlargement including of Ukraine, and prohibited NATO military activity on the territory of Ukraine and other states in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Critically, both texts invoked the principle of indivisible, equal and undiminished security and referenced earlier OSCE and NATO-Russia documents. Russian officials presented them as addressing “root causes” and as requiring legally binding treatment rather than political assurances. The invasion of Ukraine followed within weeks of the Western responses that rejected the core of those texts. Russian statements then and since have linked the use of force to the failure to obtain the requested guarantees. That framing is not the whole explanation for the war – regime concerns about a successful independent Ukraine, historical claims and domestic factors also play roles – but it is not post-hoc either. The demands were tabled in advance and remain the stated strategic objective. In the November 2026 talks in Abu Dhabi the Russian side returned to the same framework. A non-paper restated the 1997 force and basing baseline, the bar on further enlargement, and the restrictions on military activity in Ukraine and adjacent regions, while adding further items such as constraints on British and French nuclear protection of other European states and conditions that would limit Ukrainian participation in the EU’s common defence policy even if membership itself were accepted. Officials including Ryabkov described the situation on the ground as shifting against Kyiv and characterised European approaches as obstructive rather than constructive. Medinsky, Lavrov and others continued to treat full Ukrainian withdrawal from the claimed oblasts, neutrality and demilitarisation as baseline requirements rather than opening bids. The talks were used to reaffirm the architecture package, not to narrow it. This is consistent with the broader record. Public Russian positions have shown continuity rather than material retreat on the central points. Tactical flexibility has appeared on secondary issues – sequencing language, limited technical measures, occasional private signals – but the architecture demands and the Ukraine-related conditions tied to them have not been publicly diluted. Claims that Russia has shown or is about to show real willingness to compromise on these points lack strong evidentialsupport. The opposite pattern is more visible: restatement, and in some respects extension, of the original package. Europe’s position sharpens the logic. European states have supplied substantial military and financial support that has enabled Ukraine to continue resisting and has imposed heavy costs on Russia. At the same time they have ruled out direct combat involvement. Industrial capacity, stockpiles, political willingness for sustained further spending increases and public tolerance remain constrained in many countries. The result is an asymmetry that grows with time: Russia can concentrate resources on a single front under wartime conditions; European governments must balance Ukraine aid against domestic priorities and the risks of escalation. A significant further deterioration in Ukraine’s military position would confront Europe with the choice of accepting an outcome that includes substantial Russian architecture demands or attempting to reverse it through direct involvement that has so far been judged too costly. By binding European credibility and security policy tightly to Ukraine’s ability to deny Russia its maximalist aims, European governments have given Moscow a mechanism for converting battlefield attrition into leverage over the wider security order. Russian combat power has not simply collapsed under those costs, contrary to repeated predictions since early 2022. Production of artillery ammunition, one-way attack drones and certain missile types has increased substantially relative to pre-war levels. The active force has grown. Operations have continued at high intensity for nearly five years. Early forecasts of rapid economic breakdown or inability to sustain mobilisation have been revised. At the same time the costs of the war to Russia are large and cumulative. In response the Russians have reconfigured to sustain a long war. Russia remains capable of gradual advances and deep strikes, even as its capacity is under strain. There is little public indication that these costs have produced a decision in Moscow to abandon or substantially dilute the core demands. Senior statements continue to convey that the war will continue until the stated objectives are achieved and that Ukraine’s position is expected to weaken further. Engagement in talks has occurred, but it has been paired with reaffirmation of maximalist conditions rather than evidence of a shift toward accepting a settlement close to the status quo ante. Internal economic pressures are real but have not translated into visible retreat from the line that continued pressure favours Russian aims. An assessment that Russia is primarily setting the scene for later European engagement with its architecture demands – while retaining the capacity and political will to continue attritional pressure – fits the diplomatic and military record more closely than expectations of near-term moderation. ~~~ Full texts of the December 2021 drafts for reference. ### Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees (Unofficial translation) The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties", guided by the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as the provisions of the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the 1999 Charter for European Security, and the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation, recalling the inadmissibility of the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations both in their mutual and international relations in general, supporting the role of the United Nations Security Council that has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, recognizing the need for united efforts to effectively respond to modern security challenges and threats in a globalized and interdependent world, considering the need for strict compliance with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs, including refraining from supporting organizations, groups or individuals calling for an unconstitutional change of power, as well as from undertaking any actions aimed at changing the political or social system of one of the Contracting Parties, bearing in mind the need to create additional effective and quick-to-launch cooperation mechanisms or improve the existing ones to settle emerging issues and disputes through a constructive dialogue on the basis of mutual respect for and recognition of each other’s security interests and concerns, as well as to elaborate adequate responses to security challenges and threats, seeking to avoid any military confrontation and armed conflict between the Parties and realizing that direct military clash between them could result in the use of nuclear weapons that would have far-reaching consequences, reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and recognizing the need to make every effort to prevent the risk of outbreak of such war among States that possess nuclear weapons, reaffirming their commitments under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War of 30 September 1971, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas of 25 May 1972, the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 15 September 1987, as well as the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities of 12 June 1989, have agreed as follows: Article 1 The Parties shall cooperate on the basis of principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security and to these ends: shall not undertake actions nor participate in or support activities that affect the security of the other Party; shall not implement security measures adopted by each Party individually or in the framework of an international organization, military alliance or coalition that could undermine core security interests of the other Party. Article 2 The Parties shall seek to ensure that all international organizations, military alliances and coalitions in which at least one of the Parties is taking part adhere to the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 3 The Parties shall not use the territories of other States with a view to preparing or carrying out an armed attack against the other Party or other actions affecting core security interests of the other Party. Article 4 The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The United States of America shall not establish military bases in the territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral military cooperation with them. Article 5 The Parties shall refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas where such deployment could be perceived by the other Party as a threat to its national security, with the exception of such deployment within the national territories of the Parties. The Parties shall refrain from flying heavy bombers equipped for nuclear or non-nuclear armaments or deploying surface warships of any type, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas outside national airspace and national territorial waters respectively, from where they can attack targets in the territory of the other Party. The Parties shall maintain dialogue and cooperate to improve mechanisms to prevent dangerous military activities on and over the high seas, including agreeing on the maximum approach distance between warships and aircraft. Article 6 The Parties shall undertake not to deploy ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles outside their national territories, as well as in the areas of their national territories, from which such weapons can attack targets in the national territory of the other Party. Article 7 The Parties shall refrain from deploying nuclear weapons outside their national territories and return such weapons already deployed outside their national territories at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty to their national territories. The Parties shall eliminate all existing infrastructure for deployment of nuclear weapons outside their national territories. The Parties shall not train military and civilian personnel from non-nuclear countries to use nuclear weapons. The Parties shall not conduct exercises or training for general-purpose forces, that include scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons. Article 8 The Treaty shall enter into force from the date of receipt of the last written notification on the completion by the Parties of their domestic procedures necessary for its entry into force. Done in two originals, each in English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America For the Russian Federation ### Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Unofficial translation) The Russian Federation and the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), hereinafter referred to as the Parties, reaffirming their aspiration to improve relations and deepen mutual understanding, acknowledging that an effective response to contemporary challenges and threats to security in our interdependent world requires joint efforts of all the Parties, determined to prevent dangerous military activity and therefore reduce the possibility of incidents between their armed forces, noting that the security interests of each Party require better multilateral cooperation, more political and military stability, predictability, and transparency, reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the 1999 Charter for European Security, and the Rome Declaration "Russia-NATO Relations: a New Quality" signed by the Heads of State and Government of the Russian Federation and NATO member States in 2002, have agreed as follows: Article 1 The Parties shall guide in their relations by the principles of cooperation, equal and indivisible security. They shall not strengthen their security individually, within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions at the expense of the security of other Parties. The Parties shall settle all international disputes in their mutual relations by peaceful means and refrain from the use or threat of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties shall not create conditions or situations that pose or could be perceived as a threat to the national security of other Parties. The Parties shall exercise restraint in military planning and conducting exercises to reduce risks of eventual dangerous situations in accordance with their obligations under international law, including those set out in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea outside territorial waters and in the airspace above, as well as in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of dangerous military activities. Article 2 In order to address issues and settle problems, the Parties shall use the mechanisms of urgent bilateral or multilateral consultations, including the NATO-Russia Council. The Parties shall regularly and voluntarily exchange assessments of contemporary threats and security challenges, inform each other about military exercises and maneuvers, and main provisions of their military doctrines. All existing mechanisms and tools for confidence-building measures shall be used in order to ensure transparency and predictability of military activities. Telephone hotlines shall be established to maintain emergency contacts between the Parties. Article 3 The Parties reaffirm that they do not consider each other as adversaries. The Parties shall maintain dialogue and interaction on improving mechanisms to prevent incidents on and over the high seas (primarily in the Baltics and the Black Sea region). Article 4 The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties. Article 5 The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties. Article 6 All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States. Article 7 The Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other States in the Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia. In order to exclude incidents the Russian Federation and the Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct military exercises or other military activities above the brigade level in a zone of agreed width and configuration on each side of the border line of the Russian Federation and the states in a military alliance with it, as well as Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Article 8 This Agreement shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, nor the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations. Article 9 This Agreement shall enter into force from the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification, expressing consent to be bound by it, with the Depositary by more than a half of the signatory States. With respect to a State that deposited its instrument of ratification at a later date, this Agreement shall enter into force from the date of its deposit. Each Party to this Agreement may withdraw from it by giving appropriate notice to the Depositary. This Agreement shall terminate for such Party [30] days after receipt of such notice by the Depositary. This Agreement has been drawn up in Russian, English and French, all texts being equally authentic, and shall be deposited in the archive of the Depositary, which is the Government of ... Done in [the city of ...] this [XX] day of [XX] two thousand and [XX]. ~~~ xitter.gq/RSA_Observer/status/21

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Louis Clerc retweeted
when stupidity islethal
With President Trump’s support, Health Secretary RFK Jr. tells Americans to fear vaccines, contradicting decades of evidence showing their safety and effectiveness. He argues children build stronger immunity through direct exposure — by getting sick. Read our special report reut.rs/4C2mirj
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Louis Clerc retweeted
Sen te olette jo nÀyttÀneet ja kansa on siihen vastannut.
Kokoomuksen kannatus myös Hesarin gallupissa on niin matala, ettĂ€ se pakottaa meidĂ€t vakavaan itsetutkiskeluun. Huonot talousajat eivĂ€t tilannetta yksin selitĂ€. MeidĂ€n on pystyttĂ€vĂ€ paremmin kuvaamaan ÀÀnestĂ€jille, millaista Suomea me haluamme rakentaa. hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000012

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À la barre,le gardien de la paix Aurelien L. admet avoir rĂ©digĂ© un PV d’interpellation contre Michel Zecler par «peur» des poursuites contre les violences policiĂšres commises.Dans le PV, tout est faux et Ă  charge contre Michel Zecler.Les 3 policiers avaient aussi dĂ©posĂ© plainte

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This alone is cause for impeachment. If you can’t maintain our elimination statuses, you are absolutely not qualified for the job.
The US has officially lost its ‘measles elimination’ status after over 25 years. The highly contagious disease has now come back, with 5,400 cases in 2026 alone.
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You don't get to pretend you haven't been spreading anti-vaccine propaganda for decades and that this entire problem was not entirely caused by you.
We will stop measles outbreaks, protect American families, and work to regain U.S. measles elimination status. I continue to recommend MMR vaccination as the most effective way to prevent measles. Worldwide COVID-era disruptions interrupted routine childhood vaccination, leaving gaps in protection here and abroad. The multi-year global outbreak has caused many nations to lose their elimination status including, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Canada, Mexico, Spain, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. Under Dr. Schwartz’s leadership, CDC has provided approximately $100 million in additional funding since August to strengthen prevention and response to measles and other vaccine-preventable diseases. CDC has worked alongside state teams in Texas, South Carolina, Virginia, Kansas, New Mexico, and Wisconsin to help bring their outbreaks rapidly and successfully under control. CDC is also supporting Pennsylvania and New York with epidemiologists and other experts. We are working to close vaccination gaps and rebuild public trust. We will answer families’ questions honestly about vaccine benefits and risks and work with trusted health care providers and community leaders to prevent measles, limit its spread, and support timely treatment. We will support Americans who become ill, regardless of vaccination status, and for the first time equip health care providers with guidance to diagnose and treat measles and its complications.
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