And finally, one last example from the Villarreal game, where they employed an almost identical pattern to Brighton, with the wingers and one of the full-backs inverting in rotation. Notice how Gakpo’s marker literally runs straight past him, yet he shows absolutely no interest in tracking the movement. Van Dijk is responsible for Saliba, Kerkez for Buchanan, and Jacquet for Mikautadze - a classic man-oriented defensive approach, whether implemented within a zonal structure or through full-pitch man-marking. In any case, this is nothing unusual for an Iraola side, as I discussed in my analysis of the Manchester City game. Interestingly, when everyone fulfilled their defensive responsibilities in that match, Manchester City - arguably a stronger side than Villarreal - managed just 0.08 xG in the first half. Whether or not the two situations are directly correlated, I’m not entirely sure, but I can see a potential connection between them. The result is yet another situation in which the opposition gains a numerical advantage in a highly dangerous area, creating a valuable opportunity to attack our goal

Ultimately, Gakpo attempts to rectify his mistake, which suggests that his role was not to maintain a higher position that would have given us a better starting point to exploit possession regains and launch counterattacks. Instead, he drops deeper to restore the defensive balance and bring the situation back to a 2v2. For me, this further supports the argument against those claiming that Gakpo maintained his higher position because that was the coach’s specific instruction. His decision to drop back and restore numerical balance suggests otherwise

What happens next is that Groß makes a forward run into the space behind Gakpo, who loses track of him, creating a third-man combination. It’s a textbook pattern for progressing the ball and breaking through the opposition’s pressure. And I agree that Gravenberch could perhaps have done a better job of blocking the passing lane into the dropping Ayari, while Alexis could potentially have engaged Ayari more effectively. However, Gakpo neglects his tracking responsibilities, allowing Brighton to find the free player in the central area with ridiculous ease. For me, that’s inexcusable. Now, look at Barcola, despite the fact that play isn’t even developing down his side🤔

I believe I’ve explained Liverpool’s pressing mechanism in relatively good detail (although I could probably expand on it further). I’ll present another example of a similar error, problem or disruption - call it whatever you like, as I usually look for representative patterns and recurring elements in my analysis. Brighton build up with a back four, using Verbruggen, with Chema dropping alongside him as part of a double pivot to receive the ball, while Pascal Groß positions himself diagonally, already aware of Gakpo’s limitations. Wirtz shadows Boscagli, while Gravenberch maintains a distance that allows him to access the ball carrier. As you’ll see in the following screenshots, Alexis and Kerkez are also ready to apply pressure if the ball is played into their zone. I think we were trying to force Brighton to play vertically through the middle

Considering that forcing the goalkeeper to play long is one of the intended outcomes of a successful press, it can be seen as evidence of good work from the front line. However, long balls are increasingly used as a deliberate means of bypassing pressure, so everything ultimately comes down to winning the first or second ball. Numerical balance is crucial here, and this is where Gakpo’s failure to track Pascal Groß becomes apparent. Although the problem originates earlier in the sequence, the moment Van Dijk loses the aerial duel illustrates how an apparently harmless situation can quickly turn into a dangerous transition. The underlying issue is that neglecting to track an opponent can leave the opposition with a numerical advantage and an additional central player available either as a bounce-pass option or to collect the second ball. Gakpo’s failure to follow Groß therefore affects more than just the initial marking assignment: it compromises Liverpool’s ability to control the next phase of play. In this instance, Brighton exploit the situation to create a 4v2 overload in the wide area. If we also factor in Alexis’ difficulties tracking deep runs from central midfielders, we begin to see a potential recipe for serious danger - particularly against a side under Hürzeler, known for turning these situations into quick, incisive attacks

Pascal Groß is a chameleon, capable of taking on several different roles within a short space of time. He starts as a right-back, then moves into the double pivot, while the nominal right-back drops slightly deeper. The initial idea is to open up the passing lane to the full-back. In this instance, Liverpool had already transitioned into a man-oriented pressing structure. Wirtz shifted across the pitch with a curved run, using his cover shadow to cut off Brighton’s left-sided passing option, while Kerkez maintained a distance that allowed him to access Costinha. When Virgil took over Gomez’s responsibilities, I won’t go into the rest of Liverpool’s structure in greater detail, as it isn’t the focus of this thread. This forced Verbruggen into playing a long ball forward under pressure

Brighton heavily rely on Pascal Groß as a reference point for the rest of the team, making his nullification a key priority. This was precisely the responsibility assigned to Cody Gakpo, given his role and the spaces frequently occupied by the German. Brighton typically use Verbruggen as part of a back three in build-up, push their full-backs higher up the pitch and operate with a double pivot

Against Villarreal, I noticed some very concerning signs from Cody Gakpo out of possession, which resurfaced on Sunday against Brighton. While most of the team generally adapted to the opposition’s rotations and structural changes, Gakpo repeatedly failed to track his man in a man-oriented marking/pressing scheme. A thread illustrating how poor execution of basic individual responsibilities can undermine the effectiveness of the entire team on the pitch. 🧵#LFC

But I didn’t like the whole pressing system - everyone was a beat too late

The aging curve suggests that this summer would be the right time in his case. Many people believe Alexis has rebuilt himself physically, but I have my doubts. The improvement in the team’s overall structure is influencing how people perceive him, as the team now defends more cohesively. However, in moments of transition, when he needs to cover several metres and win a footrace, something that will happen frequently in Iraola’s vertical and direct style of football, Mac Allister is still falling short. His intelligence and the support of his teammates will help mask these shortcomings, but when something disrupts the structure and he has to solve the problem on his own, it simply doesn’t work. We need to replace him with an athletic, space-covering midfielder #LFC

Two identical systems, yet such noticeable differences (and problems) emerge when movements are even slightly mistimed in relation to the opposition. Even the smallest delay can escalate the danger, which compounds with every passing second #LFC

Fluid circulation with a one-sided overload (asymmetry) provides the platform for players like Rio, who manipulate and destabilise opponents through various types of vertical and horizontal runs. Rio initially moves out wide before dynamically cutting inside, eliminating his marker and reducing the advantage to an isolated 1v1 duel. This also creates a “gate” between the CB and LB, which he can exploit to penetrate the penalty area freely. However, the entire sequence is initiated by Gravenberch, who reads Rio’s non-verbal cues and recognises his intentions through his movement. The relationships between these players are almost imperceptible. It is this momentum that generates temporal advantages, denying the opponent time to analyse the situation and instead forcing an immediate reaction #LFC