I’ve been thinking for a while about how to structure this thread because I wanted to cover #Nyoni’s impact both in possession and out of possession. There’s simply too much material to fit into one thread without making it exhausting to read, so I decided to split it into separate parts. Long tactical threads can be difficult to get through, and I don’t want this one to feel like a chore. This part will focus on how Trey Nyoni leaves his mark on the team in possession - how he creates freedom for the full-backs, manipulates the opposition press, and facilitates ball progression through different variations and mechanisms. Let’s get into it🧵#LFC

As always, a powerful educational read

Iraola demands the same intensity of work from his wingers in every phase of the game. The principle is simple - one disruption can often destroy the entire mechanism

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Let’s move on to the conclusion, although this is more of a personal reflection than a definitive summary. Before accusing me of bias or jumping in to argue that he’s our best attacking player, let’s be clear about one thing: even 50+ goals do not excuse any player from neglecting his off-ball responsibilities so glaringly. I hardly need to remind anyone of the criticism Salah faced last year. In modern football, players are not exempt from defensive work in systems like these. Quite the opposite - it’s fundamental, especially when facing high-quality opposition. This discussion is not intended to offend anyone or discredit a player so that you can start berating him. That is not the purpose of this analysis. The objective is to explain, identify problems and understand how they can be addressed. I believe Cody can improve in this regard because he’s an intelligent player, and doing so would benefit both him and the team as a whole. Ultimately, we all want the same thing: a team that functions as a cohesive unit. “Understand in order to recognise; recognise in order to improve”

And finally, one last example from the Villarreal game, where they employed an almost identical pattern to Brighton, with the wingers and one of the full-backs inverting in rotation. Notice how Gakpo’s marker literally runs straight past him, yet he shows absolutely no interest in tracking the movement. Van Dijk is responsible for Saliba, Kerkez for Buchanan, and Jacquet for Mikautadze - a classic man-oriented defensive approach, whether implemented within a zonal structure or through full-pitch man-marking. In any case, this is nothing unusual for an Iraola side, as I discussed in my analysis of the Manchester City game. Interestingly, when everyone fulfilled their defensive responsibilities in that match, Manchester City - arguably a stronger side than Villarreal - managed just 0.08 xG in the first half. Whether or not the two situations are directly correlated, I’m not entirely sure, but I can see a potential connection between them. The result is yet another situation in which the opposition gains a numerical advantage in a highly dangerous area, creating a valuable opportunity to attack our goal

Ultimately, Gakpo attempts to rectify his mistake, which suggests that his role was not to maintain a higher position that would have given us a better starting point to exploit possession regains and launch counterattacks. Instead, he drops deeper to restore the defensive balance and bring the situation back to a 2v2. For me, this further supports the argument against those claiming that Gakpo maintained his higher position because that was the coach’s specific instruction. His decision to drop back and restore numerical balance suggests otherwise

What happens next is that Groß makes a forward run into the space behind Gakpo, who loses track of him, creating a third-man combination. It’s a textbook pattern for progressing the ball and breaking through the opposition’s pressure. And I agree that Gravenberch could perhaps have done a better job of blocking the passing lane into the dropping Ayari, while Alexis could potentially have engaged Ayari more effectively. However, Gakpo neglects his tracking responsibilities, allowing Brighton to find the free player in the central area with ridiculous ease. For me, that’s inexcusable. Now, look at Barcola, despite the fact that play isn’t even developing down his side🤔

I believe I’ve explained Liverpool’s pressing mechanism in relatively good detail (although I could probably expand on it further). I’ll present another example of a similar error, problem or disruption - call it whatever you like, as I usually look for representative patterns and recurring elements in my analysis. Brighton build up with a back four, using Verbruggen, with Chema dropping alongside him as part of a double pivot to receive the ball, while Pascal Groß positions himself diagonally, already aware of Gakpo’s limitations. Wirtz shadows Boscagli, while Gravenberch maintains a distance that allows him to access the ball carrier. As you’ll see in the following screenshots, Alexis and Kerkez are also ready to apply pressure if the ball is played into their zone. I think we were trying to force Brighton to play vertically through the middle

Considering that forcing the goalkeeper to play long is one of the intended outcomes of a successful press, it can be seen as evidence of good work from the front line. However, long balls are increasingly used as a deliberate means of bypassing pressure, so everything ultimately comes down to winning the first or second ball. Numerical balance is crucial here, and this is where Gakpo’s failure to track Pascal Groß becomes apparent. Although the problem originates earlier in the sequence, the moment Van Dijk loses the aerial duel illustrates how an apparently harmless situation can quickly turn into a dangerous transition. The underlying issue is that neglecting to track an opponent can leave the opposition with a numerical advantage and an additional central player available either as a bounce-pass option or to collect the second ball. Gakpo’s failure to follow Groß therefore affects more than just the initial marking assignment: it compromises Liverpool’s ability to control the next phase of play. In this instance, Brighton exploit the situation to create a 4v2 overload in the wide area. If we also factor in Alexis’ difficulties tracking deep runs from central midfielders, we begin to see a potential recipe for serious danger - particularly against a side under Hürzeler, known for turning these situations into quick, incisive attacks

Pascal Groß is a chameleon, capable of taking on several different roles within a short space of time. He starts as a right-back, then moves into the double pivot, while the nominal right-back drops slightly deeper. The initial idea is to open up the passing lane to the full-back. In this instance, Liverpool had already transitioned into a man-oriented pressing structure. Wirtz shifted across the pitch with a curved run, using his cover shadow to cut off Brighton’s left-sided passing option, while Kerkez maintained a distance that allowed him to access Costinha. When Virgil took over Gomez’s responsibilities, I won’t go into the rest of Liverpool’s structure in greater detail, as it isn’t the focus of this thread. This forced Verbruggen into playing a long ball forward under pressure

Brighton heavily rely on Pascal Groß as a reference point for the rest of the team, making his nullification a key priority. This was precisely the responsibility assigned to Cody Gakpo, given his role and the spaces frequently occupied by the German. Brighton typically use Verbruggen as part of a back three in build-up, push their full-backs higher up the pitch and operate with a double pivot

Against Villarreal, I noticed some very concerning signs from Cody Gakpo out of possession, which resurfaced on Sunday against Brighton. While most of the team generally adapted to the opposition’s rotations and structural changes, Gakpo repeatedly failed to track his man in a man-oriented marking/pressing scheme. A thread illustrating how poor execution of basic individual responsibilities can undermine the effectiveness of the entire team on the pitch. 🧵#LFC

I’m not sure whether Iraola deliberately allows the opposition to create 3v2/4v2 overloads. He usually commits the player on the ball-side to pressing off the ball, allowing the team to switch play immediately, while Isak often moves over to the side where the winger has been drawn into defensive duties

There was so much footage that I didn’t know what to choose from, but to avoid appearing biased, I selected what I felt was representative of yesterday’s match and the one against Villarreal

I’m genuinely shocked at how someone can show such an obvious lack of commitment to the defensive phase. I’ve picked just two moments that happened close together, but there are plenty more