Ethiopia: Landlocked by History, Portless By Choice Ethiopia has five neighbors with eight ports, yet it still complains about ports. The reason is not geography or logistics. It is that Addis Ababa does not want to lease a port. It wants to own one. Or two. The distinction is not semantic. A lease is a commercial arrangement. Ownership, or the functional equivalent of it—a land corridor under Ethiopian administration plus a port sized for its navy—is a territorial claim dressed up as a logistics problem. That difference has driven the last several years of Ethiopian diplomacy and, more quietly, its choice of partners. Here is how the demand for “sovereign sea access” has played out, port by port. 1. Port Sudan, Sudan The internationally recognized government of Sudan controls Port Sudan. Ethiopia has instead positioned itself as a conduit for UAE arms shipments to the Rapid Support Forces, the main group trying to unseat that government. Outcome: no deal. 2–3. Massawa and Assab, Eritrea The 1993 Eritrea-Ethiopia port treaty gave Ethiopia preferential treatment precisely because, as the preamble stated, Ethiopia has “special needs as a landlocked state.” The terms were already more favorable than a standard commercial lease. Ethiopia rejected them. What it has sought instead is a land corridor inside Eritrea under its own administration and a port large enough for its navy. Outcome: no deal. 4–6. Doraleh, Tadjourah, Damerjog — Djibouti Ethiopia already moves the overwhelming majority of its trade through Doraleh. When it asked for access to Tadjourah, Djibouti was prepared to negotiate until the actual requirement became clear: a land corridor under Ethiopian administration and a port sized for naval use. Outcome: no deal. 7–8. Berbera and Bosaso, Somalia On 1 January 2024 Ethiopia signed an agreement for the use of Berbera on terms it preferred. But the arrangement was not binding: it was concluded with an entity that lacked the legal authority to enter into it. Before the year ended, Ethiopia signed a second agreement acknowledging Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, effectively walking back the earlier one. Outcome: reversed. 9–10. Mombasa and Lamu, Kenya Lamu was meant to serve Ethiopia and South Sudan under the LAPSSET framework, complete with railways and the diversion of South Sudanese oil. Cost realities have left the project barely built since 2012. Lamu is used, modestly, for southern Ethiopian industry—by road, not rail. The Mombasa–Moyale route exists and is barely used. Outcome: marginal. The pattern is consistent. Where a commercial lease or transit arrangement is on offer, Ethiopia has either declined or redefined the request until the other party walks away. Where a partner is willing to overlook sovereignty questions, the arrangement has not survived contact with international law or regional pressure. The demand for “sovereign sea access” has not produced a port. It has produced a series of rejected or reversed arrangements and a region that has grown more wary of the ask. Ethiopia has claimed it has a “natural” right to the Sea. Nations don’t have natural right. Ethiopia has claimed that it has historical right to the Sea. But the net history of Ethiopia is that of a landlocked nation, except when the Cold War calcifications dictated it be given someone else’s Sea, reversed and internationally recognized. Ethiopia has also claimed it had legal right to sovereign access to Sea. It hasn’t even tried to argue that coherently since it had signed multiple agreements recognizing its borders with Eritrea make her landlocked. Ethiopia is historically landlocked but powerless by choice.