RealOpenArmy

It’s too late for me to do a full review of $OPEN and the numbers / commentary. But I’ll say a few words: > Under the hood, the NEW business at Opendoor is genuinely working and it's bigger than the headline numbers suggest. Kaz admitted on the call that he "underestimated how big a business title and escrow could become.” it's already running 3x last year's volume, and they're now extending it to transactions that have nothing to do with Opendoor. >Same with this week's launch of Buy with Opendoor: the full product suite including mortgage, title, escrow now open to buyers whether or not they buy an Opendoor home. >Cash Now, More Later passing $1B of volume in a year, mortgage originations up 5x in a quarter, and marketing cost per acquired home down 57%, and the pattern is clear: the future of this company is owning the transaction, not the house. > What they got wrong was timeline and sequencing. They were far too aggressive. Acquisitions ramped +316% before the resale system was ready. >by management's own scorecard, acquisitions are "solid green" and resale velocity is "yellow." homes bought before the discipline was in are being cleared at a loss, with the pain guided into Q1. >The result is bloated, aging inventory 7,596 homes, $2.57B on the books, stale listings doubled to 18% >carrying costs eating the P&L with two-thirds of the Q4 loss guide is holding costs. The CFO has now conceded both profit targets are behind schedule. > The balance sheet isn't broken with $910M in cash. But $1.8B of operating cash burn in nine months means the clock is ticking louder than the plan assumed. The new business is becoming more real. The old one's mistakes are what they have to outrun because they got to antsy to wait another Quarter or two before ramping acquisitions. Time will tell. For now I’m still long my small piece and looking to add!